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Abstract
This thesis presents a theory of voting behaviour for the governments represented in the 
European Union’s Council of Ministers and analyses a large original data set covering all 
legislation adopted by the EU from 1999 to 2004. It argues that the governments’ voting , 
behaviour is dominated by party political preferences rather than national preferences over ! 
EU integration issues. The already very elaborate EU policies and processes for adopting 
laws mean that most issues related to decisions on the degree of integration are solved 
outside the Council. Instead, decision-making in the Council is over actual policy content 
and the level of regulation. Consequently, the governments negotiate over possible policy 
outcomes along the traditional left/right political dimension.
In addition to presenting the actors in the Council as political parties rather than 
national representatives, the thesis argues that the governments act strategically rather than 
sincerely when deciding how best to pursue their policy preferences. The Council members 
consider their possibilities for influencing new legislation as dictated by their voting 
power, and voting behaviour is the result of strategic estimations of when support or 
disagreement needs to be voiced, and how. Empirically, the prediction is a difference 
between left- and right-wing governments and, within this policy space, between small- 
and large member states.
The theory is tested in a series of multivariate analyses and geometrical scaling 
methods. A range of alternative hypotheses from the literature is included in each of the 
empirical tests. The evidence supports the theory: Legislative politics in the Council take 
place within a one-dimensional policy space, and each of the Council members’ ideal 
policy points are found to be aligned with their preferences over left/right political issues 
in the domestic sphere. Furthermore, the member states that experienced a change in 
government during this period similarly changed their voting behaviour in the Council, 
indicating that EU politics are indeed a party political matter. When taking into account 
also the governments’ voting power, larger Council members in the opposition are 
generally more likely to oppose the majority than smaller members. However, smaller 
members frequently use the option of making formal statements following a vote as a 
mean of voicing disagreement. The findings are robust across different stages of the 
legislative process as well as most policy areas, although a variance in magnitude appears.
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Introduction
Each year several hundred pieces of legislation affecting the lives of the citizens of the 
European Union (EU) member states come from the EU level rather than from the 
respective national governments. Yet, decision-making in the EU is a complex process 
and many issues around its functioning are still left unexplored by even the most 
committed EU analysts. For example, of the three legislative actors (the Council of 
Ministers, the Commission and the European Parliament) it is the Council of Ministers1 
which is the main decision-making body and is often referred to as the ‘government of 
the EU’. Nevertheless, due to the complexity and secrecy surrounding the institution, 
legislative processes in the Council have until recently been an almost neglected area of 
research within the study of EU politics. Yet, the last decade has seen an effort to create a 
more transparent EU political system, including the decision to make voting records and 
minutes from the Council meetings public. Therefore, an increased interest in Council 
decision-making has recently emerged within academia. As a contribution to the growing 
literature, this thesis analyses a large original data set covering all voting situations in the 
Council from 1999 to 2004. Combined with a series of interviews with practitioners 
involved in Council decision-making, its aim is to provide a rigorous analysis of when, 
how and why the governments decide.
The thesis has two ambitions: First, there is an empirical ambition of advancing 
the knowledge of Council decision-making by providing detailed facts about the 
members’ voting behaviour. The thesis reports on the level of contest and investigates 
apparent voting patterns across i) policy areas, ii) countries, iii) legislative procedures, 
and iv) the different stages of the decision process. Apparent differences in how voting 
and formal statements are used for voicing disagreement are also investigated. Second, 
building on rational choice theory and combining existing accounts of coalition 
formation and legislative bargaining, the thesis presents a theory of voting behaviour in 
the Council: Due to the already advanced level of EU integration as well as the 
institutional structures, coalition formations and policy outcomes are argued to reflect the 
governments’ party political preferences. Contrary to current research which makes 
somewhat similar claims, this thesis argues that the governments’ decision on whether to
1 Hereafter referred to as ‘the Council’.
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support or oppose a proposal is strategic rather than sincere. Much like shareholders in 
private companies, Council members consider their possibility for influencing voting 
outcomes based on their vote shares. In sum, coalitions are therefore argued to be 
‘weighted preference-connected’ groupings formed according to positions on the 
left/right political scale and dictated by the distribution of voting power.
Implications of the argument
The theory and findings of this thesis challenge four key arguments often found in the 
current literature. First, negotiations in the EU in general and in the Council in particular 
are frequently described as consensual rather than competitive (e.g. Heisenberg 2004; 
Lewis 1998; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006). This thesis does not dispute the fact 
that a large proportion of decisions are taken by what is officially presented as a 
unanimous Council. However, contrary to the impression often given in the existing 
literature, the interpretation is here that ‘consensual’ means compromise based on 
bargaining rather than homogeneity. As will be evident from the empirical findings 
presented in the subsequent chapters, observing a unanimous vote can in many cases be 
more convincingly argued to be the product of institutional or political constraints rather 
than homogeneity of preferences. Therefore, the Council cannot be presented as a unitary 
actor.
Second, policy-making in the Council is often presented as a decision-process 
based on informal norms and, hence, it is frequently argued that preferences and policy 
outcomes cannot be appropriately accounted for based on minutes and voting records. If 
consensus is in fact the dominant mode of governance (e.g. Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 
2006; Lewis 1998) and informal norms dominate the members’ interactions, then voting 
or other formal rules would not be widely used for reaching agreements. In the minority 
of cases where voting would be used, a significant degree of disagreement would not be 
apparent as most issues would already be agreed upon in the preparatory stages and 
simply nodded through at the ministerial level (Moberg 2002). However, recent research 
as well as the empirical findings presented in this thesis makes it clear that voting in the 
Council certainly takes place (Hosli 1999; Mattila 2004; Mattila and Lane 2001). It has 
also been established that there are indeed winners and losers in Council decision-making
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(Stokman et al. 2004). Hence, although a winning coalition in the Council may not 
exclude governments which are not necessary for meeting the threshold for adoption of 
an act (Riker 1962), the spoils of policy outcomes are found to be settled according to the 
distribution of core actors’ policy positions. This makes the nature of the negotiations 
competitive rather than consensual and, as will be shown in the following chapters, has in 
fact resulted in more voting and observable conflicts than what most studies have 
reported so far.
Third, the Council, being the most intergovernmental institution in its 
organisational structure, has both in quantitative and qualitative studies been assumed to 
adopt legislation according to the level of cooperation acceptable to all member states. In 
other words, like other international decision-making bodies, it is commonly expected 
that Council decision-making have elements of attitude towards further integration as a 
significant determinant of agreements. Instead, the argument of this thesis is that 
left/right political bargaining is the dominant policy dimension. However, this is not to 
say that the issue of integration or other nation-based factors may not play a role for 
Council politics. Other empirical studies based on different data sources have found 
convincing evidence of national cleavages between the Council members (Mattila and 
Lane 2001; Mattila 2006; Zimmer, Schneider and Dobbins 2005; Naurin 2006; Hayes- 
Renshaw and Wallace 2006). Yet, much in line with the liberal intergovemmentalist 
literature (Moravcsik 1998), it is here recognised that policy issues which can result in 
divisive national cleavages - such as for example the level of integration within the 
broader policy fields - are often established either in the European Council or in 
preparatory meetings. Therefore, as agreements in the Council are concerned with 
negotiations over the distributional and regulatory implications of policy proposals, and 
since the governments are also representatives of political parties, this thesis’ 
examination of minutes from individual Council meetings rather than also the preparatory 
process make party political differences a dominant point throughout the analysis (see 
also Mattila 2004).
Fourth, the argument that the Council members vote strategically rather than 
sincerely within the left/right policy space has implications for analyses of incentive 
structures and predictability of policy outcomes. A key determinant in the calculation of 
whether it pays off to oppose the majority is the vote share (e.g. Pentrose 1946; Shapley
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and Shubik 1954; Banzhaf 1965). Little voting power means a small chance of 
influencing the final policy and hence, small and large countries base their voting 
behaviour on different calculations over how to manipulate a policy outcome. This 
argument has already been put forward by several scholars engaged with theoretical 
discussions of the usefulness of voting power indices in the context of the Council (e.g. 
Best 2000; Brams and Affuso 1985; Hosli 1996, 1999; Konig and Brauninger 1998; 
Laruelle and Widgren 1998; Leech 2002; Machover and Felsenthal 1997,2001; Moberg 
1998; Pajala and Widgren 2004). However, this thesis finds that shareholder theory from 
the literature on corporate governance provides additional insights into the governments’ 
incentives and preferences. The expectations from the current voting power literature 
applied to the Council setting - though mainly pursued at a theoretical level - are that 
primarily big member states have an opportunity to influence policy outcomes and, 
hence, also have incentives to actively oppose the majority when they are in 
disagreement. Small members should be more passive and simply follow the majority as 
their opposition in most cases will have no significant effect. However, the corporate 
governance literature explains -  based also on empirical observations -  that large 
shareholders have more power, yet, shares in the expected pay-offs similarly determine 
the level of participation as well as likelihood of going against the majority. Therefore, 
members with smaller voting shares may be very active in the negotiations and will 
indeed voice their positions if the issue in question goes against their preferences and is 
of salience to them. Though, since the corporate governance literature finds it extremely 
difficult to deduct any other permanent structures regarding shareholders’ preferences 
than their interests in an increased revenue, it is established that voting behaviour must 
initially be studied solely on the basis of the distribution of voting power. Hereafter more 
empirical information can be added on an ad hoc basis in studies of individual corporate 
governance settings. These insights are useful also for the study of voting behaviour in 
the Council, though, since the preference configurations are usually more stabile in a 
legislature, this thesis finds that a combination of the effects of the distribution of voting 
power with the findings of the preference structures in the Council is indeed feasible; 
taking into account both the distribution of voting power and the governments’ 
preferences provides a useful analytical framework for how, when and why the Council 
members oppose or support the majority.
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Relevance of the argument and findings for political science
The theory and empirical findings of this thesis contribute to the wider political science 
literature in the following ways. First, the thesis presents a theory combining the effect of 
voting power and spatial analyses which is relevant also to the general study of 
legislatures. Second, it highlights the role of political parties in contexts other than 
national political legislatures. Third, it elaborates on the possibility for party coordination 
across institutions in bicameral systems. Each of these points are elaborated in the next 
three paragraphs.
The theory’s assumptions regarding a combined effect of voting power and policy 
positions have implications also for other legislatures where actors possess an unequal 
distribution of vote shares and, hence, experience a difference in voting power. National 
parliaments are one such setting where the distribution of voting power between parties 
depends on the allocation of parliamentary seats and the voting rules for adoption of 
laws. Building on the theories of preference-connected coalitions (Axelrod 1970), the 
thesis argues that it is necessary to include the aspect of voting power in order to go 
beyond the mere identification of members of the winning majority. Voting power theory 
combined with the spatial location of actors can help to explain the individual member’s 
incentive to oppose the majority in the Council. For example, actors in the Council who 
have more voting power and who find themselves in the opposition behave differently 
than actors with the same preferences, but who possess little voting power. In order to 
explain these tendencies it is necessary to investigate the effect of preference positions as 
well as incentives for opposing or supporting the majority. The combined theory takes a 
step in this direction and offers an analytical framework which goes beyond the mere 
classification of who is included and who is excluded from the winning majority2. The 
purpose is to explain and predict individual actors’ behaviour both within a majority and 
amongst those in opposition, rather than only grouping members into the different 
coalitions.
Arguing that the Council members should be presented not only as national 
representatives but also as political parties means that party preferences rather than
2 In Chapter 2 it is explained that inclusion and exclusion of governments are rarely observed in the 
Council. However, minorities and majorities can still be identified when looking into the voting 
patterns across policy areas.
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institutional affiliation may dictate behaviour. This hypothesis is often heard in relation 
to the Parliament (e.g. Hix et al. forthcoming 2006), yet, has only been applied to the 
Council to a limited extent in theoretical terms (Hix and Lord 1997; Hooghe and Marks 
1999) and even less so in empirical analyses (Mattila 2004; Franchino and Rahming
2003). Nevertheless, the argument may also be relevant to test in other decision-making 
bodies consisting of national representatives, yet, where the political issues to be agreed 
upon are not necessarily of a national or state centric character. In other words, 
institutions at either the national, regional and international level could have similar 
preference configurations leading to policy outcomes which are not necessarily of an 
intergovernmental character. Within the EU’s own geographical borders, the Nordic 
Council could be pointed to as one such example as many decisions are related to 
cooperation regarding environmental, educational, cultural and social standards without 
any serious differences in geo-political interests or other issues linked to state power. At 
the global level also national representatives in, for example, the United Nations’ sectoral 
programmes could be thought of as actors with party political policy platforms besides 
of being government delegates (cf. Reinalda 2001).
Lastly, the thesis’ findings and theory have implications for legislative studies in 
general and bicameral systems in particular when it suggests that parties may benefit 
from coordinating their voting behaviour across the institutional divide between the 
Council and the Parliament. Policy outcomes in bicameral systems depend on the actions 
taken by representatives in both chambers. The collective position adopted by one 
chamber may influence representatives’ behaviour in, and the collective position of, the 
other chamber (Buchanan and Tullock 1962). This phenomenon may be particularly 
important if the decision process is sequential rather than simultaneous, such as is the 
case in the EU’s Co-decision procedure. Therefore, following the theory from this thesis 
that not only do the EP and the Council have the same preference structures (i.e. they do 
not have separate legislative cores; Tsebelis and Money 1997) but they are in fact 
composed by the same political parties, then each of these parties may seek to exploit the 
possibility for manipulating policy outcomes towards own policy preferences across the 
institutional divide. The conclusion elaborates on this argument in light of the findings 
from the empirical chapters, however, the general observation is that intra- and inter-
3 See http://www.un.org/aboutun/chart.html (accessed 01 October 2006) for an overview.
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institutional power dynamics may differ quite significantly from what is traditionally 
reflected in the literature when party politics are considered also across the institutional 
divide.
In sum, the research presented in this thesis shows that Council decision-making 
can be understood as strategic negotiations between self-interested actors who vote 
according to their calculated possibility for influencing policy outcomes. It shows that 
left/right politics is the main dimension of contestation. And it clarifies patterns of voting 
behaviour at the aggregate level as well as how changes occur across policy fields and 
stages of the legislative process. All of these issues are of importance to both normative 
and positive evaluations of the Council and the EU system in general.
Plan of the thesis
The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part evaluates and updates existing 
knowledge regarding negotiations in the Council, presents the theory and related 
empirical predictions, and describes the empirical material. The second part of the thesis 
is the empirical analyses and tests of a set of hypotheses derived from the theory. Each of 
the two parts consists of a number of chapters, structured as follows:
Part I: Theory and Method
Part I begins with a discussion of the existing theoretical and empirical knowledge 
regarding legislative behaviour in the Council (Chapter 1). It is found that there is a 
pressing need to empirically confront some of the theoretical accounts, as well as clarify 
the somewhat contradictory evidence provided by different empirical analyses. The latter 
seems largely to be due to a difference in research methods and the existence of relatively 
few large-n quantitative analyses. Furthermore, the chapter finds it necessary to re­
consider some of the key aspects from the existing accounts regarding the use of formal 
rules and procedures in the Council. One example is the findings regarding the use o f‘A’ 
and ‘B’ agenda points as an indicator of how controversial a proposal is when presented 
to the Council. Based on the empirical results from the data set, this thesis finds that ‘A’ 
agenda points have seen an increase in the level of contested decisions and, conversely,
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‘B’ points are not always a matter of dispute. Practitioners in the Council have explained 
that the distinction is increasingly becoming a political signalling tool rather than merely 
the current literature’s explanation of an organisational measure to ensure efficient 
decision-making. A last issue which is rarely addressed is a frequent use of formal 
statements included in the minutes as a mean to voice disagreement with a policy 
proposal.
Motivated by the discussions of the current literature in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 
formulates and presents the theoretical argument of the thesis. The theory draws on 
lessons from three different sets of literature on decision-making when it argues that the 
Council of course still resembles an intergovernmental organisation due to the fact that 
membership is allocated to national political representatives and its reliance on unanimity 
in decisions related to transfers of power. Yet, aspects similar to other governing 
assemblies such as national legislatures and cooperatives are also present, and it is argued 
that the theoretical framework needs to accommodate both party political dynamics and 
‘shareholders”  incentives to vote in favour of or oppose a proposal. The presentation of 
the theoretical argument that voting behaviour is reflected in ‘weighted preference- 
connected coalitions’ makes it possible to derive a set of empirical predictions. These 
predictions are formulated and presented as hypotheses to be tested in the empirical 
chapters in Part II.
The first part of the thesis ends with Chapter 3, which presents the empirical 
material used for the tests of the hypotheses. The collection and coding of the Council 
minutes from which the data has been gathered are discussed in detail, and descriptive 
statistics are presented together with a range of variables to be used in the statistical 
models. The last section in the chapter summarises the expected effect of the variables as 
predicted by the theory as well as by alternative hypotheses from the literature.
Part II: Empirical analyses
As the first empirical chapter of the thesis, Chapter 4 tests the first of the hypotheses 
derived from the theory. It states that the Council members are party political actors 
behaving according to policy preferences captured by the traditional left/right political 
dimension. The results presented in this chapter are generated by running the data with 
the recently developed scaling method technique Optimal Classification (OC). Contrary
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to current accounts in the Council literature, which mostly rely on unobserved 
assumptions regarding the voting behaviour, coalition formation and preferences of the 
actors, this scaling method does exactly the opposite and provides a picture of the 
observed voting behaviour. Based on the results inferences can then be made regarding 
the legislators’ voting behaviour and, ultimately, the policy space within which the 
Council members decide. The chapter finds that the governments act within a uni­
dimensional policy space which, when compared with a range of exogenous measures, is 
found to correspond with their positions on left/right political issues in national politics. 
Government changes are also captured in the spatial maps, and the result of the right­
ward shift in many of the European governments is an apparent right-ward shift of these 
member states’ voting behaviour in the Council. None of the theoretical alternatives from 
the current literature are found to correlate with the ideal point estimates. The findings 
are compared to another popular scaling method technique, NOMINATE, and to ideal 
point estimates obtained through a Baysian approach.
Chapter 5 is an analysis of changes in voting behaviour across the different stages 
of the legislative process. Due to the party composition of the Council, a right-wing 
government was in 1999-2004 generally more inclined to oppose a policy proposal than a 
left-wing government, and this effect increases as the legislative process moves towards 
the final adoption stage. However, within this party political framework, big and small 
member states are also found to vote differently; especially small countries seem to vote 
strategically and primarily choose to voice their opposition at stages prior to the final 
adoption of an act. Again, this effect is most visible for governments which find 
themselves towards the opposite end of the policy spectrum than the majority. In sum, the 
conclusion from the empirical findings in this chapter is therefore that only when 
considering both left/right political preferences and the members’ voting power is it 
possible to adequately capture the changes in voting behaviour across the different stages 
of the legislative process.
Chapter 6 presents a range of descriptive statistics on the level of contest in each 
policy field, country specific features as well as data on how each government has used 
either opposition through voting, abstentions or formal statements to voice their 
disagreement with a policy proposal. The chapter finds that there is great variance in the 
adoption rates and amount of recorded contest across the policy areas, both in absolute
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and relative terms. When running the data from each policy area in a series of 
regressions, a government’s position on the left/right political dimension is found to have 
a significant influence on the governments’ voting behaviour. However, neither the 
magnitude nor direction of this effect is consistent across all areas: in the important areas 
of Agriculture & Fisheries, Economic & Financial Affairs and Justice & Home Affairs 
left-wing governments are more frequently found to oppose the majority than right-wing 
governments, whereas the reverse is true in all other policy areas. A difference between 
small and large Council members is also apparent and this effect is consistent across all 
areas. Interestingly, the decision rule only proves to have an effect on the frequency of 
oppositions in some policy areas, whereas the governments’ positions in corresponding 
policy areas in national politics are significant in all of the Council’s policy fields.
The conclusion summarises the findings and compares them with alternative 
propositions from the literature. In light of this comparison, further opportunities and 
challenges are discussed for research on legislative politics in the Council and the EU as 
a bicameral system.
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Part I
17
Chapter 1: Current and new knowledge about 
legislative politics in the Council of Ministers
1.1 Introduction
Almost every study of Council decision-making begins with the complaint that the large 
amount of legislation adopted by unanimity makes it difficult for outsiders to get a proper 
insight into the institution. The criticism is well grounded as it obviously makes the study 
of the Council less approachable when it is commonly found to unanimously adopt 
between 70%-95% of all legislation (cf. Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006; Mattila 
2006). However, such findings are the result of analyses of the Council members’ 
behaviour at the very last adoption stage. Also, the data that provides those results is 
usually collected from the Council’s monthly summaries, which stipulate only the title of 
the policy proposals together with the final conclusions of the negotiations. With this 
focus, other important sources of information are neglected. Therefore, this chapter will 
seek to briefly outline and discuss the existing theoretical and empirical knowledge about 
the rules and procedures for adopting legislation in the Council. Hereafter a description is 
given of what information is in fact available from the Council, and new empirical 
findings are presented regarding two issues: the level of conflict and the use of voting and 
formal statements for voicing disagreement. The data set which provides the new 
empirical results, and which also forms the basis for the empirical analyses in the rest of 
the thesis, is based on minutes from individual Council meetings. Hence, the new 
information presented in this chapter is derived from data which includes voting 
outcomes from not only the final adoption stage, but also from prior readings.
The chapter is structured as follows: The first section, Section 1.2, briefly outlines 
how the formal rules and procedures for adopting legislation in the Council are 
commonly described in the current literature. Section 1.3 subsequently discusses the 
existing theoretical accounts of how this institutional framework influences policy 
outcomes and Council members’ behaviour. The finding is here that both the theoretical 
insights provided by the voting power literature and the theoretical arguments based on 
spatial models have been essential for understanding the Council decision processes. 
However, both sets of theories are still largely left unchallenged by direct empirical
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testing. Section 1.4 then presents the existing empirical knowledge and evaluates to what 
degree the empirical accounts correspond with the expectations from the theories. The 
main conclusion is that within the empirical research, much of the current evidence 
seems rather contradictory. The reason is likely to be large differences in research 
methods, and the section hence calls for further large scale quantitative analyses in order 
to settle some of the disputes.
Motivated by each of the above observations, Section 1.5 describes what 
information is in fact available from the Council. Based on the information included in 
this thesis’ data set, Section 1.6 subsequently presents new findings regarding how 
formal rules and procedures are used. Particularly three fundamental points are 
addressed: 1) the use of formal voting for adopting legislation; 2) the use o f ‘A’ and ‘B’ 
agenda points as indications for how controversial a policy issue is; and 3) the general 
level of conflict recorded in the Council. Section 1.7 summarises the chapter and 
concludes that despite the recent attention from EU scholars, there is still a pressing need 
to advance the current empirical knowledge about legislative processes in the Council. 
Such empirical insights would also help to address the different theoretical views on how 
best to model legislative politics in the Council, and whether it is indeed a ‘Council of 
Conflict’ or a ‘Council of Consensus’.
1.2 Legislative procedures
Decision-making in the Council is a complicated matter. However, this section will seek 
to outline the main features of the legislative processes in order to provide a general 
overview over the institutional framework within which the Council members act.
During the almost four and a half years of decision-making investigated in this 
thesis (January 1999 - May 2004), the Council was first divided into 21 sectoral councils 
and then reduced to 9 in June 20024. The reduction in Council formations has not 
similarly led to a reduction in policy areas or ministerial seats, and the Council meetings
4 The Trumpf and Piris (1999) report from the Council’s legal service formed the basis for what 
became the Helsinki Conclusions of December 1999 and the Seville Conclusions o f 2002. The 
conclusions stipulated a number o f issues for how to make the Council’s organisational structures more 
efficient, including the decision to reduce the number of Council formations.
19
are still held according to policy specialisation such that, for example, the ministers of 
environment meet independently of ministers from other policy areas5.
Each council formation has to adopt legislation according to a set of rules 
depending on the legal basis of the policy proposal in question. The Commission settles 
which of the decision-making procedures apply to a proposal before presenting it to the 
Council for negotiations, a decision which relies on the legal framework for the specific 
policy field as stipulated in the treaties. When a policy proposal has been initiated and 
presented to the Council it is usually first discussed in specialised working groups where 
officials from the member states and the Commission meet. Gradually, proposals advance 
through the preparatory bodies closer to the Council. The most senior of the preparatory 
committees are the Committees of Permanent Representatives (COREPERI and II) from 
where proposals are sent to the Council as either ‘A’ or ‘B’ agenda points. In previous 
descriptions of Council decision-making (e.g. Dinan 1999; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 
2006; Sherrington 2000; Van Scendelen 1998) it has been explained that at this stage ‘A’ 
points are normally agreed upon already and therefore accepted without much discussion 
in the Council. The more controversial agenda items are categorised as ‘B’ points6.
When voting takes place, different rules apply depending on the policy area: 
unanimity is applied to certain matters affecting the members’ fundamental sovereignty, 
and a weighted qualified majority system (QMV) to others. The key feature of the QMV 
system is that all members have a seat but that their respective number of votes varies, 
reflecting the differences in population shares (cf. Leech 2002). Table 1.1 shows the 
distributions and thresholds for the QMV systems throughout the EU’s history.
5 For a recent analysis o f the division into sectoral councils and the changes made since 2004 please 
refer to Van Schaik et al. (2006).
6 Van Schendelen (1998) finds that more than half o f all decisions made by the Council are categorised 
as ‘A ’ points. The figures for the 1999-2004 time period are presented in Chapter 3.
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Table 1.1 QMV thresholds and distribution of votes in the Council
Member
state
1958-72 1973-80 1981-85 1986-94 1995-
2001
Since 2001
Germany 4 10 10 10 10 29
France - 10 10 10 10 29
UK 4 10 10 10 10 29
Italy 4 10 10 10 10 29
Spain - - - 8 8 27
Poland - - - - - 27
Netherlands 2 5 5 5 5 13
Greece - - 5 5 5 12
Belgium 2 5 5 5 5 12
Czech Rep. - - - - - 12
Portugal - - - - 5 12
Hungary - - - - - 12
Sweden - - - - 4 10
Austria - - - - 4 10
Slovakia - - - - - 7
Denmark - 3 3 3 3 7
Finland - - - - 3 7
Ireland - 3 3 3 3 7
Lithuania - - - - - 7
Latvia - - - - - 4
Slovenia - - - - - 4
Estonia - - - - - 4
Cyprus - - - - - 4
Luxembourg 1 2 2 2 2 4
Malta - - - - - 3
Total 17 58 63 76 87 321
QMV
Threshold:
Voting
weights
Member
states
12 41 45 54 62 232
, 62% Population (282 7 mjoj
13
^ —  ■ « ■ ■ ■ ■  ■ ■ I ■ I
Source: http://europa.eu.int/institutions/council/index_en.htm .
Depending on the legislative procedure, the Council may be presented with a proposal 
and its various amendments several times during the process that leads to its final 
adoption or rejection. For example, in the Co-decision procedure, the Council may adopt
o
a common position before the proposal goes to the European Parliament for a next 
reading after which it may return to the Council once again9. The Co-operation Procedure
7 Accessed 01 October 2006.
8 Hereafter referred to as the ‘Parliament’.
9 Please refer to Hix (2005) for a description o f the Co-decision procedure and H6rl et al. (2005) and 
Selck (2004) for recent literature reviews.
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and Consultation Procedure may similarly include a few rounds of negotiations on the 
same proposal if an agreement is not reached immediately. However, the preparatory 
bodies make this scenario rather rare.
Despite the complex voting system reflected in Table 1.1, the Council does not 
always vote in the formal sense of raising hands (Westlake 1995:87). A proposal can be 
adopted by the Chairperson when she knows that there is a sufficient majority or 
unanimity in the Council. If the Council is not unanimous, the Chairperson takes into 
account the member states’ positions and simply counts whether enough member states 
are on board to meet the threshold. In this way, it can be argued, although the votes are 
not explicitly in use, decisions are still made in ‘the shadow of the vote’ (Golub 1999). 
Yet, one important difference between the unanimity and QMV systems must be pointed 
out. When the decision rule is unanimity, abstentions are not counted as ‘no’ votes. This 
means that decisions can be made with few countries actually voting for the proposal, if 
none of the countries actively opposes it. The opposite is true for QMV, where the high 
threshold makes abstentions have the same effect as ‘no’ votes in practise. Furthermore, 
if a proposal is accepted, members who wish to oppose, abstain or who have serious 
concerns about the decision can record their views officially by making formal 
statements. Formal statements are usually made immediately after a decision has been 
adopted, yet, after the implementation of the Nice Treaty it has become possible to 
submit formal statements to the chairperson also in the days after a Council meeting. The 
deadline for submission is now until the minutes have been published and the adopted 
decision is turned into law. The formal statements are hence either included directly in 
the minutes from the meetings or posted separately on the Council website10.
1.3 Existing theoretical knowledge
The theoretical accounts of how the formal institutional framework for adopting 
legislation influences the member states’ voting behaviour and policy outcomes have 
been dominated by particularly by two distinct kinds of models11. The models have either
10 http://europa.eu/documents/eu_council/index_en.htm (accessed 01 October 2006).
11 It could be argued that there is another theoretical branch which is not included here, namely 
constructivist theories stressing the effects of culture, social norms and identities o f actors. Please refer
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been in the form of various voting power indices (e.g. Heme and Nurmi 1993; Konig and 
Brauninger 1998; Raunio and Wiberg 1998; Hosli 1999; Machover and Felsenthal 2001,
2004) or by using spatial models (e.g. Crombez 1996; 1997; 2001; Moser 1997; 
Steunenberg 1994; 1997; Tsebelis and Garrett 1997, 2000). From these studies the 
expectation has been a dominance by certain member states depending on such issues as 
the distribution of voting power, the position of the status quo vis-a-vis the members’ 
preferred policy location or the preference of the agenda-setter. The next two sections 
briefly discuss the conclusions from each of these theoretical branches.
1.3.1 Voting power indices
The voting power index literature (e.g. Banzhaf 1965; Penrose 1946; Shapley and Shubik
1954) has at its core the considerations and calculations of each member state’s
frequency of being pivotal in voting outcomes across all logically possible combinations
of votes. The purpose is to identify actors’ possibilities for influencing policy in terms of
highlighting the difference between voting power and voting weights. Two approaches 
10are often used : first, is the analysis of relative voting power of members within a given 
legislature using indices such as the popular normalised Banzhaf power index (Banzhaf 
1965). Second, is the analysis of absolute voting power most commonly measured by 
using the Penrose index (Penrose 1946). Related hereto are also three indices proposed 
by Coleman (1971) which capture members’ power to act, the power to prevent action 
and the power to initiate action. The former relative power analysis is useful for making 
comparisons of a priori voting power between members within a given voting body 
defined by weights and a specific decision rule. This form of analysis can hence also 
form as the basis for normative evaluations regarding, for example, the fairness of the 
distribution of votes. The latter is useful for comparisons across different institutions, and 
is frequently included in evaluations of efficiency. The empirical chapters will return to 
the former matter of voting power when analysing the governments’ chance of 
influencing decision-making. Hence, Appendix A includes the definition of the popular
to Kaeding and Selck (2005) and Lewis (2003) for a discussion between constructivist and rationalistic 
approaches to the studies o f behaviour in the Council.
12 See Leech 2002: 443ff for a more detailed explanation of the following argument.
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normalised Banzhaf index in order to clarify the method for calculating the Council
1members’ relative voting power .
A classic example in the Council which illustrates the importance of applying 
considerations of voting power is when Luxembourg with its one vote in the first phase 
of the Council’s history turned out to have absolutely no formal influence on decision­
making. Since the threshold required to reach a decision was 12 votes during this period, 
it was mathematically impossible for Luxembourg’s one vote to be decisive despite the 
disproportional representation of its population14. No matter how the five other countries 
voted, their combined total would never be equal to 11 (cf. Brams and Affuso 1985; 
Leech 2003). Similar situations are still possible, although perhaps in more complex 
versions (Felsenthal and Machover 2001). Hence, Table 1.2 compares the voting weights 
and voting power distribution in the 1999-2004 Council as calculated by the normalised 
Banzhaf index15.
Table 1.2 Distribution of voting power 1999-2004
Member
state
Population 
(in mio.)
Votes Normalised
Banzhaf
Index
Germany 82.4 10 11.16
France 60.2 10 11.16
UK 60.1 10 11.16
Italy 58 10 11.16
Spain 40.2 8 9.24
Netherlands 16.2 5 5.87
Greece 10.7 5 5.87
Belgium 10.3 5 5.87
Portugal 10.1 5 5.87
Sweden 9.9 4 4.79
Austria 8.2 4 4.79
Denmark 5.4 3 3.59
Finland 5.2 3 3.59
Ireland 3.9 3 3.59
Luxembourg 0.5 2 2.26
Total 455.9 87 99.97
Source: Results generated by the POWERSLA VE (2002) programme.
13 Please refer to Leech (2002) and Machover et al. (2003) for a discussion o f Council decision-making 
based on a comparison of different voting power indices as well conclusions regarding the indices’ 
suitability for analyses of this legislative setting.
14 Luxembourg had one vote for its 310.572,500 people whereas West Germany had one vote for every 
13.572,500 people (Leech 2003:480).
15 Many other indices could have been mentioned, yet, the Banzhaf index is widely recognised and by 
some theorists claimed to be the most suitable for the study o f the Council. See for example Felsenthal 
and Machover (1998) for a discussion o f this argument.
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Voting power indices used in the context of Council decision-making have been 
subjected to considerable criticism with opponents of the approach often stating that the 
indices assume too little and too much at the same time to be useful for analysing the 
Council dynamics: too little in that they only include the constitutional aspects (votes and 
threshold), and too much in that they consider the probability of a voter voting ‘Yes’ or 
‘No’ and any voter combination or permutation to be equally likely16. On the other hand, 
while it is correct that most of the indices do not include the preferences, affinities and 
disaffinities of the voters, this may in fact also be a strength of the voting power index 
method in this context. For example, the specific power which a Council member derives 
from the formal and informal institutions framing the Council bargaining is, inevitably, 
related to the bare decision rule. As explained in the previous section, qualitative 
accounts of Council meetings explain how a Council chairperson often counts votes -  
either formally or just by quick estimates -  in order to establish whether a sufficient 
majority will support the proposal in question. Hence, although voting power theories 
applied to decision-making in the Council has only been compared with empirical 
evidence to a very limited extent (Pajala and Widgren 2004; Bailer 2004), the empirical 
study of voting behaviour in the Council should have as its basis a consideration of also 
the formal, a priori power distribution17. The theory in Chapter 2 will return to this point 
and builds on the insights from the voting power literature. However, to summarise the 
conclusions from this set of theoretical models, it is commonly agreed that the 
distribution of voting power dictates the possibilities for influencing policy outcomes. 
The behavioural expectations are hence that larger member states will dominate the 
legislative process, whereas smaller member states will actively seek to become members 
of a winning majority at any cost, as they otherwise have small chances of taking part in 
the construction of new policies.
16 For a recent discussion o f the voting power indices see Garrett and Tsebelis (2001), Albert (2003, 
2004) and Felsenthal et al. (2003).
17 Furthermore, much in the same way as inequality indices have been used as baseline tools for 
normative as well as positive analyses o f social standards (List 2004), voting power theory can be used 
for deriving empirically testable predictions.
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1.3.2 Spatial modelling
Conversely to the above power-focused analysis, the other set of theoretical models often 
used to analyse the institutional setup in the EU is focused on policy preferences. These 
theories are often based on standard spatial theory (Hotelling 1929; Black 1948, 1958; 
Downs 1957; Davis and Hinich 1966; Enelow and Hinich 1984; Plott 1967) which 
commonly present each actor, /, with a set of preferences which may be defined 
algebraically or geometrically in a single-dimensional or multidimensional, Euclidean 
policy space. A utility function w,, x for each i is defined, and each i is furthermore
assumed to have an ideal point, x , , which maximizes her utility. The assumption of
Euclidean symmetry implies that preferences are a decreasing function of the distance 
between the policy outcome and the agent’s ideal point. In the geometric representation, 
this is reflected in the form of indifference curves. Each legislator’s indifference curve 
consists of points such that for any point x on the curve, the utility can simply be 
compared to any other point: the outcome x equals exactly that associated with any other 
points x x "... on the curve. Points beyond the curve will be less preferred and points 
within the curve will be more preferred. In other words, starting at the ideal point, the 
utility declines monotonically in any given direction and, hence, a legislator will only be 
willing to accept a policy change which moves the status quo to a point closer to her
1 Qpreference point from where the status quo is currently located .
Applying this logic to the EU context, Crombez (1997; 2001), Tsebelis (1994; 
1997), Tsebelis and Garret (1997; 2000) and Steunenberg (1994; 1997) analyse the 
implications of the different legislative procedures implemented in the EU over the last 
decades. For example, the standard model (e.g. Steunenberg 1997; Tsebelis and Garrett 
1997; 2000) used for analysing the EU’s legislative procedures consists of 7 member 
states as well as the EP and the Commission positioned in a one-dimensional policy 
space according to their preferred level of integration. The EP and the Commission are 
usually presented as unitary outliers, preferring more integration than any of the member 
states. The weighted qualified majority requirement in the Council is the same as the 
coalition of 5 out of the 7 member states, and the status quo is assumed to be located at a 
lower point than the ideal point of any of the member states. As a consequence of this
18 Please refer to McCarty and Meirowitz (2005) for a recent description o f the use o f spatial models in 
analyses o f legislatures.
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logic, the model can predict which member state will turn out to be pivotal as well as the 
location of new policy outcomes. Figure 1.1 shows a summarised version of the Tsebelis 
and Garrett (1997) model.
Figure 1.1 Tsebelis-Garrett model of the effect of institutional rules
Proposals preferred to SQ under QMV
Proposals preferred to SQ under unanimity
No integration _ |__  Integration
EP
Commission
SQ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
02 03 01 04
SQ = the current policy, the status quo
0 1 = Outcome under Cooperation
0 2  = Outcome under Consultation
0 3  = Outcome under Co-decision I
0 4  = Outcome under Co-decision II
The usefulness of the logic behind the model presented in Figure 1.1, and the similar 
versions presented in other analyses (e.g. Steunenberg 1994; Crombez 1996), is beyond 
doubt. However, the existing spatial models applied to the EU setting overlook a few key 
aspects related to both the inter-institutional bargaining as well the internal dynamics in 
both of the institutions. First, the prominent assumption that the preferences of the 
legislative actors are still best captured by the ‘supranational scenario’ in the Council 
(Garrett and Tsebelis 1996:280; Tsebelis 2000; Tsebelis and Garrett 2000: 366) must be 
challenged as the governments’ general attitude towards the EU may no longer play that 
important a role at the ministerial negotiation table (Mattila 2004; Van Schaik 2006). 
Tsebelis & Garrett (2000) have indeed considered the effect of both a two-dimensional 
policy space and the implications of assuming a left/right policy dimension to be present 
at the EU level. However, in their analysis it is concluded that a dominant left/right 
dimension would result in policy gridlock as the more centrally located status quo would 
make it difficult to mobilise a sufficient majority in favour of a policy change (Tsebelis 
and Garrett 2000; cf. Banks and Duggans 2006). However, as will be elaborated in 
Chapter 2, the fact that negotiations may take place within a single dimension does not 
exclude the possibility of introducing more than one policy issue in order to increase the
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actors’ winsets and in that way make a policy change possible. For example, two 
different policy proposals -  say, one on an environmental issue and one on internal 
market - may be introduced simultaneously in order to make a policy change possible. 
Both of these two proposals can be settled according to the actors’ policy preferences 
over general socio-economic matters (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) and, hence, both fall 
within the larger left/right political dimension. Therefore, instead of dismissing the 
left/right political dimension as a dominant bargaining continuum based on the Tsebelis 
and Garrett (2000) considerations, it may be beneficial to distinguish between mvlti-issue 
and m\i\ti-dimensional bargaining. As will be apparent later in this thesis, empirical 
research has not been able to falsify the left/right political trends -  quite the contrary - 
and, hence, the recurring discussion of Council negotiations within a single pro-/anti EU 
dimension even in recent analyses (e.g. Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006) seems 
somewhat problematic.
A second point of critique of the existing theoretical models from the spatial 
literature is that the possibility for preference coordination across the institutional divide 
is not considered in detail. For example, a party political division in the Council rather 
than merely the inter-governmental scenario opens up for an advantageous 
communication opportunity with party groups in the EP, particularly since the decision 
process is sequential rather than simultaneous. In addition, the current models neglect the 
fact that whereas the Council voting rule remains constant (the same QMV requirement 
has to be met at all stages for the Council to adopt policy), the pivotal voter in the EP is 
not the same across the readings. The shift in the EP from a simple majority at the first 
reading to adopt an opinion to an absolute majority at the second reading to amend the 
common position of the Council19 means that the threshold is considerably higher for 
amending or rejecting the common position of the Council, than it is to draw up a 
proposal in the first reading. In other words, it is harder for the EP to amend or reject than 
to simply accept a proposal from the Council (Hoyland and Hagemann 2006). The 
consequence is that, assuming the members in the Council are rational, self-interested 
actors, the models neglect the possibility of members’ manipulation of policy outcomes 
based on not just speculations in the internal negotiations in the Council, but also
19 See the following link for the details and o f the Co-decision procedure:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/public/staticDisplay.do?id=46&pageRank=4&language=EN 
(last accessed 01 October 2006).
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calculations over the changes in the EP’s preference configuration from the first to the 
second reading. Officials working at the national representations have explained that both 
sets of actors are fully aware of the potential of communication and preference alignment 
across the institutional divide . As a consequence of the fact that the EP has become 
more influential in the legislative process, all national representations in Brussels now 
have a least one official fully dedicated to facilitate the coordination between the MEPs 
and the government’s position in the Council. These are important considerations to 
include in any modelling of the Co-decision procedure, and may considerably alter the 
coalition formation process as well as the identity the pivotal parties.
Lastly, a third point of critique of the current spatial modelling of the formal rules 
is that neither of the models applied to the Council setting include explicit considerations
9 1of the difference in vote shares . Effectively , this means that the pivotal member state 5 
in Figure 1.1 becomes an arbitrary concept, and leaves the model with little empirical 
power in terms of predictability of both internal and inter-institutional preference 
aggregation outcomes. Therefore, in order to adequately analyse and predict possible 
coalition formation and policy outcomes, the spatial theories may benefit from also 
taking into account the difference in vote shares. Chapter 2 returns to this issue, however, 
together with the issues mentioned above, it appears as if several of the fundamental 
assumptions included in the spatial models may not fully correspond with the current 
Council dynamics. The next section outlines the existing empirical knowledge and looks 
into the degree to which the empirical evidence corresponds with the expectations from 
both the voting power literature and the arguments from the spatial approach.
1.4 Existing empirical knowledge
Although the last few years have seen an impressive increase in the empirical research on 
Council decision-making, the field is still very much in its infancy. As a consequence, it 
is clear from the outset that the above theoretical considerations of the impact of the 
formal institutional rules on behaviour and policy outcomes have only been empirically
20 Interview III, IX and XIV.
21 Except for Crombez (1998) who includes the qualified majority pivot as the preference point o f the 
Council vis-a-vis the EP. Yet, in his model the EP and Commission are still presented as unitary actors, 
and the changes from the absolute to the simple majority requirement in the EP is not taken into 
account.
29
addressed to a rather limited extent (cf. Horl et al. 2005). Still, similarly to many other 
policy fields, the increasing number of empirical studies has started to part into groups 
distinguished by a reliance on either qualitative or quantitative research methods.
1.4.1 Qualitative empirical research
The above theoretical analyses predicted legislative behaviour to be dictated by either the 
distribution of voting power or by the member states’ spatial distance to the status quo. 
Conversely to these accounts, where pareto-efficient outcomes are not always assumed to 
emerge and conflict may be observed, the group of scholars who have engaged in 
qualitative empirical research have adopted a more consensus-oriented view of Council 
decision-making. In fact, this branch of the empirical literature rejects most of the 
conclusions from both the spatial analyses and the voting power theories (e.g. Westlake 
1995, Sherrington 2000, Lewis 1998), and often argues that decision-making processes 
and legislative outcomes must be accounted for through an ‘empirical experience in the 
Council’ (cf. Heisenberg 2005:66). Formal voting records and minutes do not capture the 
dynamics of informal bargaining, and hence do not adequately portray the political 
ambitions and behaviour by the member states, according to this line of thought. Instead 
of trying to predict the outcome of specific policy negotiations or make claims with 
regard to who dominates the bargaining process, the intention of this group of scholars 
has mainly been to provide a more qualitative insight into the daily-day decision-making, 
and describe the formal and informal institutions which shape the Council members' 
negotiations.
The main empirical findings by the group of scholars applying this approach have 
been that explicit voting on agreed decisions at ministerial level is rather rare and that 
when dissent is expressed, this is usually only by a single member state (Hayes-Renshaw 
and Wallace 2006:284; Naurin 2006). Ministers generally endorse collective decisions by 
consensus, even in those cases where they could activate qualified majority voting 
(QMV). Furthermore, when disagreement is apparent, this is in nearly half the cases 
related to ‘technical’ decisions, rather than political issues. To the extent that voting takes 
place, this even occurs implicitly rather than explicitly, operates mostly at the level of 
officials rather than ministers, and is not recorded systematically in publicly accessible
30
form (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006; cf. Heisenberg 2005). Therefore, it is argued, 
the Council can be understood only by analysing its informal as well as its formal 
operations, and the over-simplification by many theoretical accounts results in a neglect 
of the very reason why the complex Council system is even able to function: ‘corridor 
bargaining’, dynamics within working groups and committees as well as the importance 
of actors’ experience and personal negotiation skills must be qualitatively accounted for 
(e.g. Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006:28). However, whereas the qualitative branch of 
the literature has indeed advanced the knowledge regarding each of these issues, their 
findings would benefit from being supported in quantitative studies of Council members’ 
behaviour at the aggregate level as well. The group of researchers presented below are 
partly motivated by this demand.
1.4.2 Quantitative empirical research
The empirical studies which combine quantitative analyses with different theoretical 
takes on EU policy-making have sought to conclude on such issues as preference 
aggregation, voting behaviour and the consequences of the power distribution within 
different areas. Yet, so far this branch of the literature is still only starting to emerge and, 
as mentioned, only very sparse empirical evidence has been provided with regard to the 
general tendencies in the Council. Still, two groups using the quantitative research 
methods can be identified: one relies on information gathered from interviews with 
experts (Bailer 2004; Pajala and Widgren 2004; Thomson et al. 2006; Zimmer, Schneider 
and Dobbins 2005) and the other on voting records (Heisenberg 2005; Hosli 1999; Lane 
and Mattila 2001; Mattila 2004; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 200622). Both groups 
attempt to identify underlying patterns of conflict in the Council by applying statistical 
models to quantitative data sets, in most cases for the purpose of testing theory-driven 
predictions23.
22 Although Wallace and Hayes-Renshaw (2006) use both interviews and council minutes for their 
work, the quantitative part o f their analysis relies on a data set consisting o f information from the 
Council’s monthly summaries.
23 Many more projects engaged with the same issues at the general EU level could be mentioned. The 
ones which are included here are studies which are specifically concerned with the internal decision­
making in the Council.
31
It is currently difficult to say if data from expert interviews or the Council minutes and 
voting records provide the best source of information regarding underlying conflict 
structures and preferences in the Council (Konig 2005:366). It is furthermore also 
difficult to evaluate which of the research projects, if any, actually present an accurate 
picture of the general dynamics in the Council; each of the current studies are restricted 
by important boundary specifications which in many cases makes it difficult to further 
generalise on the basis of the findings. This also explains why a few studies have 
produced contradicting results even though the purpose of the research has been to 
explain similar research questions24. Table 1.3 below summarises the findings, methods 
and scope from each of the existing quantitative research projects on governments’ 
preferences and underlying conflict structures in the Council.
24 See for example the difference in the conclusions from Mattila (2004) and Zimmer, Schneider and 
Dobbins (2005).
Table 1.3: Existing research on preferences and conflict structures in the Council based on quantitative analyses
Author Project Type o f Data Voting Stage Data Method Scope/limitations
Mattila and 
Lane(2001)
‘Why unanimity in the Council? 
A Roll-Call Analysis o f Council 
Voting’
Quantitative; based on 
Council minutes
Final vote 1381 pieces o f legislation 
from 1994-1998.
Roll-call analysis Stages prior to the final adoption 
stage are disregarded. Formal 
statements following the adoption 
o f a decision are not included.
Franchino 
and Rahming 
(2003)
‘Biased Ministers, Inefficiency 
and Control in Distributive 
Policies’
Quantitative; based on 
exogenous measures o f  
parties’ preferences in 
national politics and policy 
outcomes from a specific 
policy field
Adopted
regulations
14 regulations Document analysis, 
analysis with 
governments’ 
preferences from 
national politics
Analysis is carried out within a 
single policy field.
Selck, T. 
(2004)
‘On the Dimensionality o f  
European Legislative Decision 
Making’
Quantitative; based on 
expert interviews (DEU 
data)
From proposal 
to adoption
66 Commission proposals; 
162 issues
on decrees, directives and 
decisions under 
Consultation and Codecision
Policy positions o f  
legislators on a series 
o f issues.
Scales range from 0 to 
100
Difficult to evaluate experts’ 
aggregation o f information and 
conclude on the locations o f policy 
positions; not clear if  the sample o f  
proposals is representative for the 
whole population o f decisions
Mattila
(2004)
‘Contested decisions: Empirical 
analysis o f voting in the 
European Union Council o f  
Ministers’
Quantitative; based on 
Council minutes
Final vote 180 observations (voting 
records for 15 member states 
for 12 half-year periods) 
from 1995-2000.
Roll-call analysis Stages prior to the final adoption 
stage are disregarded. Formal 
statements following the adoption 
o f  a decision are not included.
Zimmer,
Schneider,
Dobbins
(2005)
‘The Contested Council: The 
Conflict Dimensions o f an 
Intergovernmental Institution’
Quantitative; based on expert 
interviews (the DEU data 
set)
From proposal 
to adoption
70 Commission proposals; 
174 issues on decrees, 
directives and decisions 
under
Consultation and Codecision
Correspondence 
analysis based on the 
DEU data set.
Difficult to evaluate experts’ 
aggregation o f information and 
conclude on the locations of policy 
positions; not clear if the sample o f  
proposals is representative for the 
whole population o f decisions
Heisenberg
(2005)
‘The institution o f consensus in 
the European Union: Formal 
versus informal decision-making 
in the Council’
Quantitative; base on 
Council minutes
Final votes Recorded legislation from 
1994-2002
Roll-call analysis Stages prior to the final adoption 
stage are disregarded. Formal 
statements following the adoption 
o f a decision are not included.
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Table 1.3: Existing research on preferences and conflict structures in the Council based on quantitative analyses (continued)
Author Project Type of Data Voting Stage Data Method Scope/limitations
Thomson et 
al. (2006)
The European Union Decides Quantitative; based on expert 
interviews (DEU data)
From proposal 
to adoption
66 Commission proposals; 
162 issues on decrees, 
directives and decisions 
under Consultation and 
Codecision
Policy positions 
of legislators on 
a series of  
issues.
Scales range 
from Oto 100
Difficult to evaluate experts’ aggregation 
o f information and conclude on the 
locations o f policy positions; not clear if  
the sample o f proposals is representative 
for the whole population o f decisions
Hayes- 
Renshaw 
and Wallace 
(2006)
The Council o f  Ministers Quantitative; based on 
Council minutes
Final votes Recorded legislation from 
1994-2004
Expert
interviews;
document
analysis
Difficult to make generalisations re. 
preferences and conflict structures as 
mostly descriptive statistics are presented. 
Data is confined to last stage formal 
voting.
Mattila
(2006)
‘Voting and coalitions in the 
Council two years after 
enlargement’
Quantitative; based on 
Council minutes
Final vote 805 legislative acts from 
May 2004 to April 2006.
Roll-call
analysis
Stages prior to the final adoption stage are 
disregarded. Formal statements following 
the adoption o f a decision are not 
included.
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It should here be stressed that Table 1.3 is not meant as a critical assessment of individual 
research projects. In fact, each of these studies has provided extremely valuable and 
interesting insights into the Council’s processes and member states’ behaviour. 
Furthermore, most of the abovementioned scholars do not make any claims with regard 
to the general applicability of their findings for issues or areas other than those included 
in their analysis. They are, in most cases, careful to explain the specifications and 
limitations to their analyses and findings. This is also why it does not seem useful to 
critically address any of the studies in more detail here. However, the table is provided to 
give a precise and brief overview of what has already been done in the field, and what 
further possibilities and necessary steps are still left for future investigations. On this 
basis, the conclusion must be that there is, to say the least, room for much more research: 
First, it is essential to simply advance the empirical knowledge and get more detailed 
information on all of the Council’s policy areas, across more stages of the legislative 
process and over longer time periods . Second, it is imperative to make use of rigorous 
statistical methods in order to appropriately capture and analyse any emerging patterns in, 
for example, voting behaviour. One notable observation related hereto is that many 
exogenous measures are available on the Council members’ characteristics , and can be 
useful in the testing and interpretation of findings from the Council. Third, it is necessary 
to address some of the current theoretical disputes. A final conclusion must be drawn on 
the disagreement between those scholars who present the Council as a ‘Council of 
Consensus’ and the group which pictures it at as ‘Council of Conflict’. Each of these 
assumptions has direct implications for how to approach the analyses of both intra- and 
inter-institutional issues. If Council decision-making is indeed dominated by informal 
norms of consensus without de facto formal rules in place, then the findings and 
fundamental assumptions from the rational institutionalist literature must be re-evaluated 
as they make claims about not only the position of policy outcomes from the Council 
itself, but also about the relationship between the EP, the Commission and the Council
25 Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace’s (2006) interesting data set mentioned in Table 1.3 consists o f voting 
records from 1994 to 2004, and is hence the largest o f the current data sets. However, as shown in 
Table 1, their data is restricted to the final voting stage and unfortunately stops short of any rigorous 
statistical analysis o f the findings; their reporting is in the form o f descriptive statistics.
26 An example is the governments’ political, social and economic positions as measured by Benoit and 
Laver (forthcoming, 2006).
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based on the formal decision-making rules. Therefore, if consensus is predominant to the 
extent that Council decision-making cannot be characterised as a bargaining game 
between strategic, utility maximising actors, then any further research should be very 
careful to capture the complexity of the informal negotiations in order to account for 
policy processes and outcomes. On the other hand, if no convincing evidence is found 
that Council decision-making is characterised by consensus rather than conflicts, and that 
formal rules are only secondary when reaching agreements, then it could perhaps be 
beneficial to draw on the insights from traditional bargaining theory and use the models 
proposed in the rational choice literature. The task of settling these fundamental questions 
is of great importance and may not even be the enormous tasks that they appear to be at 
first glance. What is needed is simply convincing data sets.
1.5 Available information from the Council
As mentioned above, the high percentage of legislation adopted by a -  at least officially -  
unanimous Council is a great concern for most EU scholars. However, this observation 
may be somewhat over-emphasised in the current literature and this thesis finds that it 
does not reflect an entirely correct picture of how legislation is adopted in the Council. 
The current literature’s limitation to analyses of final stage voting records reported in the 
Council’s monthly summaries neglects particularly two important sources of information: 
First, decisions from earlier stages than the final adoption stage are now publicly 
accessible via the public register of the Council and/or the PreLex database available at 
the EU website . This means that the restriction of studies of voting behaviour to last 
stage decisions is no longer necessary nor legitimate. At the final adoption stage the 
governments decide whether to accept or reject a proposal altogether, whereas the earlier 
stages consist of also negotiations over the content of the policy. Therefore, voting 
behaviour can be assumed to be different at the final adoption stage compared to prior
27 http://www.europa.eu.int/prelex/apcnet.cfm?CL=en. See also 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/oeil/search.jsp (both accessed 01 October 2006). In order to follow the policy 
through the various steps in the process it is sufficient to know the COM reference number of the initial 
Commission proposal for the PreLex database, the complete title o f the proposal or the inter-institutional 
file number for the public register o f the Council. The inter-institutional file number will provide all the 
documents linked to the same proposal/dossier (also from working groups) and can be found through 
PreLex (when the COM number is known) or on the top o f the page o f a Council document.
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readings. Hence it becomes of great importance to include also decisions from earlier 
stages.
Second, the formal statements following the adoption of a proposal may reveal 
yet another level of contest in the Council. Formal statements indicate a country’s (/ies’) 
disagreement with a policy proposal, often even in cases where it may not have been 
expressed through formal voting. Or a formal statement can be included in the minutes in 
order to highlight country specific standards related to the policy which a member state 
wishes to bring to the attention of other Council members or to external actors. Hence, 
although the analysis of voting behaviour should be based on the official records of how 
votes are cast, including formal statements as another source of information may provide 
another step towards a more accurate picture of the preference configurations in the 
Council.
Taking into account all legislative stages as well as the formal statements will of 
course not solve all issues of transparency and provide full information of the Council 
members’ ideal policy positions. The Council still adopts a large amount of decisions by 
a high degree of recorded consensus and the only formal accounts are the releases of the 
common position and related statements in the minutes from meetings held behind closed 
doors in the respective council formations. Hence, it is difficult to evaluate the effect of 
political signalling, vote trading or whether the outcomes are in fact a product of 
preference alignments. Nevertheless, the point is here that the picture drawn in the 
current literature does not show the full extent of what data is in fact available from 
Council documents; most scholars rather highlight what is not available.
So what information is accessible for studies on the Council members’ behaviour 
and preferences? From the Council minutes it is usually possible to get information on 
the following issues related to the respective policy proposals:
• Procedure,
• Date of introduction,
• Date of adoption,
• A and B points,
• Policy area (as categorised by the General Secretariat, preparatory bodies
and the Commission)
• Title of proposal,
• Details about the policy content,
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• Inter-institutional reference number,
• Sectoral Council,
• The stage of the legislative process when the vote was taken,
• The stage of the legislative process when the proposal was adopted,
• Identity of the member holding the Presidency, and
• Each country’s decision to
a. support,
b. abstain,
c. oppose, and/or
d. make a formal statement. Formal statements are either included in 
the minutes or posted separately on the Council’s website.
Information on each of these points above is, as already mentioned, available across the 
legislative stages and Council formations. Combined with also the related information 
regarding, for example, voting outcomes in the Council’s working groups or the EP’s 
plenary , the conclusion must be that data is indeed available on several important 
aspects of Council decision-making.
1.6 New empirical findings
Comparing the results from the data collected for the purpose of this thesis with the 
current literature’s description of the Council’s decision-making processes outlined 
above, particularly three issues appear somewhat contradictory. First, formal rules are 
found to be used more frequently for reaching agreements than what is reported in the 
current literature. Though, from the data it appears as if it is not necessarily only formal 
voting which the member states rely on when voicing their disagreement with new 
legislation: In the 1999-2004 time period there has been a rather frequent use of formal 
statements immediately following the adoption of a policy proposal. Formal statements 
have traditionally been described in the literature as only being used in cases where a 
member state abstains or opposes the majority in a voting situation and wishes to make 
its reasons for doing so public. However, the data set and the interviews make it clear that 
this is no longer the only purpose of the formal statements. Instead, it shows that the 
member states actually use the formal statements to voice their opposition against a 
proposal, while there may be reasons for not doing so by voting. There are several
28 http://www.europarl.eu.int/oeil/search.jsp (accessed 01 October 2006).
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Table 1.4: Recorded oppositions in current literature compared to data in this
thesis; last voting stages 1999-2004
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
□ Formal statements
Abstentions
Negative votes
Red and blue columns are results reported in Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006).
Black, grey and white columns are findings from this thesis’ data.
Figure 1.2 shows that the distribution of disagreements voiced through either formal 
statements or through voting and abstentions is rather varied across the Council 
members. Also, whereas the members who have opposed the least seem to consist mainly 
of medium and small member states, the group which has opposed the most includes 
Denmark and Sweden, and hence consists not only of larger member states. However, the 
intention here is not to investigate the patterns of opposition or support in the Council - 
that will be addressed in the empirical chapters - but rather to point out the difference in 
the results when including also the formal statements. The level of recorded oppositions 
is almost double as high for all countries when the statements are included, and it is clear 
when also comparing the findings with the results from the Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 
(2006) data, that the inclusion of such information in this thesis must lead to different 
conclusions regarding the level of conflict in the Council29.
Another finding from the data set which is somewhat in contrast to the current 
literature’s account of Council procedures is related to the distinction between ‘A’ and 
‘B’ agenda points. Although it is true that the intention behind the ‘A’ and ‘B’ points has 
traditionally been to ease the workload at the ministerial level and lower the need for
29 Please note that the columns in Table 1.4 for the year 2004 do not entirely correspond: The Hayes- 
Renshaw and Wallace (2006) data set covers the months until June 2004, whereas the columns 
representing the data from this thesis is until end o f April 2004.
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bargaining and formal voting at the last stage of the legislative process, the data shows 
here a very rare use of the ‘B’ point category which has traditionally been used for 
controversial agenda items only. The current literature often points to this categorisation 
as evidence that Council decision-making is institutionalised to a level where officials 
and other representatives are the ones to broker agreements, playing at least an equally 
important role as the ministers themselves. As a consequence, it is argued, this leads to a 
lack of transparency and the Council is often presented as a ‘Council of Consensus’ rather 
than ‘Council of Conflict’ as the ministers always seem to come to agreements with a 
super majority of members on board, even on ‘B’ agenda points. However, the data in 
this thesis shows that, for example, in 2003 the ‘B’ point category made up only 6,7% of 
the total amount of legislation adopted. This does not seem to correspond with the 
importance ascribed to the ‘A’ and ‘B’ distinction in the literature. Of course, this finding 
could be evidence that the member states are actually able to settle agreements without 
any disputes at the ministerial level. Yet, when taking an additional step and looking into 
the ‘B’ items, it is found that not all ‘B’ items are actually a basis for dispute. For 
example, in 2000 and 2001 there was only recorded disagreement on 9 out of 25 (36%) 
and 5 out of 15 (33%) of the ‘B’ points, respectively. Additionally, as will be evident 
from the empirical chapters, open disputes are increasingly accepted under ‘A’ points 
too. Hence, the difference between ‘A’ and ‘B’ items seem to be diminishing rather than 
the Council being increasingly able to pass legislation by consensus. Therefore, the 
literature’s recurring focus on the distinction between the two forms of agenda points 
could be questioned with regard to the categorisation of controversial or uncontroversial 
policy proposals. Rather, as was explained in a series of interviews with officials and 
representatives working in the Council, the categories may instead be viewed as a means 
for political signalling to external actors or internally between bureaucrats and 
politicians30. Table 1.5 summarises the findings.
30 Interview I, III, V, VI.
Table 1.5: Recorded disagreement in ‘B’ agenda points
Year
Number 
of acts 
adopted
‘B’
points
Disagreement*/’B ’
points
1999 161 10 7(6.2%) (70%)
2000 169 25(14.8%)
9
(36%)
2001 160 15 5(9.3%) (33%)
2002 163 17 15(10.4%) (88%)
2003 163 11(6.7%)
9
(82%)
2004** 115 2(1.7%)
2
(100%)
* By disagreement it is meant that more than 2 countries 
opposed or abstained from voting under QMV.
** The figure for 2004 only covers the January-May period.
A third finding largely unrecognised by the literature, yet, which in the data proves to 
deserve further attention, is the issue of how the Amsterdam Treaty has changed 
decision-making within the Council. Much attention has been given to the changes in the 
inter-institutional dynamics, yet it is apparent that important accommodations have also 
been made in the Council itself. After the reform of the Co-decision procedure in the 
Amsterdam Treaty, which came into effect in May 1999, more legislation falls within the 
Co-decision procedure and can now be adopted already in the first reading. In other 
words, it is currently possible to see Co-decision legislation adopted at either the first 
reading in the Council, the second reading in the EP, the second reading in the Council or
o  1
in the Conciliation Committee . The empirical findings related to this issue are presented 
in Table 1.6.
31 For an explanation of the EU’s inter-institutional legislative processes see Hix (2005).
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Table 1.6: Decision rules and adoption rates per year
Year
Number of 
acts 
adopted
Council Voting 
Rule, Unanimity
Council Voting 
Rule, QMV
1999 161
2000 169
2001 160
2002 163
2003 164
20048 115
QMV legislation 
adopted in 
Council 1st 
reading
85 76 41
(52.8%) (47.2%) (53.9%)
80 89 52
(47.3%) (52.7%) (58.4%)
58 102 32
(36.3%) (63.8%) (31.3%)
66 97 35
(40.5%) (59.5%) (36.1%)
103 61 35
(63.2%) (36.8%) (58.3%)
87 28 19
(75.7%) (24.3%) (67.8%)
(%) are row percentages.
8 The figure for 2004 only covers the January-May period.
Table 1.6 shows that each year has had an adoption rate of between 160 and 170 pieces 
of legislation. Yet, the ability to adopt legislation already at the 1st reading seem to be 
vary across the years, with the middle years having a lower adoption rate at the 1st 
reading than the early and late years. Of the adopted legislation, 52.8% fell under the 
unanimity requirement and 47.2% fell under the QMV system in 1999, whereas 40.5% 
and 63.2% fell under unanimity and 59.5% and 36.8% was adopted under QMV in 2002 
and 2003, respectively. In other words, the rate of passing laws under the different rules 
varied considerably in these years, and whether the figures indicate that Council decision­
making is becoming more efficient since legislation can be adopted also at earlier stages 
is still left for further research to explore32. However, a few descriptive studies suggest 
that due to time pressure and the fewer negotiation stages it is increasingly necessary to 
rely on quicker decisions in the meetings through the use of formal rules (e.g. 
Mammonas 2005; Lemp 2006) . In either case, it seems relevant for future research to 
also address issues related hereto when further advancing the current literature’s accounts 
of decision-making processes in the Council.
32 Also, efficiency could of course be argued to be more related to time than to adoption stage.
33 See also Dimitrakopoulos (2004) on the inter-institutional agreement between the EP and the Council 
on the intention to speed up and make the legislative process more efficient.
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1.7 Summary
This chapter has described the legislative processes for adopting legislation in the 
Council and discussed the current theoretical and empirical accounts of the implications 
of the formal institutional framework. Based on a few indicative findings from the data 
set used in this thesis, 3 findings were presented and suggest that more information is in 
fact accessible and may allow for further analyses of voting behaviour and preferences 
structures than what is currently included in the literature: First, it was found that the 
reported level of disagreement in the Council may be underestimated or even somewhat 
skewed as quantitative studies have so far confined themselves to last stage voting 
records without taking into account decisions from earlier stages. Second, the Council 
members often make formal statements following the adoption of a proposal. These 
formal statements may reveal yet another level of contest in the Council as they include 
both statements which show direct disagreement with an adopted piece of legislation or a 
member state’s serious concerns with a proposal. Third, the literature’s recurring focus 
on the distinction between the two forms of agenda points, ‘A’ and ‘B’ points which are 
automatically presented as either controversial or uncontroversial policy proposals, must 
be re-evaluated. From the findings in this thesis’ data it seems that ‘B’ agenda points are 
rarely used and actually do not seem to always include any noteworthy disputes. Also, 
‘A’ agenda points are not -  as will be apparent in the empirical chapters -  always 
automatically ‘nodded’ though by the Ministers (Moberg 2002). Therefore, as has been 
suggested by Council representatives and officials, the categories may actually be a mean 
for political signalling rather than a sign of institutionalised bargaining.
The two first sections in this chapter showed that the existing theoretical and 
empirical literature has provided invaluable insights into the functioning of the Council. 
However, it was also made clear that the expectations from the theories and the findings 
in the empirical research do not allow for extensive and coherent conclusions to be made 
regarding legislative politics in the Council. So far no research project has fully explored 
the Council dynamics across legislative stages, policy areas or decision procedures. There 
are reasons to be cautious with making generalisations based on the current research, as 
each of the existing studies include important boundary specifications. Most 
specifications have been necessary due to the limited availability of data, and may also
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explain why some research projects have resulted in contradicting evidence when 
addressing similar research questions. Though, the access to Council information has 
recently changed and although collection and coding of data is obviously a time 
consuming and less-interesting exercise than the analytical part itself, it seems to be the 
most convincing way forward from the current position. Research on legislative politics 
in the Council which combines theoretical knowledge and empirical analysis is indeed 
possible to an extent which still remains to be sufficiently explored.
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Chapter 2: A theory of party politics and strategic 
behaviour in the Council of Ministers
2.1 Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapter, the current literature mainly presents the Council as 
an intergovernmental institution where decision-making is dependent on the distribution 
of voting power, the governments’ preferences regarding further EU integration, their 
geographical or economic status, or other nation-based characteristics. A party political 
framework is still rarely applied in both theoretical and empirical investigations of intra- 
institutional dynamics in the Council, and is usually completely disregarded in analyses 
of inter-institutional bargaining between the Council and the Parliament.
This chapter draws on the insights from different sets of literature on decision­
making and presents a theory of voting behaviour. The theory implies that the 
governments are not only national representatives, but also political parties who 
strategically calculate how to fulfil their preferences over policy content and the degree 
of regulation. The members of the Council have political ambitions explicitly stated in 
party manifestos. The consequences are that when the majority of governments are from 
a left-wing (right-wing) political background, this will also be reflected in the 
negotiations and new policy outcomes. The minority right-wing (left-wing) governments 
may in this scenario find themselves in opposition to the common position more often. 
However, this is not to argue that EU policy is generally not adopted according to the 
member states’ preferences over EU integration. Proposals are most likely presented to 
the Council on the basis of estimations and prior agreements on the degree of EU 
harmonisation that is acceptable to the members. Once this level is established in the 
European Council and preparatory bodies, negotiations over a policy issue become a 
party political matter where attitudes towards the content and level of regulation are 
determined by the governments’ party preferences.
Beside of presenting the governments as political parties, the theory argues that 
the Council members behave strategically in the pursuit of their ideal policy preferences. 
Due to the effects of the weighted voting system as well as the fact that the cost of being
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in opposition is very high, voting cannot be interpreted in the strict form where those 
opposing will vote against and those in favour will support. The current literature usually 
interprets the results from a Council vote as an outcome which either 1) indicates a great 
degree of preference alignment or willingness to signal consensus vis-a-vis the other EU 
institutions, or 2) predicts the policy outcome to be the product of the QMV pivot’s 
preferences. Contrary to this interpretation, the argument made here is that voting 
outcomes are not due to institutional solidarity, unconstrained sincere voting or based on 
considerations of Council versus EP powers. The Council members are assumed to have 
a defined set of sincere policy preferences which they may pursue in a strategic manner 
due to the constraints imposed by the weighted voting system. Hence, voting outcomes 
are the results of party political estimations by each government of when and how a 
policy proposal is best influenced, and when their disagreement needs to be heard.
The following sections present the theoretical arguments in a step-wise manner: 
Section 2.2 draws on three different sets of literature and compares the Council to other 
decision-making institutions. First, it is considered from an international perspective and 
compared to other multi-national assemblies. Second, it is compared to national 
legislatures with a particular focus on the debate within the political science literature on 
the consequences of legislative bargaining between actors driven by either policy- or 
office-seeking incentives. Third, the thesis draws on insights from the literature on 
corporate governance and explains how the voting system in many ways resembles that 
of shareholder voting in private companies.
Section 2.3 subsequently states and explains a set of assumptions about the 
governments’ ability to make choices. The assumptions concern the rationality and 
cohesiveness of parties and governments, issues of information, implications of repeated 
bargaining as well as the location of the status quo.
The theoretical argument of the thesis is then presented in Section 2.4 and states 
that alliances are formed as ‘weighted preference-connected coalitions’. As explained 
above, the theory implies that voting behaviour is a reflection of the governments’ 
location in the policy space, as well as their strategic calculations over how to influence 
policy outcomes based on the voting power. Lastly, a set of testable hypotheses are 
derived from the theory. The hypotheses are related to the dimensionality of the policy
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space within which the Council members decide as well as specific expectations to 
behaviour across policy areas and across the different stages of the legislative process.
2.2 Three sets of literature on decision-making
The Council is a unique political entity. Yet, from a comparative perspective, the 
institution does have elements which resemble other legislative bodies in both its 
institutional setup and policy activities. This section discusses three different sets of 
literature which each provide valuable insights into voting behaviour and general 
dynamics in decision-making bodies. The three decision-making contexts considered are 
those of international institutions, national legislatures and corporate governance. 
Particularly the latter offers interesting findings with regard to strategic behaviour in 
weighted voting systems, yet has rarely -  if ever -  been considered in relation to the 
Council voting system. Theoretical models from the two former decision-making 
contexts usually provide the analytical tools for academic analyses of Council decision­
making. A few of the conclusions from the discussions of these two decision-making 
contexts can therefore also be found in some of the existing research mentioned in the 
previous chapter. However, each of the three sets of literature brings fundamental 
elements to the theoretical argument presented in section 2.4, and therefore requires some 
elaboration before the theoretical ideas behind the ‘weighted preference-connected 
coalition’ argument are presented in detail.
2.2.1 Lessons from studies o f international institutions
The definition of the EU, and in particular the Council of Ministers, as an international 
organisation is still very much apparent in the literature, especially within the field of 
International Relation (IR) studies (e.g. Hill and Smith 2005). Legally speaking, an 
international organisation must be established by a treaty providing it with legal 
recognition. International organisations established on this basis are subjects of 
international law, capable of entering into agreements among themselves or with states.
The EU is legally founded on the treaties adopted throughout the past six decades 
and resembles other international organisations in that power is formally possessed by the
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member states. Decisions in the Council are made by unanimity or by the QMV system, 
which the governments have formally agreed to. Also, the preparatory bodies and 
working groups are all national representatives or independent appointees of the 
governments and possess -  at least formally - merely advisory functions. However, 
unlike other international organisations, the Council activities cover all areas of public 
policy, from health and economy to foreign affairs and defence. The extent of its powers 
differs greatly between these areas, yet, the mere scope of policy cooperation makes the 
Council unique in the international context.
As the EU is therefore a great deal more complex than most international 
organisations, traditional IR theory is often argued to be ill fitted for the scrutiny of both 
daily EU politics and bargaining at International Governmental Conferences (IGCs) 
(Caporaso and Keeler 1995). Yet, Pierson (1996) explains how IR theory can still 
maintain its state actor perspective even within the complex EU context:
‘Despite significant internal disputes, the dominant paradigm in IR scholarship 
regards European Integration as the practice of ordinary diplomacy under 
conditions creating unusual opportunities for providing collective goods through 
highly institutionalised exchange. From this ‘intergovemmentalisf perspective, 
the EC is essentially a forum for interstate bargaining. Member-states remain the 
only important actors at the European level. Societal actors exert influence only 
through the domestic political structures of member-states. Policy making is 
made through negotiation among member-states or through carefully 
circumscribed delegations of authority. Whether relying on negotiation or 
delegation [...] Chiefs of government are at the heart of the EC and each 
member-state seeks to maximise its own advantage.’ (Pierson 1996:124)
This fundamental theory of individual and collective preference aggregation between 
states is, indeed, not without consequences. Implicitly, the framework assumes that the 
primary political instrument by which popular will is translated into international action 
is the national government, which acts externally and as a unitary entity on behalf of its 
constituency (Archen 1995). However, it is on several occasions mentioned that this
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assumption does not presuppose that states are also unitary in their internal politics 
(Moravcsik 1998:20). Rather, it merely maintains that once particular objectives arise out 
of the domestic competition, then states negotiate as unitary entities against/with other 
states. Therefore, state preferences need not necessarily be fixed, but may vary in 
response to changes in the economic, social or political environment (Moravcsik 
1998:22f). Nevertheless, even if the state bargaining scenario is on this basis an easy 
assumption to adopt in relation to Council decision-making, two issues are problematic 
from this approach: Although the institution is a formal legislative body, where 
governments meet to solve problems of common concern and advance shared interests, 
the governments do not have a monopoly on political demands even at the EU level. 
Furthermore, the fact that the governments are also political parties is largely neglected, 
although this fact seems of great relevance when considering issues of interest 
representation.
Both of these observations regarding the institutional set-up and the political 
identity of the actors change the preference aggregation process considerably at the 
collective EU level as well as in the national sphere, compared to what is suggested by 
the state centrist theories within the IR literature. The IR argument that preferences are 
nation-based implies that there would be no significant changes at the EU level if one or 
more countries experience a change in government. Although Moravcsik (1998) argues 
that the state preferences need not be fixed, the governments are presented as 
representatives of the aggregated national interests, and are not themselves portrayed as 
actively promoting interests of their own. Hence, new governments would essentially 
pursue similar national preferences as their predecessors since they arise from the same 
basis of interests. Conversely, if the EU system is regarded as a democratic political 
system where political parties translate public needs and opinions into political action, 
and interest groups seek to influence this process by promoting specific interests 
according to their members’ preferences (Hix 2005:7), then a change in government will 
have an effect also on EU decision-making. From this view, national representatives are 
not assumed to execute the same policy preferences as those held by their entire national 
constituencies. The governments would simply not be representative of the full set of
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populations, and representatives in favour of alternative policy solutions should be 
observed.
The fact that the Council is merely one institution out of three in which the 
preferences of the EU citizens are either directly or indirectly represented34, and that 
many checks and balances are in place for scrutinizing the actions of the institution, 
support the critique of pure state-centric analyses. In addition, as the Council is a 
legislative institution where elected representatives bargain over preferences in a wide 
range of policy areas that are not directly related to geo-politically defined issues such as 
state power or security, makes it seem doubtful that a party political affiliation is entirely 
innocent in the legislative scenario. EU politics also calls for the actors to have 
standpoints on the regulatory functions and redistributive impact of legislation.
2,2.2 Lessons from studies o f national legislatures
The Council members have different preferences and bargain over policy issues within a 
defined institutional framework, similarly to how the domestic political sphere is usually 
conceptualised in the political science literature (Hinich and Munger 1997). Therefore, 
this section moves on to a discussion of some of the key points from the political science 
literature on the function of political actors, representation of interests as well as actors’ 
motivations for participating in political activities. The intention is, in other words, to 
consider some of the theoretical and methodological answers which are provided by the 
general political science literature on government, politics and processes. Through this 
approach it may be possible to address and capture the effect of different representations 
of interests in the Council, regardless of the content and nature of those interests.
Members of a national legislature usually consist of elected representatives from a 
standardized political system35, where the population shares a common understanding of 
the political platforms of the candidates. Hence, in most cases, the legislators are selected 
on the basis of their policy manifestos and receive an equal distribution of voting weights 
for adopting laws. In parliamentary systems the legislature appoints the executive,
34 Besides o f having their interests represented in the EP (by direct elections) and in the Council 
(indirect elections) the citizens o f the EU can also been said to influence the development and 
enforcement o f EU law by taking legal action either in national courts or the European Court o f Justice 
(Hix 2006:5).
35 Though, not necessarily based on a common set o f electoral rules (e.g. Spain).
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whereas in presidential systems it is considered a power branch equal to, and independent 
of, the executive. Legislatures normally have the exclusive authority to raise taxes and 
adopt the budget, and its consent is required for the ratification of treaties and 
declarations of war.
The organisation of legislatures at the national level is characterised by political 
parties (e.g Sartori 1976; Lijphart 1999; Mair 1997). Parties are collaborative devices for 
mutual gain (Strom 2000:182. See also e.g. Cox and McCubbins 1993) and the literature 
usually points to three different political conditions which may generate incentives for 
party formation to occur: either parties emerge due to collective action issues, social 
choice problems or political ambitions (Aldrich 1995). The central functions of parties in 
government are to control policy-making, policy implementation and administration, and 
to take public responsibility for policy outcomes (Keys 1964). As democratic political 
systems always include more than one party group, voters can use the competition 
between parties as a mechanism for choosing between policy alternatives (e.g. 
Schumpeter 1943) and to reward or punish elected officials (e.g. Strom 1990).36
Studies of coalition formation and party competition in national legislatures have 
traditionally relied on the assumption that legislators are either ‘office-seekers’ or 
‘policy-seekers’. Each of the two assumptions has direct implications for legislators’ 
political behaviour and can be summarised as follows: The ‘office-seeker’ branch of the 
literature generally draws on the Median Voter Theorem developed by Black (1958). The 
Median Voter Theorem has at its core the idea that whoever controls the median is the 
pivotal voter under simple majority rules, capable of tipping a minority into a majority. 
The theorem supposes single-peaked preferences of voters in a uni-dimensional policy 
space, yet, does not take into account for example issues of agenda-manipulation or vote 
cycling (May 1952; McKelvey 1972; Riker 1982; Schofield 1978; Sen 1982; Shepsle 
1979; Tullock 1981). Building on the median voter argument, Riker (1962) has explained 
how all multiparty systems will converge into two coalitions of almost equal size in the 
government formation process. Since the control of office at the national level is a zero- 
sum game, Riker’s theory states that rational actors should only form minimum-winning
36 Though, refer to e.g. Schattschneider (1960) for a critique o f parties’ ability to accommodate voters’ 
preferences, Sartori (1976) for the argument that parties only promotes one group o f the popultation’s 
interests, and also Katz and Mair (1995) for the argument that parties form ‘cartels’ in order to ensure 
their positions in office.
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coalitions in order to ensure as large a share of the pay-off to each of the winning parties 
as possible (see also Von Neumann and Morgenstem 1953; Baron and Ferejohn 1989). 
Implicitly, the empirical consequence of the ‘minimum-winning coalition’ is that smaller 
parties are more likely to be included in the winning coalition than larger parties, as they 
are less costly at the stage where the distribution of the spoils of holding office are 
agreed. However, if a party finds itself in the position to be pivotal for turning a losing 
coalition into a winning coalition, it becomes powerful and can demand a disproportional 
share of the spoils. The voting power index approach described in Chapter 1 builds on 
these insights.
The ‘policy-seeking’ approach, on the other hand, argues that some coalitions are 
more likely to form than others dependent on ideological distance. That is, parties will 
only form coalitions with other parties close to their ideological preference points. Hence, 
the approach goes against the assumption that policies have no intrinsic value to a party’s 
leadership (Down 1957). The requirement that parties which are part of the same 
coalitions will be located near each other within a given ideological-issue dimension does 
not necessarily result in minimum-winning coalitions. However, forming a coalition 
entails bargaining among the potential coalition members and bargaining takes time. 
Therefore, since it is reasonable to assume that it is easier for fewer parties to form a 
coalition than for more, and in particular if they are situated close to one another along 
the policy continuum rather than far away, it can be expected that coalitions containing 
the smallest number of parties is the most likely to form (Lieserson 1966). Hence, 
Axelrod (1970) famously proposed that coalition formation would be in the form of 
‘minimum-connected winning coalitions’ .
A debate is still present in the political science literature over whether the office- 
seeking or policy-seeking argument most adequately explains and predicts party 
formation and coalition processes at the national level. Several empirical studies have 
been carried out to settle the issue, and evidence has been provided by locating each party 
in a country along a left-right issue dimension and subsequently testing the theoretical 
arguments by looking into bargaining processes and coalition outcomes. For this purpose, 
scholars of European politics have relied on judgements by panels of experts, mass
37 See also De Swaan’s (1973) variation, which specifies how the minimum-wining coalition also 
should be o f the smallest ideological range.
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survey data, and content analysis of party manifestos . Yet, the location of various 
parties in the policy space is a somewhat difficult matter and, hence, there is even 
disagreement over how well the empirical evidence supports either of the theories. Taylor 
and Laver (1973), De Swaan (1975), and De Swaan and Mokken (1980) claim that the 
minimum-connected winning coalition hypothesis provides the best explanation for the 
observed behaviour. Yet, Warwick (1994) finds that the minimum-connected winning 
coalition hypothesis adds no explanatory power to the predictions offered by the 
minimum-winning coalition hypothesis (Mueller 2003:280-283). Laver and Schofield’s 
(1990) later work also lends support to Warwick’s findings.
Each of these considerations from the literature on the functionality of government 
and political ambitions of actors in the national political sphere can be applied to the 
Council scenario. The Council resembles a national level legislature in that it is one of 
two chambers which is elected on the basis of their policy positions and which debates 
and passes law. However, contrary to most bicameral systems, the Council is more 
powerful than the Parliament. In this way, it can be said to resemble the structure of 
previous political systems in many European countries, where an upper house, consisting 
of the Lords, ruled. Alternatively, one could also compare the EU political system to the 
US’ division of power system, where different institutions have been allocated separate 
competences, and where some policy competences are anchored at the central level of 
government while others are attributed to the state level (Volden 2005). Nevertheless, 
similarly to party leaders at the national level, the political actors represented in the 
Council are connected to the national constituencies mainly through their party political 
basis, since this is the platform they are elected on, and since this is also the strongest 
mechanism for holding the governments accountable. However, party political identities 
are not only exported from the national level to the EU level, but have also emerged at 
the EU level itself, particularly within the Parliament (Hix et al. forthcoming, 2006). 
Here, the Parliament’s party groups are found to behave much in line with observed 
govemment-opposition dynamics at the national level (Hoyland 2005), and the fact that 
MEPs from governing parties are also represented in the Council seems to influence both
38 For a discussion and comparison of these research methods, please refer to Laver and Schofield 
(1990:245-265).
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the internal dynamics in the Parliament and the inter-institutional bargaining in the Co­
decision procedure (Hoyland and Hagemann 2006).
If party politics is indeed present in the Council negotiations, then the lessons from 
the study of national legislatures would suggest two alternatives for which policies and 
political motivations governments are trying to pursue at the EU level:
1) Governments are primarily office-seekers at the domestic level and engage in EU 
decision-making on the basis that this will enable problem solving within the 
national sphere through collective action with other EU governments. Since the 
competition over office at the national level is about left-right policy positions of 
the electorate and parties, these are the policy positions that governments are 
most likely to care most about and emphasise also at the EU level.
2) Alternatively, one could assume that parties in government are policy-seekers at 
the domestic as well as at the EU level. Since their political identities are formed 
on the basis of preferences over left-right political issues in national politics as 
well as due to the present degree of co-operation within most EU policy areas, the 
policies that governments negotiate on are mainly of a left-right political nature 
(Hix and Lord 1997; cf. Hooghe and Marks 1999).
Researchers who have focused on power politics and have applied the ‘office-seeker’ 
approach to the Council setting predict that the size of a country in terms of it shares of 
votes determines the coalition formation and the likelihood of a country voting ‘Yes’ or 
‘No’ to a proposal (e.g. Hosli 1999; Mattila 2004; Mattila 2006). The four largest 
countries (Germany, France, UK and Italy) have accordingly been found to have great
• IQ
agenda-setting powers (Felsenthal and Machover 2001 ). However, medium countries 
(Spain, Netherlands, Greece, Belguim, Portugal) and smaller countries (Sweden Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Luxembourg) may experience disproportionate power 
opportunities for influencing polices if they are located as a decisive actor.
Conversely, if the governments in the Council are policy-seekers rather than 
office-seekers, then coalitions may not be formed based on a bargaining game which is
39 Please refer to Romer and Rosenthal (1978) for the original setter-model.
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focused on the inclusion or exclusion of members. Rather, it will be the aggregation of 
the individual members’ preferences over a given policy proposal which determines the 
size of the coalitions, and no government should be expected to be excluded based on a 
calculation over the distribution of votes or policy spoils. Effectively, this may lead to a 
tendency of supermajority rule (Goodin and List 2006), particularly if preferences are 
generally located closer to rather than far away from each other. However, the 
dimensionality of the issues which the governments bargain over becomes important in 
this scenario: If one assumes that the policies that governments care about are mainly 
left-right issues, negotiations in the Council will be competitive between left-wing and 
right-wing governments regarding the location of the new status quo. The left/right axis 
is generally found to be the continuum along which parties compete (e.g. Poole and 
Rosenthal 1997), and also represents the differences in socio-economic interests which 
have caused parties to emerge in the first place (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Negotiations 
may in this scenario be quite dynamic as parties seek to respond to current political 
demands and governments are replaced. In contrast, policies on European integration 
could divide actors along national lines rather than party lines and would possibly result 
in a more complicated and divisive negotiation process (Hix and Lord 1997; cf. Hooghe 
and Marks 1999). In the worst case scenario this could undermine the Council’s own 
internal cohesion, and an interesting question hence arises if the Council members and 
bureaucracy can simply avoid issues of such a nature in order to ensure smooth and 
efficient decision-making.
Legislative politics in the Council are not about the spoils of holding office in the 
traditional manner considered by supporters of the office-seeking theory. The main 
reason is that coalition formation in the Council is not a zero-sum game where the 
exclusion of a member from a winning majority would result in an increase in the pay-off 
for the remaining coalition partners. In fact, member states may prefer to invite other 
governments into a coalition which they formally do not have to, yet politically need to 
accommodate due to future bargaining games or to signal political coherence to other EU 
institutions and the population. Consequently, the ‘size principle’ may not always be 
apparent in the Council’s coalition formations in Riker’s (1962) or Axelrod’s (1970)
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definitions40. Nevertheless, this does not indicate a less competitive bargaining scenario 
between the governments; the location of new policy can be assumed to be a highly 
contested issue which the governments seek to influence according to the policy 
preferences of their constituencies. Whether they do this in order to ensure the spoils of 
holding office at the national level or they are policy-seekers at both the EU-level and the 
national political sphere is an issue which will be returned to in Section 2.3 below. 
However, the observation made here is that the adoption of legislation rarely results in 
direct office spoils at the EU level. Hence, coalitions may be preference-connected, but 
cannot be expected to be minimum-winning or minimum-preference-connected.
Voting behaviour is in the political science literature often used as an indicator of 
legislators’ preferences (Dowding 2002). Following the policy-seeking argument above, 
legislators that share the same preferences are expected to vote together and will be part 
of the same coalition. Implicitly, legislators with opposing preferences will be part of 
different coalitions and will not vote similarly on most policy issues. However, such 
expectations presuppose that the actors vote sincerely. This assumption is not necessarily 
shared by the supporters of the office-seeking theory. Due to the high costs related to 
opposing the majority in the Council, governments may have incentives to not always 
vote sincerely when they find themselves in disagreement with a policy proposal. The 
last issue to consider before formulating a theory of voting behaviour in the Council is 
therefore the extent and implications of this matter. The literature on corporate 
governance has provided important empirical findings with regard to how actors may 
respond to a weighted voting system by voting strategically. Hence, the next section will 
outline and discuss the insights from this set of literature on decision-making.
2.2.3 Lessons from studies o f corporate governance
The literature on corporate governance is extensive and offers several interesting findings 
regarding the relationship between shareholders and delegates. It also provides rigorous 
analyses of the empirical implications of differences in voting power, and shareholders’ 
considerations of direct pay-offs when deciding whether to actively participate in voting 
(Leech 1999). Therefore, although a comparison of the Council to a private corporation
40 See also Krehbiel 1998; Grosclose and Snyder 1996; Goodin and List 2006.
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may at first seem to stretch the analysis beyond relevance, there are fundamental 
similarities and lessons to be learned also from such evaluations.
Thinking of the Council as a corporation, where the constituencies are the 
shareholders represented by their political delegates41, at least three findings from the 
corporate governance literature are directly applicable to the Council: 1) all but the very 
largest shareholders are regarded as too small to have any real voting power; yet, 2) all 
shareholders experience an incentive to participate in decision-making when there is a 
possibility for a change in their expected pay-offs by the adoption of a decision; 3) 
opposition to or support for a proposal is found to be determined by the shareholder’s 
interest in the pay-off (in terms of absolute revenue), and the calculation of whether the 
shareholder’s vote will have any influence on the outcome (i.e. the relative value of the 
vote).
Voting by shareholders in a company is about the making of a choice which is 
either directly or indirectly linked to the question of how the firm maximises profits. 
Though, this may also include more strategic matters such as the fundamental nature of 
the products, the choice of production function or perhaps even management issues. In 
such cases it is inappropriate to cast the problem facing the shareholders as a simple 
choice between present values of explicit, alternative profit outcomes. If a shareholder’s 
vote is needed to decide on a matter, this is often because there is not unanimity among 
directors or investors. Or, the decision may be of such a magnitude that the shareholders’ 
consent is needed either from a legalistic perspective or simply in order for the 
management of the company to share the burden of responsibility (Glynn et al. 2003:6). 
Furthermore, it might be the case that neither of the proposed alternatives to be decided 
upon can be unambiguously shown to be better. Therefore, the choice to be made by the 
shareholders may be of a rather complex nature, and can be regarded as quite similar to 
one presented to a legislature, where possible outcomes have to be evaluated without 
knowing the exact ‘revenue’.
Decision-making by shareholders in corporations is commonly characterised by 
an unequal distribution of voting power, which in some cases is even further emphasised 
in a distinction between A- and B-shares (Leech 1988). In most cases B-shares are open
41 Here the comparison is made while disregarding who’s interests are represented by the delegates.
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to the public whereas A-shares are in the hands of the ‘real’ owners. These owners may 
be, for example, the founders or the founders’ descendants. Nevertheless, the distinction 
between the two kinds of shares dictates a difference in the percentage of voting rights, 
such that B-shares count for Vi and A-shares for 2 in voting situations. It has in many big 
companies become a norm for A-share holders to have the - sometimes contradictory - 
privilege of casting their votes first (Skypala 2006). This may have great implications for 
how the B-shareholders cast their votes, as their vote can become completely irrelevant if 
their shares are small compared to the A-shareholders’ proportion. Conversely, they may 
in fact become disproportionally important if they turn out to be pivotal based on the 
votes which have already been cast. In either case, the consequence is that some voters 
may find that they prefer to vote strategically rather than sincerely (ibid).
A key empirical insight from the corporate governance literature is that incentives 
to participate are usually in place regardless of the vote share, due to the shareholders’ 
interests in the expected pay-off. For example, a shareholder who owns a 1% stake in the 
UK’s 100th largest company -  currently Smith Industries which is worth £29 million - 
still experiences a strong incentive to be active, and will most likely wish to use her 
voting power irrespective of the real possibility for influencing outcomes. Such interests 
may of course vary to a certain degree, and shareholders’ behaviour is also found to 
change between issues which have fewer consequences for the revenue, and those which 
have more (Leech and Manjon 2003). However, this finding is made in parallel to the 
somewhat contradictory observation that opposition or support of an issue is closely 
related to the shareholders’ possibility for influencing decision outcomes (Leech and 
Leech forthcoming, 2006). So although preferences over the voting result -  defined by 
the expected pay-off - seem to dictate voting behaviour in the first example, voting 
behaviour is also found to be linked to the distribution of voting power (ibid). As a result, 
the corporate governance literature reaches a very strong conclusion regarding how to 
capture and analyse shareholders’ voting behaviour: Although shareholders’ preferences 
and the saliency of the vote (i.e. interest in absolute returns from the voting outcome) is 
in some cases found to be the primary explanatory variable for voting behaviour, these 
issues are argued to be necessary to study on an individual, case-by-case basis (Leech 
1999). Analyses of the implications of an unequal distribution of voting power should -
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at least initially -  be studied separately, it is argued. This conclusion is drawn as no 
general assumptions can be made about the shareholders’ preferences other than their 
interests in increasing the revenue (Leech 1999; Leech and Leech, forthcoming 2006). 
Therefore, analyses should instead address the unique role of voting power in a formal 
and systematic way. Based on such formal analyses of the consequences of voting power, 
more advanced and empirically informed models can then, if necessary, be constructed to 
provide more complete analyses in the individual decision contexts (Leech 1999; Leech 
and Manjon 2003).
These recommendations have fortunately also been carried out in empirical 
analyses. The main conclusion with regard to the implications of a weighted voting 
system is that larger shareholders dominate the decision-making. Although small 
shareholders are generally found to actively participate in voting due to the interests in 
the absolute returns, they do seem to take into account the positions of the larger owners 
(Leech and Manjon 2003). This is hardly surprising. However, it is still a useful 
observation to bear in mind, especially when considering the critique made by some 
theorists regarding the applicability of voting power indices also to other decision­
making contexts (cf. Chapter 1). On the other hand, when empirical information has been 
added, this observation is reported to vary between issues which have fewer 
consequences for the revenue and those which have more. Indeed, the preferences or the 
saliency of the vote, to put it in political science terms, has a major impact on voting 
behaviour42 and has in certain cases been found to be the dominant explanatory variable 
for shareholders’ voting behaviour (Leech 2003). Nevertheless, due to the difficulty with 
making assumptions about shareholders’ preferences a priory in a corporate governance 
scenario, the recommendations for studies of shareholder voting made above seem 
convincing: It may be beneficial to seek to capture the consequences of an unequal 
distribution of voting power in a formal and systematic way, and then subsequently 
empirical enrich such a basic model.
Unlike in the corporate governance literature, the consequences of the weighted 
voting system in the Council has been considered mainly in a theoretical manner,
42 A frequently made observation related to this point is that in a substantial proportion o f companies a 
small group o f leading shareholders are found to combine to produce a powerful, controlling block 
although they may only posses a minority of the shares (Leech and Leech forthcoming 2006).
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presumably due to the sparse availability of empirical material43. Though, the evaluations 
of the voting system have in these studies been focused on much the same topics as what 
has been studied in the corporate governance literature: the incentives to participate in 
voting and the possibilities for influencing policy outcomes. It therefore seems of great 
relevance to try to learn from the above findings from the corporate governance 
literature. Yet, a few apparent differences between the two voting scenarios should be 
mentioned: In the Council, no formal rules are in place regarding who can cast their votes 
first and who will be allowed to hold back their decision. However, it would be 
interesting to investigate whether governments generally try to await others’ decision in 
order to calculate the better strategy. Another differentiating issue is that vote shares 
cannot be sold in the Council, and in that way provide an exit for the ‘owner’. Neither 
can a government maximise its influence in a single policy field or at the aggregate level 
by buying more shares44. Nevertheless, if one adopts the same conclusions to the Council 
setting as what has been found in the corporate governance literature, then two main 
expectations can be formulated regarding the Council members’ voting behaviour within 
the weighted voting system: First, governments have an incentive to participate in 
decision-making regardless of their vote share. Council representatives, like large 
institutional investor agents, have to be present in negotiations at all times regardless of 
the policy issues. Since it can be assumed that these representatives aim to get the best 
“return” for their constituencies, incentives will always be in place for being involved in 
the decision process. When a decision is made on a policy proposal, the new status quo 
will most commonly apply to all member states, and involvement is therefore important 
also for the smaller Council members. Second, preferences over a decision-outcome and 
the unequal distribution of voting behaviour may similarly to the corporate governance 
setting be dominant variables for explaining the governments’ voting behaviour. In the 
corporate governance literature the conclusion was that, since shareholders’ preferences 
over the issues to be voted upon are not easily predicted, voting behaviour within this 
weighted voting system should be studied based on the distribution of voting power. It
43 Though, see for example Bailer (2004), Pajala and Widgren (2004); cf. Chapter 1.
44 The only way something similar could be argued for in the Council is if one assumed an extensive use of 
vote trading as a government’s method for increasing its vote share. However, as will be elaborated in the 
next section, vote trading does not seem to take place in the Council to a degree where it could be 
perceived as a permanent system for increasing influence
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was argued that more empirically informed models can then subsequently be introduced 
in analyses of individual decision context. However, one important observation should be 
made here: the corporate governance literature’s findings regarding the importance, yet 
also difficulty with, saliency and preferences may not prove quite as unpredictable and 
unstructured in the Council. Whereas the actors within the corporate governance setting 
can be assumed to be utility maximisers in terms of seeking to increase their absolute 
revenue from the company, they may each have completely different ideas regarding how 
such increases can and should be accomplished. The interest in the revenue may in fact 
be the only issue which they have in common. In other words, these actors may not share 
any wider sets of preferences and cannot be assumed to form stabile coalitions across 
several voting situations, such as it is often observed in a legislature. It may well be that 
if the Council members’ have more structured preferences, this will offer an additional 
possibility for predicting how they cast their votes. For example, building on the 
discussion from the previous sections, if the Council members form coalitions along the 
left-right political dimension at the same time as the weighted voting system influences 
how votes are cast, then several more specific predictions can be formulated than just the 
expectation that, for example, smaller governments would generally look to how large 
members cast their votes, or that left-wing governments will vote against right-wing 
governments. The next section presents a theoretical argument which takes into account 
both the assumptions of left-right politics in the Council as well as the effect of the 
weighted voting system.
2.3 Assumptions
The previous sections have considered the contributions from different sets of literature 
on decision-making which can contribute to analysing the behaviour of the political 
actors represented in the Council. The main points to be extracted from those sections are 
that national parties are important actors in the Council, just as they are in the domestic 
sphere, and that these parties are affected by institutional constraints when deciding 
whether to voice their support or opposition of a proposal. This part of the chapter 
presents a theory of party politics and strategic voting in the Council. The theory draws
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on the insights from each of the three different sets of literature discussed in the previous 
sections, as well as the spatial theories presented in Chapter 1. The core argument is that 
voting behaviour in the Council is reflected in the formations o f ‘weighted preference- 
connected’ coalitions. The theory relies on a set of basic assumptions regarding the 
governments’ behaviour and ability to make choices. The assumptions are explained in 
this section after which the ‘weighted preference-connected coalition’ argument is 
presented in detail. The theory allows for specific predictions regarding the governments’ 
behaviour to be derived, and these are presented as testable hypotheses at the end of the 
chapter.
2.3.1 Council members are rational actors
A fundamental assumption underlying the theoretical argument presented in this thesis is 
that the Council members are rational actors capable of evaluating and choosing between 
policy alternatives. More specifically, in line with general rational choice theory and 
most of the existing theoretical models of EU actors’ behaviour described in Chapter 1, 
the governments are assumed to 1) have a clear set of preferences over all policy issues, 
and 2) behave as utility maximizers in any given situation. This means that Council 
members are in voting situations able to choose which policy alternative they prefer on 
proposals presented by the Commission. The governments then pursue the strategy which 
is most likely to result in their favoured policy outcome, and they are assumed to 
understand the consequences of their actions.
Such abilities are frequently questioned by organisational theorists (e.g. March 
and Olsen 1989), and the highly institutionalised and complex legislative processes in the 
Council provide these objections with some validity. However, it is in most cases better 
to model actors’ behaviour as if they are capable of making such calculations rather than 
if they are not. Only in cases where the limitations to an organisation’s cognitive 
capabilities are so severe that perfect randomness is an equally valid prediction as perfect 
rationality does it make real sense to reject the rationality assumption all together 
(Tsebelis 1990). Hence, when considering the implications of assuming the Council 
members to be rational compared to an assumption that they are not, the rational actor 
assumption is indeed the more convincing alternative.
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2,3.2 Council members are policy-seekers
As discussed in Section 2.2.2, legislative politics in the Council are not about the spoils 
of holding office in the traditional manner considered by supporters of the theory that 
politicians are primarily driven by office-seeking incentives. Policy-making in the 
Council is not a zero-sum game and, hence, exclusions of governments who are 
interested in becoming a member of a coalition are rarely observed. In fact, over-sized 
majorities mostly prevail. Also the relatively modest pay-offs politicians can gain from 
participating in Council politics make the office-seeking argument seem unconvincing in 
this connection. However, office-seeking incentives could be argued to be present in an 
indirect manner: If governments are seen as office-seekers at the domestic level, their 
incentives to engage in EU decision-making is an opportunity to enable problem solving 
of collective action issues that they are faced with in national politics, as well as signal 
strong leadership to the home constituencies. In this case, since the competition over 
office at the national level is about left-right policies, these can also be assumed to be the 
issues that the governments care about at the EU level.
Alternatively, one could assume that the parties in government are policy-seekers 
both at the national and EU level. This thesis finds such an argument more convincing: 
The Ministers in the Council are partisan politicians who are elected based on policy 
platforms stipulating their social and economic ambitions for society as a whole, or with 
emphasis on special groups in the constituencies. The differences in socio-economic 
preferences are the reasons which have caused parties to emerge in the first place (Lipset 
and Rokkan 1967), and party elites have a wide range of preferences, but are primarily 
characterised by their preferences and actions related to the socio-economic issues, 
including taxing, spending and market regulation, as well as the role of the state in 
individual social and political relations. Research in comparative politics has found that 
an ‘amalgamated’ left-right dimension, which includes both the economic and the 
social/cultural variants of these party preferences, is the main dimension of political 
conflict in almost all democratic party systems (e.g. Budge et al. 2001; Huber and Gabel 
2000; Benoit and Laver, forthcoming 2006). Following a rational choice institutionalist 
logic, such motivations can also explain the current level and nature of Council decision­
making: if the governments are primarily motivated by their socio-economic policy
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preferences, they should be mainly aligned along a generic left-right dimension and their 
preferences on institutional design issues - for example in terms of how power is 
allocated between the member states and the EU - are dependent on the type of socio­
economic policies that will result from the design (Hix forthcoming, 2007). The 
advanced degree of current EU decision-making may therefore be interpreted as a 
reflection of the Council members’ policy-centred ambitions, and does not correspond 
well with the office-seeking argument; it has long exceeded what the home constituencies 
monitor. In sum, the theory presented in this thesis therefore relies on the assumption that 
Council members are policy-seekers, and current EU decision-making is the result of, 
and further enables, the governments’ motivations to pursue their policy aspirations also 
beyond the national political context.
2.3.3 Council members possess perfect information
The Council members are assumed to possess perfect information about own as well as 
others’ positions and corresponding strategies. The perfect information assumption may 
in certain cases be implausible in a pure form, and would in most scenarios need to be 
somewhat relaxed in other to provide a useful framework for empirical analyses. 
However, the extensive preparatory work prior to the Council negotiations as well as the 
highly institutionalised nature of the bargaining makes an assumption of perfect 
information valid for the purpose of explaining Council bargaining in a theoretical - and 
hence simplified - manner.
2.3.4 Repetitive negotiations
This thesis assumptions about the sequences of negotiations in Council decision-making 
would in game theoretical terms be categorised as a repeated bargaining game, where no 
credible commitments for future negotiations are made. In other words, while the 
governments are involved in a series of bargaining sessions, this thesis does not assume 
the governments can commit to decisions in future decision rounds. This is both due to 
issues of time inconsistency, the division of labour between sectoral councils as well as 
general uncertainty regarding external political factors that can influence the
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governments’ ability to commit45. Although some vote trading has been reported within 
certain Council formations (Mammonas 2005), several of the officials interviewed for 
this thesis have stressed that these tendencies are not possible as a permanent form of 
bargaining46. There is simply too much uncertainty and too many external factors which 
influence the complex interaction from one decision-making scenario to the next.47 
Therefore, the theory assumes that decisions are constructed around the policy (or 
perhaps policy bundle) on the table; history or future negotiations may be considered, yet 
cannot be assumed to have a real impact on the final policy outcome.
2.3.5 Location o f the status quo
Lastly, most policy proposals in the EU are not adopted on the background of a blank 
past, but have by now some degree of regulatory standards as the default position. 
Therefore, the theory assumes that the status quo of a given policy will be located at an 
arbitrary point which is not at either of the extremes. In fact, the status quo is more likely 
to be somewhat centrally located due to the fact that previous legislation on the policy 
issue is unlikely to have produced an extreme outcome (Banks and Duggans 2006).
2.4 Behavioural predictions
The combination of the above assumptions, as well as the considerations of the 
institutional setup from the three decision-making contexts in the first part of the chapter, 
form the basis for the theoretical argument: The governments are political parties with 
explicit policy preferences who take into account their possibilities for influencing new 
legislation when they decide whether to oppose or support a proposal. The possibilities 
for influencing policies are in the Council defined by the distribution of voting power. 
Therefore, the governments are assumed to act sincerely in their pursuit of their ideal
45 Both internal politics in the Parliament and domestic politics can be assumed to have an influence on 
the governments’ ability to commit to future policy agreements.
46 Interview I, VI, X, XI.
47 This argument is in contrast to some existing accounts o f Council decision-making (e.g. Bueno de 
Mesquita (2004)), which states that EU legislative bodies do not solely bargain over the legislative 
proposal at hand, but across legislative proposals in order to ensure gains from vote trading (Bueno de 
Mesquita 2004: 132-3). Though, as explained, this argument diminishes the uncertainty of decision-making 
and the complex interaction and shifting coalition patterns within each sectoral council.
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policy preferences, yet strategically -  and based on their voting power - when calculating 
how best to satisfy these preferences. This means that Council decision-making can be 
understood as negotiations between policy-driven, self-interested actors who vote 
according to their calculated possibility for influencing policy outcomes. Negotiations 
based on such properties can be presented through various models. However, due to the 
emphasis on the party political identity of the actors and the content of the policies 
negotiated on, a spatial presentation of the argument may be particularly useful: 
Governments’ estimate the distance between their ideal policy location and the status quo 
when choosing between policy alternatives. Governments whose preferences are located 
closer to the proposed policy change than the status quo will support the new legislation. 
Governments whose preferences are located further away are less likely to do so; in those 
cases the governments will consider whether it pays-off to voice their disagreement or 
not. Governments with more voting power will oppose more often than governments 
with less voting power. Though, contrary to existing suggestions (Mattila 2004; Hayes- 
Renshaw and Wallace 2006), this thesis’ explanation for a difference in voting behaviour 
between large and small Council members is that larger governments have stronger 
incentives to signal their opposition to external and internal actors: They may wish to 
state their opposing position on a policy issue for the purpose of future negotiations or for 
the purpose of the implementation process. Smaller Council members may similarly have 
reasons to do so, however, as their possibilities for influencing legislation will be less 
than those of the larger members’, their incentives to oppose are also fewer.
This behaviour translates into the coalition formation process such that 
governments will form into groupings based on the closeness of their party political 
preferences. The high threshold for adopting legislation together with the lack of explicit 
office-spoils does not encourage competition over the inclusion or exclusion of 
governments. However, since governments are policy driven, competition is assumed to 
exist over new policy locations. The spatial distance between the governments’ ideal 
points as well as the distribution of voting power determine which members will vote 
together. Governments located towards one end of the policy spectrum will try to form 
coalitions with governments with similar preferences and who possess the necessary 
amount of voting power to meet the decision threshold. In other words, coalitions can be
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said to be formed as ‘weighted preference-connected coalitions’, where the voting power 
ascribes the weights with which each of the Council members’ will be able to enact their 
preferences. Figure 2.1 illustrates the argument.
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Figure 2.1: Weighted preference-connected coalitions in the Council
SQ
Left Right
 ______     1st_________________________________________p________ 3rd__________________________________
A B c D E F G H 1 J K L M N O
(5) (10) (3) (4) (8) (3) (10) (10) (5) (3) (5) (10) (5) (2) (4)
p = Median
l st= Lower quartile
2rd = Upper quartile
A, = Individual governments
( ) = Random distribution of voting weights allocated according to 1999-2004 QMV rules. 
— SQ — = Feasible area for status quo location.
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Figure 2.1 simply ranks the governments according to an arbitrary party political 
preference distribution along the traditional left/right political axis. Each box represents a 
government and the numbers in parenthesis show the distribution of voting weights. The 
model shows that the status quo can be located anywhere but at the extremes. The ‘1st’ 
and ‘2nd marks above the boxes indicate the position of the lower and higher quartile. As 
a 2/3 of the votes is more or less equal to the QMV threshold48, a government located at 
either of these positions will be the pivotal member under this rule, depending of the 
direction of the proposed policy change as well as on which side of the centre the status 
quo is located.
Rejecting the traditional assumption that the status quo is located at an extreme 
point leaving all members better off from a policy change (Rubenstein 1982), and instead 
suggesting an arbitrary point located more centrally, has severe implications for the 
prediction of the feasible area for a policy change (Banks and Duggans 2006). However, 
the purpose of Figure 2.1 is not to predict the location of new policies49. Rather, it is to
48 As explained in Chapter 1, the threshold equals 62 votes out of 87.
49 It is clear from Figure 2.1 that policy changes on existing EU law will be moderate when considering 
only bargaining on a single policy issue. For example, assume the status quo to be placed at L’s ideal point. 
Any policy change away from this position would under the QMV rule need the consent of at least the 
member states E-O, A-K or a coalition around the centre such as D-M or C-L. Since member states D-H 
will not accept anything to the right of K, status quo cannot be shifted in that direction. And a left-ward 
change is possible only until a point where either A-K, D-M or C-L accepts. Hence, the coalition A-K 
leaves room for the biggest left-ward policy change as M and L would oppose more left-ward changes than 
what K is willing to accept. The feasible area for the A-K coalition is the I-L area, so even under this 
coalition the room for change is still rather narrow. The same logic obviously applies to a situation where 
the status quo is positioned at the same distance, but to the left o f the centre. However, consider also the 
example where the status quo is located even more centrally, say, at member H’s preference point. As is 
also concluded in Tsebelis and Garrett’s (2001) version of the model, this scenario cannot result in any 
policy change at all. Neither A-K, E-O, D-M or C-L would be able to agree on a shift in either direction as 
at least three o f the governments (either E, F and G or I, J and K) would be worse off. This is more than the 
QMV threshold allows. Hence, in Tseblis’ and Garrett’s (2001) analysis a complete policy gridlock is 
predicted within the Council if  negotiations are over left-right political issues. However, this is not what 
can be observed in the Council. Extensive research has already uncovered that in most legislatures policy 
positions lie on a low-dimensional plane through all issue spaces, because attitudes across the issues are 
related to the legislators positions on one or two fundamental dimensions (Poole 2005). In fact, the most 
common finding is either a single dimension reflecting a left-right (/conservative-liberal) policy axis, or a 
two-dimensional policy space often including a second dimension which reflects a single-issue political 
matter, such as religion or environment (Cahoon, Hinich and Ordeshook 1976; Hinich and Pollard 1981; 
Enelow and Hinich 1984). The explanation is that a few underlying basic issues, such as liberal- 
conservative issues, generate overall policy stand points which can guide and determine also preferences 
over individual policy questions. Hereby the policy space is divided into two spaces -  one with a few 
fundamental dimensions, and a second high-dimensional space representing all the distinct issues (Poole 
2005:13). Therefore, although the illustration in Figure 2.1 makes it clear that policy changes are only 
possible within very constrained scenarios if bargaining is on single policy issues, the introduction of a new 
policy issue does not necessarily mean also the introduction o f new policy dimensions in the Council.
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capture the effects imposed on a policy-driven legislature by a weighted voting system in 
order to specify which coalitions are likely to form, and how individual members are 
likely to behave. With this objective in mind, the figure shows that three kinds of 
coalitions are possible under the QMV system: 1) a coalition consisting mainly of 
governments located towards the centre-left hand side of the policy spectrum and 
including the governments A to K; 2) a coalition formed around the centre of the policy 
axis and excluding both of the extremes such that the governments included are D-M or 
C-L; or 3) a centre-right positioned coalition of the governments E-O. In none of these 
cases will it be the governments located at the centre of the policy axis that will be in 
opposition to a policy change. Hence, the governments A-E or L-0 are the ones which 
can be expected to voice their disagreements most frequently, depending on the 
composition of the Council. It is also apparent from Figure 2.1 that government changes 
may influence the coalitions to varying degrees: changes in a single or a few individual 
governments will in most cases change the location of the median, but will not 
necessarily change the identity of the pivotal member. However, combined with the 
dynamic legislative agenda - influenced by both national and EU level political matters - 
the location of the status quo may even within a relatively short time period shift to a 
different position compared to the distribution of governments’ ideal positions than what 
was the case during the time when the policy was adopted. For example, if government 
E, F and G in Figure 2.1 over any given period of time were substituted with three centre- 
right governments at the same time as the general political demand has evolved towards a 
more right-leaning attitude, then a pressing need for policy change may prevail, and the 
identity of both the median and the pivotal member may have shifted from when the 
policy was initially adopted. Several more specific predictions regarding individual 
governments’ voting behaviour can be derived in a similar manner from Figure 2.1, yet, 
before formulating such expectations, the basic hypothesis of the model must be tested:
Hypothesis 1:
The main dimension o f  politics in the Council is the classic left/right political
dimension.
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As discussed in Section 2.2, the definition of a left/right political dimension is often 
applied as a generic policy dimension which captures parties’ economic and 
social/cultural preferences in an ‘amalgamated’ continuum (Budge et al. 2001; Gabel and 
Huber 2000). The initial meaning of a left/right political division, suggested by Lipset 
and Rokkan (1967) in their ‘cleavage theory’, may no longer be apparent to the same 
degree between the different social groups in Europe (Inglehart 1977,1990; Ignazi 1992; 
Dalton et al. 1984; Franklin et al. 1992; Karvonen and Kuhnle 2001). However, the 
classic “party families’ identified by Lipset and Rokkan’s theory are still found to 
dominate the political picture in most Western democracies. This is partly due to the 
ability of parties, as organisations, to adapt to changing political circumstances, and 
partly due to the fact that many of the traditional conflicts over socio-economic issues are 
still appear in modem society (Bartolini and Mair 1990). Hence, the left/right political 
dimension still has substantive meaning, and in the contemporary variant adopted here, it 
is used to capture the two, interrelated, sets of political conflicts, namely economic and 
social (e.g. Kitschelt 1994). Such conflicts and the resulting party formations have -  in 
the history of party politics - always been identified across geographical boundaries, and 
the organisation of parties is commonly defined according to functional rather than 
territorial interests (Bartolini 2000).
Expecting the main dimension in day-to-day EU politics to be over an aggregated 
left-right dimension, new legislation moves the status quo to the left or to the right 
depending on the composition of the Council. During the years 1999-2004, most of the 
governments in the Council represented social-democratic parties50. Hence, a new policy 
would mean a leftward shift away from the status quo. Therefore, regardless of the 
decision rule, the governments who are most likely to oppose a policy change are 
therefore the right-of-centre governments, since a left-ward policy shift in most cases 
would not be favourable to their preferred policy positions. Hence, Hypothesis 2 states 
the following:
50 Table 3.2 in Chapter 3 lists the parties in government in 1999-2004 as well as their affiliation with 
party groups in the Parliament.
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Hypotheses 2:
A right-wing member state is more likely to oppose the majority than a
left-wing member state.
Furthermore, the assumptions about weighted preference configurations in the Council 
lead to the prediction that it is particularly large governments positioned towards either of 
the extremes which would be likely to actively oppose. In the illustration in Figure 2.1 it 
would hence be government B who would oppose if the direction of the policy shift is 
towards the right, followed by A and/or E, then C and D. In the opposite direction it 
would be government L, then M and K followed by N and O. As mentioned, several 
empirical studies have already established that larger member states are more often found 
in opposition to the majority than smaller countries (Mattila 2004; Mattila and Lane 
2001). The explanation most often heard related hereto is that larger countries may be 
more likely to feel the need to voice their opinions more forcefully if they disagree; their 
electorates could find it very difficult to have their national interests overruled by EU 
decisions (Mattila 2004:33). The theory presented here suggests another explanation: that 
the governments act strategically and calculate the costs and benefits of voicing 
disagreement based on both internal factors within the Council and considerations about 
signals to external actors such as home offices and constituencies. Yet, the result will be 
similar in terms of voting behaviour:
Hypothesis 3:
A country with more voting power will oppose the majority more
frequently than a country with less voting power.
Though, there is one way to find out whether the suggestion that the difference in voting 
behaviour between large and small Council members is indeed due to strategic estimates 
of when and how it pays off to oppose the majority: Since voting at the final adoption 
stage can be assumed to be different to voting at earlier readings (Mattila 2004), any 
apparent changes across the legislative stages could either support or reject this 
assumption. Chapter 5 undertakes such an analysis.
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Lastly, in order to test the interaction effect between the voting power distribution and the 
preference configurations Hypothesis 4 summarises the ‘weighted preference-connected 
coalition’ argument when it states that:
Hypotheses 4:
Small (large) right-wing governments vote differently to small (large) 
left-wing governments.
Each of the hypotheses are used in the empirical investigation in the second part of the 
thesis. However, as the intention is to first establish the dimensionality of the policy 
space and, based on the results hereof, look into the effects of the issues of party politics 
and voting power across the different stages of the legislative process as well as policy 
areas, the testing of the hypotheses are carried out in the following order: Chapter 4 
applies scaling method techniques and a Baysian simulation model to the data and in this 
way aims to conclude on the overall discussion on the dimensionality of politics in the 
Council. Hence, the analysis is a test of Hypothesis 1. Three ‘sub-hypotheses’ related to 
Hypothesis 1 are also tested. They state the following:
Hypothesis 1:
The main dimension o f politics in the Council is the classic left/right political 
dimension.
Hypothesis la:
A change in government means a change in the country ’s ideal 
point estimate.
Hypothesis lb:
A pro-/sceptic EU dimension could be secondary to the classic 
left/right political dimension.
Hypothesis lc:
Other dimensions subsequent to the first dimension o f  
contestation in the Council could be characterised by coalition 
building on individual issues and therefore cannot be interpreted 
by any distinct theory.
Each of the sub-hypotheses will be elaborated in the empirical chapter. Chapter 5 and 6 
then proceed on the background of the findings from Chapter 4 and test each of the 
remaining hypotheses across the legislative stages and the policy areas. In other words,
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Chapter 5 looks into whether left- and right-wing and big and small Council members 
vary in their decisions to oppose the majority across the legislative process. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 2, 3 and 4 are in Chapter 5 extended to also include specific predictions for 
the changes across legislative stages in the following way:
Hypothesis 2:
A right-wing government is more likely to oppose the majority than a left- 
wing Council member.
Hypothesis 2a:
A right-wing government is more likely to oppose the majority 
than a left-wing government at all voting stages.
Hypothesis 3:
A government with more voting power will oppose the majority more 
frequently than a government with less voting power.
Hypothesis 3a:
A government with more voting power will oppose the majority 
more frequently than a government with less voting power at the 
last voting stage.
Hypothesis 3b:
A government with less voting power will be more likely to oppose 
the majority at stages prior to the final adoption o f  a piece o f  
legislation than at the last adoption stage.
Hypotheses 4:
Small (large) right-wing governments vote differently to small (large) 
left-wing governments.
Hypotheses 4a:
Small (large) right-wing governments vote differently to small 
(large) left-wing governments at all stages.
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Chapter 6 does a similar exercise, only here the analysis is carried out across policy areas. 
Hence, the sub-hypotheses for Hypothesis 2, 3 and 4 are:
Hypothesis 2:
A right-wing government is more likely to oppose the majority than a left- 
wing government.
Hypothesis 2a:
A right-wing government is more likely to oppose the majority 
than a left-wing government within most policy areas.
Hypothesis 3:
A government with more voting power will oppose the majority more 
frequently than a government with less voting power.
Hypothesis 3a:
A government with more voting power will oppose the majority 
more frequently than a government with less voting power within 
most policy areas.
Hypotheses 4:
Small (large) right-wing governments vote differently to small (large) 
left-wing governments.
Hypotheses 4a:
Small (large) right-wing governments vote differently to small 
(large) left-wing governments within most policy areas.
2.5 Summary
This chapter has discussed three sets of literature on decision-making and, based on the 
insights from these contributions, it has presented a theory of party politics and strategic 
behaviour in the Council. The argument is that coalitions will form as ‘weighted 
preference-connected coalitions’, in the way that voting behaviour and policy outcomes 
are dictated by the governments’ party political preferences and the distribution of voting 
power.
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As such, the presentation of the ‘weighted preference-connected coalitions’ is not much 
different from the standard spatial models applied to the EU setting (e.g. Tsebelis and 
Garrett 1996, 2000; Crombez 2001). The only differences between the two versions of 
the model are the assumptions about the political identity of the actors as well as the 
explicit inclusion of voting power. These two issues change the predictions derived from 
the model considerably, yet, perhaps more importantly, it is clear that the intentions 
behind the models are also somewhat different: The common objective behind applying 
the current literature’s spatial models to the Council is to establish the possibilities for 
policy change and the identity of the pivotal member, assuming that voting is a strictly 
sincere act. In that way the governments can also be divided into winning and losing 
coalitions. Instead, the intention behind this thesis’ argument is to address the 
consequences of an unequal distribution of voting power in a policy-driven legislature for 
the voting behaviour. Taking into account that formal opposition to the majority is a very 
costly act, and hence may spur strategic considerations by the governments on when it 
pays off to voice disagreement, the distribution of voting power indicates which members 
are likely to oppose and which are not. In other words, governments are assumed to be 
sincere in their pursuit of their ideal policy preferences, yet may behave strategically 
when considering how to fulfil those preferences. The consequences are that small and 
large governments behave differently within the left/right policy space. Table 2.1 
summarises the set of more specific hypotheses derived form the theory and shows in 
which chapters they will be addressed.
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Table 2.1: Summary of hypotheses
Chapter 4: Policy dimensions in the Council o f Ministers
Hypothesis 1 The main dimension of politics in the Council is the classic left/right political
dimension.
Hypothesis la A change in government means a change in the country’s ideal
point estimate.
Hypothesis lb A pro-/sceptic EU dimension could be secondary to the classic
left/right political dimension.
Hypothesis lc Other dimensions subsequent to the first dimension of
contestation in the Council could be characterised by coalition
building on individual issues and therefore cannot be interpreted
by any distinct theory.
Chapter 5: Changes in voting behaviour across the different stages of the
legislative process
Hypothesis 2 A right-wing government is more likely to oppose the majority than a left-wing
government.
Hypothesis 2a A right-wing government is more likely to oppose the majority
than a left-wing government at all voting stages.
Hypothesis 3 A government with more voting power will oppose the majority more frequently
than a government with less voting power.
Hypothesis 3a A government with more voting power will oppose the majority
more frequently than a government with less voting power at the
last voting stage.
Hypothesis 3b A government with less voting power will be more likely to
oppose the majority at stages prior to the final adoption o f a piece
of legislation than at the last adoption stage.
Hypothesis 4 Small (large) right-wing governments vote differently to small (large) left-wing
governments.
Hypothesis 4a Small (large) right-wing governments vote differently to small
(large) left-wing governments at all decision stages.
Chapter 6: Voting behaviour across policy areas
Hypothesis 2 A right-wing government is more likely to oppose the majority than a left-wing
government.
Hypothesis 2a A right-wing government is more likely to oppose the majority
than a left-wing government within most policy areas.
Hypothesis 3 A government with more voting power will oppose the majority more frequently
than a government with less voting power.
Hypothesis 3a A government with more voting power will oppose the majority
more frequently than a government with less voting power
within most policy areas.
Hypothesis 4 Small (large) right-wing governments vote differently to small (large) left-wing
governments.
Hypothesis 4a Small (large) right-wing governments vote differently to small
(large) left-wing governments within most policy areas.
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Chapter 3: Data and Measurement
3.1 Introduction
‘Knowledge rarely advances on the basis of one test of a single hypothesis. In 
fact, it is easy to get a distorted picture of the research process by focusing on a 
single research project that tests one hypothesis. Knowledge develops over time 
as researchers throughout the scientific community test many hypotheses. Each 
hypothesis represents an explanation of a dependent variable. If the evidence fails 
to support some hypotheses, they are gradually eliminated from consideration. 
Those that receive support remain in contention. Theorists and researchers 
constantly create new hypothesis to challenge those that have received support’ 
(Neumann 2000:129).
There are several ways of evaluating the empirical relevance of a theory. Yet, following 
the logic described above, that hypothesis testing can serve to either falsify or sustain a 
theoretical causal chain, this chapter describes how the hypotheses from the theory in 
Chapter 2 are operationalised in order to be tested in the empirical chapters. As discussed 
in Chapter 1, quantitative tests of theoretical predictions seem necessary in order to 
further advance the current position of research on Council decision-making. Such 
methods will, if carried out correctly, provide a high degree of certainty with regard to 
the empirical applicability of an argument. Therefore, the purpose of each of the 
empirical chapters in the second part of the thesis is to investigate whether there appears 
to be any statistical correlation between the actual, observed voting behaviour and the 
hypotheses from Chapter 2. Alternative theories from the existing literature which are 
either competing with or complementing the hypotheses are also included.
The chapter proceeds as follows: The first section, Section 3.2 explains how the 
data has been collected and presents some of the basic properties of the data set. It 
discusses the limitations to the data, and also explains how a series of interviews with 
different actors in the Council has helped to clarify certain elements of the results from 
the empirical analyses. Section 3.3 presents the dependent, independent and control
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variables which are used in the three empirical chapters. Section 3.4 presents the 
descriptive statistics, and the last section summarises the predicted effect of the variables.
3.2 Empirical material
The data used in each of the three empirical chapters includes information on all 
legislation adopted in the Council from 1999 to May 2004. However, the data set is used 
differently in each of the chapters due to a difference in the unit of analysis as well as 
differences in the analytical models. Hence, each chapter will explain the choice of 
statistical models as well as how the data is organised. This section will provide the basic 
description of the full data set and how it has been collected.
3.2.1 Data
The complete data set consists of individual votes cast by each government on 932 pieces 
of legislation. Legislation which was initiated and voted upon in the Council, yet, not 
finally adopted in the period 1999 to May 2004 is not included in the analyses. However, 
of these 932 acts, 301 pieces were presented to the Council several times. A proposal 
which is voted upon X number of times is treated as X individual votes as behaviour in 
the Council can be assumed to change throughout the different stages of the legislative 
process (cf. Chapter 1; Mattila 2004; Mattila and Lane 1999). Furthermore, the data 
includes several cases where a single policy proposal presented to the Council had more 
than one issue to make a decision upon. For instance, a proposal on regulation of 
emission from vehicles may include several different levels of emission standards 
depending on the type of vehicle51. Votes may therefore be taken on each of these 
regulatory levels and are also included in the data as separate voting situations. In sum, 
the total number of voting situations in the 1999-2004 period amounts to 1.281 and, 
hence, results in (15 x 1.281=) 19.215 individual votes.
51 See e.g. Council document number 8118/00: Decision o f the European Parliament and o f the Council 
establishing a scheme to monitor the average specific emissions o f C 02 from new passenger cars. 
Reference numbers are PE-CONS 3608/00 ENV 48 ENT 28 CODEC 145 + COR 1 and corresponding 
documents from meetings held in relation to this decision can be found based on these references 
though the PreLex database.
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The data is collected from the minutes of individual Council meetings and includes 
information on the issues described in Chapter 1:
• Procedure,
• Date of introduction,
• Date of adoption,
• A and B points,
• Policy area (as categorised by the General Secretariat),
• Title of proposal,
• Details about the policy content,
• Inter-institutional reference number,
• Sectoral Council,
• Which stage of the legislative process the vote was taken,
• Which stage of the legislative process the proposal was adopted ,
• Identity of the member holding the Presidency, and
• Each country’s decision to
o support, 
o abstain, 
o oppose,
o and/or make a formal statement. Formal statements are either 
included in the minutes or posted separately on the Council’s 
website.
Each of these points of information has then been coded such that Procedure, Policy 
Area, Sectoral Council, Stage of Vote, Stage of Adoption, Presidency (i.e. nationality of 
the member holding the Presidency) are included as categorical variables. Date of 
Introduction and Date of Adoption are continuous variables, whereas A and B points and 
a country’s decision to Support, Abstain, Oppose or make a Formal Statement are 
binominal.
The data is collected through the Council’s website53, the inter-institutional data 
base PreLex54 and from the Council’s Access Service55. It has since 1999 been possible 
to trace back a legislative proposal through the public register of the Council and/or the 
PreLex database. For this purpose, it is sufficient to know the COM reference number of 
the initial Commission proposal, the title of the proposal or the inter-institutional file
52 As is discussed below, one problem with the information from the voting records and minutes is that 
legislation which is not adopted is not recorded either.
53 http://europa.eu/documents/eu council/index en.htm
54 http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/apcnet.cfrn?CL=en
55 access@consilium.eu.int
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number. The inter-institutional file number will provide all the documents linked to the 
same proposal/dossier (also from working groups) and can be found through PreLex 
(when the COM number is known), or on the top of the page of the Council minutes.
Although it can hence be concluded that important information is indeed available 
from the Council, two important limitations to the data must be pointed out: First, and as 
was mentioned in Chapter 1, analyses of Council decision-making based on official 
documents often point out problems with the information that is not included in the 
minutes and voting records (e.g. Wallace and Hayes-Renshaw 2006). Only those 
decisions which result in a successful adoption are recorded, and, hence, the material 
used in this thesis includes an element of self-censorship which unfortunately cannot be 
controlled. Any legislative act which from the outset looks as though it will fail to be 
adopted will not be put on the Council agenda, but is rather sent back to the Commission 
‘for further study’ (Heisenberg 2005:71). Furthermore, although it is rarely the case, it 
should also be noted that member states can still choose not to make their positions on a 
proposal public. If any member state makes the request that the positions should not be 
officially recorded, the minutes may simply state that ‘...the Council has adopted the 
above [regulation/directive/decision]’. In the period 1999-2004 it only happened 5 times 
that a member state asked for the minutes to not be made public. Yet, despite being rarely 
used, it may still play a role that the member states are at least aware of this possibility56.
The second limitation is related to the issue of vote trading. No final conclusion 
has been drawn with regard to the extent of vote trading in the Council, but indicative 
findings suggest that it does take place (Mammonas 2005). However, due to the lack of 
credible commitments over time and across sectoral councils, vote trading is so far 
mainly found to occur on the policy issues at the table. Negotiations rarely rely on future 
proposals or takes into account positions in previous decisions. In other words, vote 
trading might occur between legislation bundles on the agenda for the same meeting, but 
is seldom expected from one meeting to another, where it might not be the same
C H
representatives at the table . Much research is still left to be done on this issue, and it is 
indeed crucial to gain further insight into particularly the extent of negotiations across 
policy areas. This will have direct implications also for questions of how to model the
56 This point will be returned to in Chapter 5.
57 Interview I and VI.
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legislative dynamics. However, in terms of the quantitative analyses undertaken in this 
thesis, the possible effects of vote trading are addressed by mainly focusing the empirical 
analyses on the reasons for voting ‘No’. Again, a ‘No’ can be assumed to be a sign of 
sincere disapproval due to the high costs of opposing the majority, whereas a ‘Yes’ is 
more ambiguous to interpret. The results from the analyses should therefore in principle 
merely result in a downwards biased picture of the conflict structures, however, no claims 
will be made with regard to the applicability of the findings to behaviour which cannot be 
observed from the Council minutes.
3.2.2 Interviews
A series of interviews and informal talks with different national representatives and civil 
servants involved in Council activities were held in November and December 2005 and 
February 2006. All of the interviews and talks have been very helpful in clarifying the 
explanations for some of the statistical results. They have also provided useful insights 
into issues such as the difference in voting behaviour from the working groups to 
COREPER meetings, and from COREPER to the ministerial level. However, all of the 
people who were interviewed or who have provided information at an informal basis 
have asked not to be used for referencing or in other ways be named in this thesis. 
Therefore, no conclusions are drawn merely on the basis of these interviews or talks, but 
in certain cases interviews are mentioned if a person has given particularly valuable 
information about an issue. In those cases a number indicating the interview is 
mentioned, yet, the names and positions are withheld. A list of the details for the talks 
and interviews including both dates, names and positions is available to the examiners of 
this thesis in Appendix B and has been presented to the supervisor, Professor Simon Hix, 
and co-supervisor, Christian List.
3.3 Variables
3.3.1 Dependent variables
Chapter 4 tests the first hypothesis which states that the dominant policy dimension in 
Council decision-making is the left/right political dimension. In the analysis in this
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chapter the data is first run with the scaling method technique Optimal Classification 
(OC), which estimates legislators’ ideal preference points by comparing the outcome of 
each legislator’s vote with other legislators’ votes on all policy proposals. The scaling 
method produces a set of points based on all the observations and lets the distance 
between each legislator be an indicator of how often -  or rare -  legislators vote together. 
Since the method is simply a ‘mapping’ of the voting behaviour rather than statistical 
testing, this first analysis in Chapter 4 does not include dependent or independent 
variables as such. However, after having obtained the scores for the ideal points of each 
government, the results are compared with exogenous measures of the governments’ 
positions on a range of issues. The scores for the governments’ ideal points only produce 
24 observations since this is the number of individual governments which were members 
of the Council in the 1999-2004 period, when differentiating between two governments
C Q
from the same country . Therefore, since no reliable statistical exercises can be carried 
out with this low number of observations, the exogenous measures introduced for the 
interpretation of the spatial maps are simply compared to the distribution of ideal points 
in a series of scatter plots. Lastly, robustness checks of the OC findings themselves are 
conducted by running the data with another widely used scaling model, NOMINATE, as 
well as the governments scores obtained from running the data with in a Baysian MCMC 
model59.
Chapter 5 tests Hypothesis 2,3 and 4 across the different stages of the legislative 
process. The hypotheses concern the expectations to the governments’ voting behaviour 
based on the ‘weighted preference-connected coalition’ argument, and will in this chapter 
be tested with regard to the likelihood of opposing the majority at different points in the 
legislative process. For this analysis it has been necessary to divide the data set into two, 
and distinguish between the last voting stage where legislation is finally adopted and 
prior decision stages. The dependent variables are hence the count variables of how often 
a government has formally opposed the majority, either through abstaining (under Co­
decision), voting or in formal statements. The variable is coded 1 if a government 
opposed, and 0 if it did not.
58 For example, a government change in France means that France 1 and France2 are estimated as two 
different governments although obviously from the same country.
59 Both o f the scaling method techniques and the Baysian simulation method will be explained in 
Chapter 4.
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Chapter 6 similarly tests Hypothesis 2, 3 and 4. Yet, here the unit of analysis is the 
differences in voting behaviour across policy areas. As in Chapter 5, the dependent 
variable is the count variable of how often a government has formally opposed the 
majority, though, here the data set is first pooled across all voting stages and then 
subsequently divided into the respective policy areas. A list of the policy areas is given 
below, however, after the descriptive results for each area have been presented in the first 
part of Chapter 5, it is necessary to group the areas with the smallest amount of adopted 
decisions for the further statistical analysis. The full list of policy areas is as follows:
• Agriculture & Fisheries,
• Economic & Financial Affairs,
• Justice & Home Affairs,
• Environment,
• Social Affairs,
• Education/Research,
• Transport,
• Internal Market,
• Development,
• Energy,
• Health,
• General Affairs,
• Industry,
• Consumer Affairs,
• Telecommunications,
• Culture,
• Aviation, and
• Administration.
The policy areas for the further statistical analysis in the second part of Chapter 5 are 
then grouped such that regressions are run on 8 categories: All policy areas, Agriculture 
& Fisheries, Environment, Social Affairs, Economic & Financial Affairs, Justice & 
Home Affairs, Transport and Others. As mentioned, the reason for the pooling of the last 
policy areas is statistical uncertainty as the individual groups include too few 
observations. Furthermore, it is worth noting here that the sectoral council in which a 
vote has been taken is not always an indicator of the policy area. For example, the
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sectoral council for transport (TRANS)60 may at times adopt legislation in the field of 
environment or social affairs. Similarly, the sectoral council for economics and financial 
affairs (ECOFIN) may decide on issues related to the internal market. The policy areas 
are therefore not identified based on who decides, but rather on the policy field stated in 
the title of the policy proposal, and most commonly identified by the chairperson from a 
preparatory working group.
3.3.2 Independent variables
The following variables are used as independent variables either in all of the three 
empirical chapters or only in one or two. They are all listed here with an explanation of 
the coding, however, the reasons for including them in the respective analyses are 
explained in the empirical chapters.
The first of the independent variables is used in all three of the empirical chapters 
and locates the governments’ positions on the left-right political dimension in national 
politics. It is labelled ‘Left/Right’, and is measured with an index variable ranging from 0 
to 20. Benoit and Laver (forthcoming, 2006) provide the values for each party in 
government on the left/right political scale, which is here then used to find a weighted 
average according to the number of ministerial posts held by each party61. The 
government that is furthest to the right has the value of 20 and the government that is 
furthest to the left has the value of 0.
Second, a variable ‘EU’ measures the governments’ attitude towards EU 
integration. The variable is included and calculated similarly to the left/right variable 
above, such that a weighted average for each government is found based on the values for 
each party in government as reported in Benoit and Laver (forthcoming, 2006). The range 
is, as above, from 0 to 20 and a high score here indicates an attitude favourable to 
European integration and a low score indicates Euro-scepticism.
It is quite possible that an interaction effect exists between the two variables 
capturing the policy dimensions described above. For example, Euro-sceptical left-wing 
governments may behave differently to Euro-sceptical right-wing governments (Mattila
60 Now referred to as TTE (Transport, Telecommunications and Energy).
61 Weighting the governments’ positions according to parliamentary seats instead does not significantly 
alter the results in any of the analyses.
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2004:41). Therefore, an interaction variable ‘Left/Right x EU’ is included to see if there 
is a significant impact of this combination on governments’ voting behaviour (see also 
Hooghe and Marks 1999).
A variable measuring the member states’ voting power in the Council is included 
and calculated on the basis of the normalised Banzhaf Index (Banzhaf 1965) by using the 
POWERSLAVE (2002) programme. Please refer to Appendix A for an explanation of the 
normalised Banzhaf Index and to Chapter 1, Section 1.3 for a list of the calculated voting 
power distribution.
A variable capturing the governments’ geographical location is labelled ‘Geo’ and 
included as a categorical variable, where the category of Northern members receives the 
value of 0 and consists of Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and UK. Central European 
governments are allocated the value of 1 and include Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, 
Austria and Luxembourg. Southern governments have the value of 2 and consist of the 
remaining: France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
Whether or not an EU member falls into the category of being a receiver or 
contributor to the EU budget is also often argued to affect the likelihood of being either 
in opposition or in favour of a proposal. Certain theorists even argue that EU politics in 
general is about the wealthier member states’ pay-offs of poorer nations by means of 
subsidies (e.g. Carruba 1997; Hosli 1996). Therefore, the variable ‘Budget’ measures the 
effect of whether or not a government is a contributor to or receiver from the EU budget. 
The variable is included as a dummy variable based on figures obtained from the 
Commission’s annual report on the budget (Commission 2003). Contributors have the 
value of 0, whereas receivers take the value of 1.
The variable ‘ParDif is used to investigate any possible effect of portfolio 
allocations (i.e. party differences) in national politics. Compared to the above variable on 
the weighted left/right positions of governments, this variable measures the effect of the 
difference in the left/right value of the individual party represented in the sectoral council 
in which a given decision has been made compared to the value for the entire 
government. For example, if a vote has been taken in the Council of Transport, then the 
value for each government representative in this variable is the difference between that of 
their national party position on the left/right political scale and the weighted average of
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the entire government. In other words, if the Dutch Minister of Transport is from the 
Labour Party (PvdA), then the value included is the difference between the position of 
the Labour Party and the weighted average of the entire coalition government. Table 3.1 
lists the ‘Left/Right’ as well as ‘EU’ values of all of the parties in government.
Table 3.1: Governing parties’ positions on the left/right and 
pro-/sceptic EU political scales
Country Party
Number of
cabinet
posts
Left/Right EU
Germany SPD 12 8.36 8.04
Die Grilnen 3 7.10 6.94
France1 PS 16 7.14 15.68
PCF 2 3.14 5.70
RPF 1 15.42 3.07
Verts 1 5.14 14.63
France2 UMP 10 14.42 12.43
UDF I 12.86 17.53
Independent 5 N/V N/V
UK Labour 24 10.95 10.02
Italy 1 DS 8 5.98 5.12
MARG 9 8.04 4.63
UDR 3 10.00 11.82
PDCI 2 3.33 8.41
FV 2 4.02 5.67
SDI 1 8.58 6.58
Italy2 FI 10 15.59 14.62
AN 5 16.94 13.54
LN 3 16.89 17.94
CCD/CDU 2 12.39 8.25
Independent 5 N/V N/V
Spain PP 14 16.99 12.61
Netherlands 1 PvdA 5 8.57 7.47
W D 5 16.33 12.60
D66 4 10.38 7.10
Netherlands2 CDA 8 13.57 9.70
W D 6 16.33 12.60
LPF 2 17.62 15.83
Greece PASOK 20 10.44 5.88
Belgiuml CVP(CD&V) 5 12.32 6.68
PSC 2 10.65 6.76
SP 3 6.64 8.41
PS 5 4.40 8.05
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Table 3.1: National Party Positions (continued)
Belgium2 VLD 5 14.50 8.10
MR 3 12.70 8.24
SP 3 6.64 8.41
PS 3 4.40 8.05
Ecolo 2 3.45 6.78
Agalev 2 3.50 7.15
Portugal 1 PS 14 8.67 6.70
Portugal2 PSD 14 13.86 9.40
CDS/PP 3 16.90 15.40
Sweden SAP 20 8.30 8.68
Austria 1 SPO 7 8.75 9.33
OVP 6 14.31 9.38
Austria2 OVP 8 14.31 9.38
FPO 3 17.38 16.31
Denmark 1 SD 15 7.58 8.25
RV 4 9.35 6.58
Denmark2 V 12 15.08 5.88
KF 7 15.19 7.50
Finland! SDP 7 8.39 6.85
KOK 5 15.58 7.61
SFP 2 13.76 8.39
VAS 2 4.45 11.91
VIHR 1 7.52 8.94
Finland2 KESP 8 12.00 15.09
SDP 8 8.39 6.85
SFP 2 13.76 8.39
Ireland FF 14 13.28 12.69
PD 1 16.38 13.24
Luxembourg 1 CSV 7 13.25 6.75
PDL 6 7.25 7.50
Luxembourg2 CSV 8 13.25 6.75
LSAP 8 13.50 9.25
Left/right = party position on the Left/Right dimension 
Integration = party position on the Pro/Anti EU dimension
The variable ‘Member’ captures duration of membership by measuring whether there is 
any effect of the number of years a country has been part of the EU. The variable is hence 
a continuous variable ranging from 11 to 45.
A variable measuring whether there is an effect of holding the Presidency is also 
included. The literature concerning this matter is mostly descriptive (Tallberg 2003) and 
it has in many cases proven difficult to establish exactly what the consequences and 
opportunities are for a country holding this position. Here, the variable is included in 
order to at least establish what the consequences are for the voting behaviour. The
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variable is included as a dummy variable where a country possessing this role gets the 
value of 1 and others have the value of 0.
A variable concerning the national party system, ‘NatSys’, is included and 
distinguishes between adversarial and non-adversarial governments. Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Sweden are categorised as 
non-adversarial political systems and have the value of 0, whereas the rest of the EU 
countries are adversarial and take the value of 1. UK, Greece and Spain are a bit different 
in this context, as they do not have a history of coalition governments. Yet, as they by 
definition are hence minimum winning, they are simply coded as having a strong norm of 
government alternation, and hence fall into the category of adversarial political system. 
Table 3.5 lists the governing parties.
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Table 3.2: Parties in government
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Date of change
Political
System
Germany
France
UK
SPD + Die Griinen 
(PES)
PS+PCF+PRS+ 
MDC+Verts (PES) 
LP (PES)
SPD + Die Griinen 
(PES)
PS+PCF+PRS+ 
MDC+Verts (PES) 
LP (PES)
SPD + Die Griinen 
(PES)
PS+PCF+PRS+ 
MDC+Verts (PES) 
LP (PES)
SPD + Die Griinen 
(PES)
PS+PCF+PRS+ 
MDC+Verts
LP (PES)
SPD + Die Griinen 
(PES)
UMP+UDF+ind.s
(EPP-ED)
LP (PES)
SPD + Die Griinen 
(PES)
UMP+UDF+ind.s
(EPP-ED)
LP (PES)
None
05/05/2002
None
Adversarial
Adversarial
Adversarial
Italy DS+PPI+RI+UDR+P 
DCI+FV+SDI (PES)
DS+PPI+RI+ 
PDCI+FV+D+ Udeur 
(PES)
DS+PPI+RI+ 
PDCI+FV+D+ Udeur 
(PES)
FI+AN+LN+CCD+C 
DU (EPP-ED)
FI+AN+LN+CCD+C 
DU (EPP-ED)
FI+AN+LN+CCD+C 
DU (EPP-ED) 13/05/2001 Adversarial
Spain
Netherlands
Greece
Belgium
Portugal
PP (EPP-ED)
PvdA+W D+D66
(PES)
PASOK (PES)
CVP+PSC+SP+ PS 
(PES/EPP-ED)
PS (PES)
PP (EPP-ED)
PvdA+W D +D 66
(PES)
PASOK (PES) 
VLD+PRL/FDF+SP+ 
PS+ Ecolo+Agalev 
(ALDE)
PS (PES)
PP (EPP-ED)
PvdA+W D+D66
(PES)
PASOK (PES) 
VLD+PRL/FDF+SP+ 
PS+ Ecolo+Agalev 
(ALDE)
PS (PES)
PP (EPP-ED)
PvdA+VVD+D66
(PES)
PASOK (PES) 
VLD+PRL/FDF+SP+ 
PS+ Ecolo+Agalev 
(ALDE)
PS (PES)
PP (EPP-ED)
CDA+W D+LPF
(EPP-ED)
PASOK (PES) 
VLD+PRL/FDF+SP+ 
PS+ Ecolo+Agalev 
(ALDE)
PSD+CDS+PP (EPP- 
ED)
PP (EPP-ED)
CDA+VVD+LPF
(EPP-ED)
PASOK (PES) 
VLD+PRL/FDF+SP+ 
PS+ Ecolo+Agalev 
(ALDE)
PSD+CDS+PP (EPP- 
ED)
None
22/01/2003
None
13/06/1999
17/03/2002
Adversarial
Non-
adversarial
Adversarial
Non-
adversarial
Adversarial
Sweden SAP (PES) SAP (PES) SAP (PES) SAP (PES) SAP (PES) SAP (PES) None Non-adversarial
Austria SPO+OVP (EPP-ED) SPO+OVP (EPP-ED) OVP+FPO (EPP-ED) OVP+FPO (EPP-ED) OVP+FPO (EPP-ED) OVP+FPO (EPP-ED) 05/02/2000 Non-adversarial
Denmark SD+RV (PES) SD+RV (PES) SD+RV (PES) V+KF (EPP-ED) V+KF (EPP-ED) V+KF (EPP-ED) 20/11/2001 Non-adversarial
Finland SDP+KOK+SFP+VA S+VIHR (ALDE)
SDP+KOK+SFP+VA 
S+VIHR (ALDE)
SDP+KOK+SFP+VA 
S+VIHR (ALDE)
SDP+KOK+SFP+VA 
S+VIHR (ALDE)
SDP+KOK+SFP+VA 
S+VIHR (ALDE)
KESP+SDP+SFP
(ALDE) 16/03/2003
Non-
adversarial
Ireland FF+PD (UEN) FF+PD (UEN) FF+PD (UEN) FF+PD (UEN) FF+PD (UEN) FF+PD (UEN) None Non-adversarial
Luxembourg CSV+LSAP (EPP- ED) CSV+DP (EPP-ED) CSV+DP (EPP-ED) CSV+DP (EPP-ED) CSV+DP (EPP-ED) CSV+DP (EPP-ED) 13/06/1999
Non-
adversarial
Austria SPO: Social Democratic Party o f Austria; OVP: Austrian People's Party; FPO: Freedom Party of Austia Belgium Agalev: (Flemish) ecologists; CVP: (Flemish) Christian People's Party; Ecolo: (Walloon) ecologists; FDF: (Brussells) 
Democratic Front o f Francophones; PRL: (Walloon) Liberal Reformist Party; PS: (Walloon) Socialist Party; SP: (Flemish) Socialist Party (from 2001, SP.A); VLD: Flemish Liberals and Democrats; Denmark KF: Conservative People's Party; V: 
Venstre, ‘Left’, or Liberal Party; RV: Radical (Left-Social) Liberal Party; SD: Social Democracy in Denmark; Germany SPD: Social Democratic Party; Die Grfinen: The Greens Finland KOK: national Coalition Party; SDP: Finnish Social 
Democratic Party; SFP: Swedish People's Party in Finland; VAS: Left-Wing Alliance; VIHR: Green League France PS: Socialist Party; UDF: Union for the French Democracy (confederation to 1998; then single party); RPR: Rally for the 
Republic (disbanded 21 Sep 2002); PCF: French Communist Party; PRS: Radical Socialist Party (then PRG); PRG: Radical Party o f the Left; MDC: Citizens Movement; DL: Liberal Democracy; les Verts: The Greens;Greece PASOK 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement Ireland FF: Fianna Fail; PD: Progressive Democrats; Italy DC: Christian Democracy; FI: Forward (Forza) Italy; LN: Northern League; AN: National Alliance; CCD: Christian Democratic Center; CDU: United 
Christian Democrats; PPL Italian People’s Party; RI: Italian Renewal; UDR: Democratic Union for the Republic; FV: Federation o f Greens; PDCI: Party o f the Italian Communists; SDI: Italian Democratic Socialists; Udeur: Union of the 
Democratic European Reformers; Luxembourg CSV: Christian Social People's Party; LSAP: Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party; DP: Democratic Party Netherlands CDA: Christian Democratic Appeal; PvdA: Labour Party; W D : People's 
Party for Freedom and Democracy; D66: Democrats 66; LPF: List Pirn Fortuyn Portugal PSD: Social Democratic Pary; PS: Socialist Party; CDS-PP: Social Democratic Center-Popular Party Spain PP: Partido Popular Sweden SAP: Social 
Democratic Labour Party United Kingdom LP: Labour Party. ( )  indicates affiliation with EP party group.
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A series of policy specific variables are included for the analysis of voting behaviour 
across policy areas in chapter 6. Each of the following variables are adopted from Benoit 
and Laver (forthcoming, 2006) and are coded as categorical variables ranging from 1 to 
20 :
A variable ‘Env’ is included measuring a pro/anti-environment attitude. The value 
1 is ‘Supports protection of the environment even at the cost of economic growth’ and 20 
is ‘Supports economic growth even at the cost of damage to the environment’.
A variable ‘Soc’ measures social attitude where 1 means ‘Favours liberal policies 
on matters such as abortion, homosexuality and euthanasia’ and 20 is ‘Opposes liberal 
policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality and euthanasia’.
‘Tax’ captures the attitude towards public expenditure vs. taxes. 1 means in 
favour of promoting raising taxes to increase public services and 20 means in favour of 
promoting cutting public services to cut taxes.
‘Privat’ measures attitude towards privatisation and defines the extremes as: 
‘Promotes maximum state ownership of business and industry’ is 1, and ‘Opposes all 
state ownership of business and industry’ is 20.
‘Lib’ measures attitude towards civil liberties such that 1 is ‘Promotes protection 
of civil liberties, even when this hampers efforts to fight crime and promote law and 
order’, and 20 is ‘Support tough measures to fight crime and promote law and order, even 
when this means curtailing civil liberties’.
A variable ‘ Agri’ measures attitude towards support for agriculture and farmers. 
Unfortunately no data has been available for the parties in government for the 1999-2004 
period on this issue. The parties’ positions have therefore instead been obtained from the 
Budge et al. (2001) party manifesto data, which covers the parties’ positions until 1945- 
1998. Each party in government has been allocated the value from the latest available 
years in that data set, i.e. values measured between 1994 and 1998. Hereafter the 
governments’ positions are calculated on the basis of a weighted average depending on 
the allocation of cabinet posts (cf. Budge et al 2001:166).
‘Dereg’ estimates attitudes towards regulation and is included such that 1 means 
‘favours high levels of state regulation and control of the market’, and 20 is ‘favours 
deregulation of markets at any opportunity’.
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Lastly, a dummy variable is included for the decision rule under the heading ‘Rule’. 
Unanimity is allocated the value of 0, and QMV the value of 1.
3.3.3 Control variables
A range of variables are included in order to control for empirical irregularities or 
alternative explanations. The number of variables may seem a bit excessive at first, yet, 
due to the sparse empirical evidence across legislative stages as well as across policy 
areas in the current literature, it seems appropriate to control and test for as many 
different explanations for the voting behaviour as possible.
The first control variable is the number of decisions taken by the Council, 
‘Workload’. This is calculated as the natural logarithm of the total number of votes taken 
either within a specific policy area (Chapter 6) or at different points in the legislative 
process (Chapter 5).The variable is used to control for the possibility that whether or not 
a country is likely to be in opposition is affected by the total number of decisions made.
‘Nation’ is measured similarly to the above independent variables and ranges 
from 1 to 20, where 1 means ‘Strongly promotes a cosmopolitan rather than a national 
consciousness, history and culture’ and 20 is ‘Strongly promotes a national rather than a 
cosmopolitan consciousness, history and culture’. As above, this variable is as a weighted 
average of the parties values as reported in Benoit and Laver (forthcoming, 2006). The 
rest of the control variables are also obtained from this data set.
Position on immigration issues ‘Imm’ is measured as ‘favours policies designed 
to help asylum seekers and immigrants integrate into society’ has the value of 1. ‘Favours 
policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants return to their country of origin’ 
has the value of 20.
A number of variables measure attitudes towards different EU competences are 
included as follows: ‘Enlar’ is ‘Favours the extension of the EU to include new member 
states’ is allocated a 1, and ‘Opposes the extension of the EU to include new member 
states’ is allocated the value of 20. EU strengthening, ‘Strength’ is measured such that 1 
means ‘Favours a more powerful and centralised EU’, and 20 is ‘Opposes a more 
powerful and centralised EU’. EU Peacekeeping, ‘Peace’, is captured by 1 meaning 
‘Favours involvement in European security and peacekeeping missions’, and 20 is
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‘Opposes any involvement in European security and peacekeeping missions’. EU 
accountability, ‘Account’ has 1 as ‘Promotes the direct accountability of the EU to 
citizens via institutions such as the European Parliament’ and 20 as ‘Promotes the 
indirect accountability of the EU to citizens via their own national governments. EU 
authority, ‘Authority’ is measured as 1 is ‘Favours increasing the range of areas in which 
the EU can set policy’, and 20 is ‘Favours reducing the range of areas in which the EU 
can set policy’.
The last section of this chapter summarises the predicted effect of each of the 
variables in the respective empirical analyses carried out in Chapters 4,5 and 6. The next 
section presents the descriptive statistics.
3.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.3 and 3.4 present the descriptive statistics and correlations between the 
dependent, independent and the control variables when applied to the full data set. Beside 
of the expected correlations between the dependent variables and a range of the 
independent variables, Table 3.4 shows that a correlation between the left/right political 
positions obtained from the Benoit and Laver (forthcoming, 2006) data set and most of 
the policy specific variables which will be used in chapter 6 on voting behaviour across 
policy areas, also exists: For environment (Env) the correlation is .63, for attitude 
towards social policies (Soc) the correlation is .55, for attitude towards tax issues (Tax) 
the correlation is .77 and attitude towards regulation (Dereg) is correlated with a 
coefficient of .64. It is not surprising that these variables are correlated as extensive 
studies show that preferences over policy issues are often structured by an underlying 
dimension, such as the left/right political dimension (e.g. Poole and Rosenthal 1997). 
Though, interestingly, no correlation between the variable on positions on agricultural 
issues and the left/right variable appear. Also, the variables ‘Account’ and ‘Authority’ 
seem to measure the same phenomena as the ‘EU’ variable. In order to check for 
multicollinearity between any of the abovementioned variables, the analyses in the 
empirical chapters have been run both with and without the variables which could lead to 
problems of multicollinearity. That is, in Chapter 6 the regression models were run both 
with and without the Left/Right variable in the analyses of the specific policy areas and
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the analyses in both Chapter 5 and 6 were tried with and without the ‘Account’ and 
‘Authority’ variables. Each of the other variables which have indications that there might 
be problems of multicolinearity actually do not come out as significant in either of 
analyses in the empirical chapters, and they are all included as control variables. Hence, 
no further precautions should be necessary regarding this issue, however, the correlations 
between the variables are of course worth noting, and should be reported regardless.
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics of the data
Variable Description of variable Obs Mean St.dev Min Max
OCd1 Governments' ideal point estimate as obtained by OC; 1st dim. 24 0.00 0 .24 -0 .350 0.461
OCd2 Governments ideal point estimate as obtained by OC; 2nd dim. 24 -0 .04 0.22 -0 .490 0 .304
OCd3 Governments ideal point estimate as obtained by OC; 3rd dim. 24 0 .02 0.27 -0 .432 0 .868
Opp/Sup Indicates whether or not a government opposes or supports the majority. 0 =support, 1 =  opposition 19215 0.62 0.50 0 1
Opp Number o f  oppositions, abstentions and formal statements per government 19215 317 64 291 520
Left/Right Index variable from 0 to 20. High score means a government is located towards the right and a low score indicates location towards the left 19215 11.29 3.13 6.938 16.987
EU Measures the governments’ attitude towards EU integration. A high score here indicates an attitude favourable to European integration and a low score indicates Euro-scepticism. 19215 9.43 2.55 5.875 14.209
Left/Right x EU Interaction variable o f  the two variables above 19215 10.94 3.22 6.571 15.403
Power Measures the governments' voting power based on the relative Banzhaf index 19215 6.66 3.12 2 .26 11.16
Geo
Budget
A categorical variable indicating the government's geographical location. Northern 
members receives the value o f  0 and consists o f  Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and 
UK. Central European governments are allocated the value o f 1 and include Belgium, 
Germany, Netherlands, Austria and Luxembourg. Southern governments have the value o f 
2 and consist o f the remaining: France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
Categorises members into receiver or contributors to the EU budget. Contributors take the 
value o f 0, wheras receivers take the value o f  1.
19215
19215
0 .467
0 .416
0 .516
0.291
0
0
1
1
ParDif
Gives the value on the left-right political axis o f  the individual party represented in the 
sectoral council in which a given decision has been made compared to the value for the 
entire government.
19215 0 .477 0.395 0 3.488
Member Measures the effect o f the number o f years a country has been a member o f the EU. 19215 29.13 14.1263 11 45
Presidency A country which holds the Presidency when a vote is taken is allocated the value o f 1 whereas countries which do not hold the Presidency get the value of 0. 19215 0 .067 0 .250 0 1
NatSys Distinguishes between adversarial and non-adversarial governments. Non-adversial members have the value o f  0, adversial 1. 19215 0 .467 0 .516 0 1
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics of the data, continued
Variable Description of variable Obs Mean St.dev Min Max
Env Measures attitude towards the protection o f the environment where the value 1 is ‘Supports 
protection o f the environment even at the cost o f economic growth’ and 20 is ‘Supports 
economic growth even at the cost o f damage to the environment’
19215 11.545 3.398 1.712 17.22
Soc Measures positions on social policies. 1 means ‘Favours liberal policies on matters such as 
abortion, homosexuality and euthanasia’ and 20 is ‘Opposes liberal policies on matters 
such as abortion, homosexuality and euthanasia’.
19215 10.922 4 .184 1.761 19.571
Tax Captures attitude towards public expenditure vs. taxes. 1 means in favour o f promoting 
raising taxes to increase public services and 20 means in favour o f promoting cutting public 
services to cut taxes
19215 12.691 3.028 6 .147 17.856
D ereg Measures attitude towards state regulation and defines the extremes as: Favours high levels 
o f state ownership and regulation o f  the market (I) and Favours deregulation o f  the market 
at every opportunity (20).
19215 11.712 2 .498 7.936 15.344
Lib Measures attitude towards civil liberties. 1 means in favour o f protecting civil liberties, 20 
means Support tough measures to fight crime and promote law and order, even when this 
means curtailing civil liberties.
19215 10.205 3 .937 5.241 16.712
Agri Measures attitude towards Support for agriculture and farmers; any policy aimed 
specifically at benefiting these. Ranges from 0 to 20, where 0 is the most favourable 
towards agricultural policies.
19215 1.580 0.088 0.216 3 .314
Rule Indicates the decision rule. Unanimity is allocated the value o f 0 and QMV the value o f 1 19215 0 .579 0 .029 0 1
Workload Total number o f  votes taken in each half-year period. 19215 2401 .875 25.041 1335 2565
Nation 1 means ‘Strongly promotes a cosmopolitan rather than a national consciousness, history 
and culture’ and 20 is ‘Strongly promotes a national rather than a cosmopolitan 
consciousness, history and culture’.
19215 12.042 0 .904 9 .867 14.072
Imm Favours policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants integrate into society (1). 
Favours policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants return to their country o f  
origin (20).
19215 15.637 4.293 7.382 18.455
Enlar 1= Favours the extension o f the EU to include new member states; 20= Opposes the 
extension o f  the EU to include new member states.
19215 8.295 2 .478 4.091 13.268
Strength 1 = Favours a more powerful and centralised EU, and 20 = Opposes a more powerful and 
centralised EU.
19215 8.509 3.119 5.248 14.172
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics of the data, continued
Peace 1= Favours involvement in European security and peacekeeping missions, and 20 = 
Opposes any involvement in European security and peacekeeping missions.
19215 9.124 0.597 6.533 14.081
A ccount 1= Promotes the direct accountability o f  the EU to citizens via institutions such as the 
European Parliament; 20= Promotes the indirect accountability o f the EU to citizens via 
their own national governments
19215 10.628 0 .619 7.000 15.216
Authority 1 = Favours increasing the range o f  areas in which the EU can set policy, and 20 = Favours 
reducing the range o f areas in which the EU can set policy.
19215 7 .522 0.498 5 .214 12.019
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Table 3.4: Correlations between variables
OCdl OCd2 OCd3 Opp/Sup Opp Left/Right EU Left/Right x EU Power Geo Budget ParDif Member Presi NatSys
OCdl 1
OCd2 -0.141 1
OCd3 -0.310 -0.386 1
Opp/Sup 0.255*** 0.089** 0.138 1
Opp 0.267*** 0.014* 0.177* 0.358*** 1
Left/Right 0.721*** 0.068 -0.076 0.485*** 0.413*** 1
EU
Left/Right x 
EU
0.006
0.141*
0.093
-0.005
- 0.010
-0.042
0.087
0.130*
0.127
0.228**
0.036
0.153*
1
0.084 1
Power 0.473*** 0.046 0.104 0.299** 0.536*** 0.117 0.106 0.224 1
Geo -0.007 -0.034 0.058 0.039 -0.045 0.011 0.014 0.072 -0.059 1
Budget -0.038 0.026 0.091 0.082 -0.103 0.048 -0.201 -0.066 0.051 0.020 1
ParDif 0.006 0.097 -0.008 -0.056 0.075 0.005 0.019 -0.047 -0.020 0.049 0.062 1
Member 0.078 0.003 0.059 -0.014 -0.026 0.020 0.098 0.073 0.142 0.056 -0.023 -0.004 1
Presi 0.024 -0.085 0.073 -0.299*** -0.351*** -0.074 0.001 -0.092 -0.018 0.074 0.098 -0.055 -0.023 1
NatSys 0.093 0.042 0.069 -0.021 -0.057 0.022 0.049 0.092 0.027 0.012 -0.014 0.032 0.046 -0.102 1
Env 0.156** -0.019 -0.037 0.131** 0.237*** 0.628*** 0.071 0.084 0.101 -0.032 0.009 -0.089 0.038 0.004 0.052
Soc 0.204*** 0.028 0.041 0.617*** 0.802*** 0.549*** 0.028 0.043 0.029 0.006 0.073 -0.061 -0.090 0.062 0.049
Tax 0.072** 0.045 0.002 0.099 0.092 0.765** 0.047 0.064 0.127* -0.048 0.031 0.782 0.094 -0.031 -0.026
Dereg 0.402*** 0.073 -0.044 0.618*** 0.549*** 0.642*** -0.058 0.002 0.034 0.011 -0.051 0.040 -0.019 -0.086 0.073
Lib 0.051 -0.049 0.084 0.306** 0.375*** 0.804*** 0.076 0.543*** -0.082 0.071 0.039 -0.021 0.002 0.045 0.059
Agri -0.086 0.067 0.080 -0.086 -0.010 0.067 0.017 -0.340 0.023 -0.008 0.074 0.046 -0.067 0.034 0.015
Rule -0.044 -0.031 -0.006 0.072 0.049 0.028 0.062 0.004 -0.095 0.023 0.058 -0.011 0.104 0.028 -0.043
Workload 0.034 0.027 -0.013 0.045 0.119 0.102 -0.058 -0.019 0.042 0.037 -0.049 -0.105 0.002 -0.046 -0.006
Nation 0.008 -0.092 0.062 0.097 -0.032 -0.014 0.029 0.087 -0.035 0.054 0.036 0.064 -0.093 0.021 0.064
Imm -0.017 0.044 -0.081 0.026 0.082 0.100 -0.003 0.016 0.077 -0.142 0.065 0.024 -0.041 -0.088 0.057
Enlar 0.037 -0.069 0.075 0.099 -0.104 0.053 0.024 -0.012 0.090 0.066 0.020 -0.113 -0.005 0.069 0.034
Strength -0.100 0.003 0.041 -0.022 0.067 0.004 0.421*** 0.019 0.047 -0.029 -0.058 -0.045 0.021 0.013 0.002
Peace -0.021 -0.097 0.082 0.091 0.043 0.076 0.062 -0.044 -0.008 -0.087 0.084 -0.091 0.032 -0.051 -0.047
Account 0.094 0.038 -0.063 0.095 -0.002 -0.041 0.109** -0.021 0.033 0.029 0.062 0.006 0.017 -0.048 0.016
Authority 0.115 0.142 0.049 0.125 0.019 -0.028 0.816*** 0.069 0.045 -0.009 0.051 -0.089 0.026 0.009 0.023
*** Correlation significant at .01, ** Correlation significant at .05, * Correlation significant at .1
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Table 3.4: Correlations between variables, continued
Env Soc Tax Dereg Lib Agri Rule Workload Nation Imm Enlar Strength Peace Account Authority
Env 1
Soc 0.113* 1
Tax -0.199** 0.539*** 1
Dereg 0.047 0.095** 0.303*** 1
Lib 0.041 0.338*** 0.106** 0.258*** 1
Agri 0.013 0.069 0.054 0.048 0.010 1
Rule 0.022 - 0.061 0.015 0.079 0.052 0.063 1
Workload 0.010 - 0.039 - 0.004 0.018 0.023 0.048 0.034 1
Nation -0.034 0.006 -0.051 0.074 -0.056 -0.029 0.018 -0.061 1
Imm 0.081 0.052** 0.017 -0.033 0.002 0.073 -0.044 -0.025 0.004 1
Enlar 0.024 -0.005 0.029 -0.061 0.010 0.104 0.012 0.037 0.013 0.039 1
Strength 0.051 -0.037 -0.049 0.024 -0.042 0.051 0.006 0.011 -0.094 0.043 0.411** 1
Peace 0.068 0.041 0.055 0.019 0.039 -0.004 0.082 0.045 0.058 0.037 -0.057 0.047 1
Account 0.049 0.089 -0.031 0.092 0.068 0.096 0.019 -0.017 0.067 0.006 0.021 -0.096* 0.061 1
Authority -0.062 -0.061 -0.025 0.054 0.033 0.057 -0.048 0.061 0.044 -0.051 0.016 0.128*** 0.0114 0.761*** 1
*** Correlation significant at .01, ** Correlation significant at .05, * Correlation significant at .1
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3.5 Summary
This chapter has described the empirical material used to test the theory. It consists of all 
legislation adopted in the Council from 1999 to May 2004 across all legislative stages 
and across all policy areas. An underlying argument throughout the presentation of the 
empirical material has been that, although the Council records and minutes leave a lot to 
wish for in terms of detailed descriptions of the negotiations and decisions, much 
information is still included. It is possible to extract facts on several aspects related to the 
individual member state’s position on a policy issue. All decisions -  also those adopted 
by unanimity -  are recorded in the minutes from the meetings, and formal statements can 
be made by the member states even on decisions which have been adopted by unanimity. 
Therefore, if one does not simply confine the analysis to last stage voting records, but 
also include minutes from meetings at prior readings as well as the formal statements, a 
convincing basis does seem to exist for rigorous quantitative analyses.
In Chapter 4 the analysis is concerned with the dimensionality of the policy space. 
The results from running the data with spatial scaling models and a Baysian simulation 
model will make it possible to observe the governments’ voting behaviour and make 
inferences about the conflict structures apparent in voting situations. The expectation is 
that the governments’ voting behaviour is correlated with their party political preferences 
as captured by the traditional left/right political dimension.
Chapter 5 analyses the assumed differences in voting behaviour between 
small/large left-wing governments and small/large right-wing governments at the 
different stages of the legislative process. The expectation is that right-wing governments 
will generally oppose the majority more frequently than left-wing governments due to the 
composition of the Council in 1999-2004. However, small- and large governments may 
use different strategies for voicing their opposition. Hence, the prediction is that a 
variance in the effect of the voting power variable will be observed from the earlier 
readings to the final adoption stage.
In Chapter 6 the analysis is focused on changes in voting behaviour across policy 
areas. The expectation is that the Left/Right variable is still significant within the 
respective policy fields, and that voting power and positions on corresponding policy 
issues from the national level also affects a government’s decision to either support or 
oppose a proposal.
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The predicted effect of each of the variables will be further elaborated upon in the 
respective empirical chapters. However, Table 3.6 summarises the expectations and how 
the predicted effects may change from one empirical chapter to another.
Table 3.5 Predictions of variables9 effect in the empirical analyses
Variables Chapter 4: Dimensionality
Chapter 5:
Across legislative stages
Chapter 6:
Across policy areas
Left/Right Positive Positive Positive
EU No effect No effect No effect
Left/Right x EU Positive Positive Positive
Power No effect Positive Positive
Geo No effect No effect No effect
Budget No effect No effect No effect
ParDif - No effect No effect
Member No effect No effect No effect
Presi - Negative Negative
NatSys - No effect No effect
National Policy - - Positive
Rule - Positive Positive
Workload - No effect No effect
Nationalism - No effect No effect
Immigration - No effect No effect
EU Enlargement - No effect No effect
EU Strengthening - No effect No effect
EU Peacekeeping - No effect No effect
EU Accountability - No effect No effect
EU Authority - No effect No effect
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Part II
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Chapter 4: Policy dimensions in the Council of 
Ministers
4.1 Introduction
Researchers across the social sciences have undertaken a plethora of efforts to put the 
measurement of individuals’ preferences on firm grounding. The reason for why it is 
important to find an appropriate method for estimating actors’ ideal points is that the 
distribution of ideal points indicates how legislators behave, and which cleavages shape 
the policy space within which the legislators act (cf. Hinich and Munger 1994; 1997; 
McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2001; Clinton, Jackman and Rivers 2004). Applying a 
party political rather than a nation-centred analytical framework to legislative politics in 
the Council suggests a certain set of expectations to the distribution of governments’ 
preferences, behaviour, policy outcomes and, ultimately, the policy space. As was 
discussed in Chapter 2, if the Council members are mostly concerned with negotiations 
over the level of integration and institutional balance with the EP, it might be possible to 
analyse the institution as an ‘ordinary’ intergovernmental organisation. However, if the 
policy space is characterised by left/right preferences, then the identity of the pivotal 
member, the coalition formation process as well as the policy outcomes are likely to be 
different from those in a purely intergovernmental setting.
This first empirical chapter tests the fundamental assumption derived from the 
theory that voting behaviour in the Council is dominated by the governments’ party 
political preferences as captured by the traditional left/right political dimension 
(Hypothesis 1). There is, as such, not one final answer as to which method provides the 
most appropriate framework for analyses of a legislature’s policy space. However, by 
applying two different methods for the measurements of actors’ ideal points in the 
Council, this chapter intends to provide sound evidence of the governments’ observed 
voting behaviour. The findings can then subsequently serve as a basis for further testing 
of the existing predictions regarding the governments’ actions and preferences. The two 
methods consist of the recently developed scaling method techniques Optimal 
Classification (OC) and NOMINATE. The results obtained from these scaling methods 
are furthermore compared to the findings from using a Baysian Monte Carlo Markov
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Chain (MCMC) estimation of the Council members’ ideal points. Based on each of these 
measures it is possible to specify the Council members’ revealed preferences relative to 
each other, and, subsequently, interpret the dimensionality of the policy space.
The findings from each of the methods show that Council decision-making is 
dominated by a single dimension. Whereas the first dimension clearly shows a left-right 
divide as known from the domestic political sphere, none of the additional dimensions 
can be interpreted by a similarly distinct theory. Furthermore, whereas the first dimension 
is specified with high certainty by each of the methods, the estimates in the subsequent 
dimensions are characterised by large standard errors. Government changes are also 
apparent in the observed voting behaviour: the right-ward shift in many of the EU 
countries results in a right-ward shift in the respective member state’s voting behaviour in 
the Council. Therefore, after having also compared the observed voting behaviour with a 
set of exogenous measures of the governments’ position on a range of policy issues, the 
analysis concludes that the Council is more than an inter-governmental institution; party 
political preferences are easily detected when mapping the policy space.
The chapter proceeds as follows: The next section, Section 4.2, briefly discusses 
the competing propositions from the literature regarding the policy space within which 
the Council members decide. Section 4.3 then explains how the hypothesis from the 
theory and alternative suggestions from the literature are operationalised and tested. This 
section hence includes also a description of the scaling method techniques and the 
Baysian MCMC measurement tool. Subsequently, the results from applying the OC 
model to the data are presented and analysed in Section 4.4. Exogenous measures of the 
governments’ positions on a range of policy issues as well as country specific 
characteristics are used for the interpretation of the OC results. Section 4.5 then presents 
the results of conducting the same analysis by using the NOMINATE scaling method. 
Also, the results from the analysis are here furthermore compared to the governments’ 
ideal point estimates as measured by MCMC. The intention behind this section is, in 
other wards, to check that the results produced by OC and interpreted in the previous 
sections are not skewed due to methodological issues. Lastly, Section 4.6 concludes by 
summarising the findings and suggests how to further develop analyses of preferences 
and conflict structures in the Council.
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4.2 The policy space
Several propositions have been made with regard to the complex political space within 
which the member states act. However, in Chapter 2 it was argued that it may be 
beneficial to distinguish between preferences over specific policy issues and preferences 
captured by larger policy dimensions when analysing preferences and voting behaviour in 
Council politics. This distinction can also be applied when trying to categorise the current 
literature’s suggestions and findings regarding which factors shape the political space. 
However, no distinction currently exists within the literature itself between policy 
dimensions and other variables which may affect voting behaviour. For example, it is 
often heard that the EU can be categorised according to a North/South divide, and that 
this policy ‘dimension’ largely corresponds with whether a country is a net beneficiary of 
or contributor to the EU budget (e.g. Zimmer, Schneider and Dobbins 2005; Naurin 
2006). Yet, a categorisation based on geographical or economic status may not be 
entirely comparable to preferences over, for example, the degree of integration or 
left/right political issues. The former are descriptive characteristics of the actors, and the 
latter are political continuums. It is true that certain characteristics such as for example 
the geographical location in one way or the other may influence the governments’ 
decisions and preferences, also in ways that can be considered permanent cleavages of 
conflict. However, these characteristics are ultimately linked to specific policy issues 
which fall within the larger political dimensions. Therefore, although it is of course of 
general importance to identify each of the observable cleavages of conflict in the 
Council, it may be beneficial to separate what can be categorised as underlying policy 
dimensions and the effect of specific characteristics of the member states. As a result, the 
following brief outline and discussion of the existing knowledge focuses on the political 
dimensions that are often mentioned in the literature. Thereafter a range of other 
variables which may have an effect on the Council members’ voting behaviour are also 
presented. Both the literature’s suggestions regarding policy dimensions and single issue 
variables will be included in the subsequent empirical analysis.
Three distinct theories related to the dimensionality of the policy space within 
which the governments decide can be identified (Zimmer, Schneider and Dobbins 2005. 
See also Marks and Steenbergen 2002, 2004; Hooghe and Marks 1999). Each of these 
theories has in some form or another already been mentioned in the previous chapters.
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However, in order to make the categorisation explicit for the further analysis, each 
theory’s predictions regarding the dimensionality of the policy space should be 
summarised here.
The first set of theories is of an intergovernmental nature and relies on the 
argument discussed in Chapter 1 that European actors negotiate on a more/less 
integration dimension. This cleavage does not, according to the supporters of the theory, 
coincide with the conflicts that erupt along the left-right dimension in debates on 
domestic issues. However, two different views can be identified within this group. One 
view can be traced back to the realist contributions as formulated by Hoffmann (1966), 
yet, has also within the last decade seen a revival in Moravcsik's (1998), ‘liberal 
intergovemmentalism’. The argument is here that European integration is a function of 
controlled and deliberate actions taken by the member states. Conversely, the other view 
-  to be found in the neofunctionalist literature (Haas 1958) - interprets EU politics as a 
‘spill-over effect’ initiated, but not further controlled, by the member states. Though, the 
common basis for both groups is the opinion that a crucial division in EU political 
bargaining lies between supranationalists and nationalists. This argument also serves as 
the basis for some of the spatial models mentioned in Chapter 1.
The second set of theories has already been discussed at length in the previous 
chapters and presents the argument that left/right politics matter also in EU politics. As 
explained, this theoretical framework is only starting to appear in studies of Council 
decision-making, but has been present in empirical studies of voting behaviour in the 
Parliament for some time (e.g. Hix and Lord 1997; Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999; Hix 1999, 
2001; Hix et al forthcoming, 2006; Noury 2002; Noury and Roland 2002). The left/right 
political dimension is in the Parliament seen as either placed orthogonally upon the 
more/less integration dimension (Hix 1999), merged with it (Hooghe and Marks 1999) or 
thought to replace it (Tsebelis and Garrett 2000). As mentioned in Chapter 1, the findings 
from existing analyses of roll call votes in the Council suggest that the governments’ 
positions on the left-right political scale do indeed have an impact on their voting 
behaviour (Mattila and Lane 2001; Mattila 2004). However, it is difficult to conclude 
whether the significance of these findings means that the political space in the Council is 
indeed dominated by left-right politics as in the Parliament, or whether the findings
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suggest that left-right politics is one of many variables which has an impact on the 
governments’ voting behaviour (cf. Mattila 2006).
As a third, yet not as clearly defined, option is the proposition that crosscutting 
coalitions of interests occur between functional and territorial groups. Since coalition 
building in the Council is argued to be both unpredictable and time-consuming (Peters 
and Wright 2001:160), member states are not necessarily thought to build permanent 
alliances. Rather, it is the common interests on individual issues that bind them together 
(Nugent 1999:474). Indeed, EU politics is a continuously evolving matter and could lead
£S)to the assumption that the general EU policy space may not be a fixed framework . 
However, since multi-dimensional decision-making results in great transaction costs, and 
as stable results are only possible in one- or two-dimensional spaces (Hinich and Munger 
1997), it is in the interest of all actors participating in repetitive negotiations to limit the 
dimensionality of the conflict space (Zimmer, Schneider and Dobbins 2005: 407). 
Therefore, the theoretical argument presented by this group of scholars that Council 
negotiations are mostly of an ad hoc nature is considered highly implausible by most 
scholars from each of the other branches.
As should hopefully be apparent by now, the theory of this thesis is in line with 
the second model. EU politics can be expected to be primarily fought along the 
traditional left/right dimension. Surely, EU politics is made up by a combination of 
national-level and EU-level political affairs, however, as explained, the already elaborate 
cooperation between the member states has turned the political picture into a reflection of 
functional, socio-economic interests rather than purely intergovernmental affairs. 
Together with the organisational structures, where the European Council and preparatory 
meetings are in place to establish the overall framework, this makes the assumption that 
party political preferences will be apparent in the Council’s decision-making seem 
credible. Thus, Hypothesis 1 can be recalled:
Hypothesis 1:
The main dimension o f politics in the Council is the classic left/right
political dimension.
62 For recent articles debating which interests the EU member states should continue to pursue as a 
collective entity, as well as several ministers’ statements please refer to 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/constitution (last accessed 01 October 2006).
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A key part of the test to establish whether a left/right political dimension is indeed 
apparent in Council decision-making is to look into not only the governments’ ideal 
policy positions vis-a-vis each other, but also to investigate the effect of government 
changes on voting behaviour. If the party position of a government matters, then a change 
in government should also matter. For example, the right-ward shift in several of the 
countries in the 1999-2004 time period should be reflected in not just the general voting 
patterns but also in the respective countries’ voting behaviour. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is 
followed by a second prediction:
Hypothesis la:
A change in government means a change in the country's ideal point 
estimate.
Whether or not several dimensions of conflict can be detected rather than merely a 
single-dimensional policy space is obviously also a possibility which must be considered. 
Studies of other legislatures have in a few cases resulted in the finding that not one, but 
two or three separate policy dimensions can dominate legislators’ voting behaviour 
(Poole, Sowell and Spear 1992). Hence, Hypothesis lb considers the commonly assumed 
possibility of a pro-/sceptic EU dimension, yet, maintains that the parties’ preferences 
over left/right political issues will be dominant. The governments’ main concern with 
socio-economic policy matters means that attitude towards the EU is dependent on 
whether these preferences are also fulfilled in EU decision-making:
Hypothesis lb:
A pro-/sceptic EU dimension could be secondary to the classic 
left/right political dimension.
Furthermore, Hypothesis lc suggests that it is possible that certain patterns of coalition 
building exist in the Council which may not be completely compatible with any of the 
dimensions suggested in the literature. For example, although this cannot be assumed to 
be the dominant policy dimension, ad hoc coalition building may be the best description
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of any of the additional policy dimensions when the left/right dimension has been 
considered.
Hypothesis lc:
Other dimensions subsequent to the first dimension o f  
contestation in the Council could be characterised by coalition 
building on individual issues and therefore cannot be interpreted 
by any distinct theory.
In sum, and conversely to the dominant view on Council decision-making, the left/right 
political positions is expected to explain most of the voting behaviour in the Council, and 
national preferences regarding the degree of integration are not expected to appear from 
the results. If ad hoc coalition building does indeed take place in the Council, such 
dynamics cannot be captured by the ideal point estimations. In either case, such dynamics 
are not suspected to dominate the governments’ voting behaviour. The three hypotheses 
will be tested in turn in Section 4.4 and 4.5 by applying the methodology explained in the 
next section.
4.3 Operationalisation
The analysis in this chapter is conducted in a step-wise manner, and the methods used in 
each step are here explained in order of appearance: First, is the application of the OC 
scaling method to the data set. Second, is the interpretation of the results by using 
exogenous measures of the Council members’ positions on a number of policy issues. 
Third, is the robustness check of the OC results by using the other popular scaling 
method technique NOMINATE, and by comparing the results to ideal point estimates 
using a Baysian simulation approach.
Chapter 1 described how standard spatial theory is often used to analyse the 
institutional setup in the Council or the EU in general (e.g. Tsebelis 2002). However, 
whereas the conclusions from this form of analysis relies on a set of unobserved 
assumptions regarding the voting behaviour and coalition formation between the member 
states, scaling method techniques such as the recently developed Optimal Classification 
Method (OC) and NOMINATE do exactly the opposite: They provide a picture of the 
observed voting behaviour. Based hereon inferences can then be made regarding the
110
incentives for the legislators’ voting behaviour and, ultimately, the dimensionality of the 
policy space.
OC is useful for analyses of voting behaviour in the Council in that it provides 
both the ideal point estimates on each policy dimension for all the governments, as well 
as it summarises these ideal points into spatial ‘maps’. By letting each government being 
represented by one point and each roll call being represented by two points -  one for 
‘Yes’ and one for ‘No’ -  the summary of all the roll calls forms a picture, or a spatial 
map, where the distance between the governments show how similar their voting records 
are. To explain the method in a very simplified manner, OC pairs off each legislator’s 
decision to either vote ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ on each individual policy proposal. Based on an 
agreement score matrix a set of cutting planes, which divides the ‘Yes’ voters from the 
‘No’ voters on each policy proposal, legislators’ ideal points are calculated in turn such 
that an optimal classification (hence the name!) for each legislative choice is achieved. 
No further assumptions are made other than that the legislators’ preferences are 
symmetric and single-peaked, and that the likelihood of voting for or against a particular 
proposal is determined by the distance of their ideal point from the ‘cutting lines’ 
dividing the ‘Yes’ and ‘No camps’. Please refer to Poole (2005) for the currently most 
detailed explanation of the OC method63.
Scaling method techniques like the OC method have lately been successfully 
applied to a number of decision-making bodies and assemblies (Poole and Rosenthal 
1997; Voeten 2000; Schonhardt-Bailey 2003; Morgenstem 2004; Rosenthal and Voeten 
2004; Poole 2005; Hix et al. forthcoming, 2006;). However, as mentioned, the picture 
produced by OC does not in itself explain anything about the dimensions of political 
bargaining, but merely reflects how often the countries vote together or not on different 
policy issues. Therefore, in order to interpret the spatial maps and identify the content of 
the dimensions, one is required to either possess a priori knowledge of politics in the 
Council, or interpret the results by comparison with other measures. Researchers who in 
other contexts have used the OC or similar scaling methods usually carry out the 
interpretation without explicit methodological tools other than their own expert reading 
of the spatial maps. Fortunately, there is a still a great degree of certainty from these
63 However, please also refer to Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004) or Martin and Quinn (2002) for a 
critique o f the method.
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analyses since the researchers’ prior knowledge of the legislatures have been of an 
extremely sophisticated standard. However, Hix et al. (forthcoming, 2006) nevertheless 
suggest to overcome any possible weaknesses of inductive scaling methods by relying on 
statistical techniques and instead use a range of exogenous measures for the explanation 
of the substantive content of the spatial maps. Following these recommendations, this 
chapter subsequently compares the results from the Council 1999-2004 data set obtained 
by OC with a set of exogenous measures in order to verify whether the interpretation of 
the results are indeed correct. However, only 24 individual governments were represented 
in the Council when including all government changes from 1999 to 2004 and, hence, the 
OC estimates result in a very low number of observations for the further interpretative 
analysis. Instead, simple scatterplot matrices are presented in support of the 
interpretation. The scatterplots show the comparisons of the governments’ positions as 
produced by OC and the exogenous measures of their positions on policy issues which in 
the literature are often argued to dominate the Council policy space. Although more 
detailed statistical insights could perhaps be sought for in future research when it will be 
possible to apply scaling method analyses to a larger number of individual governments, 
such correlation matrices can still help to confirm whether any of the factors captured by 
the variables do indeed have an influence on voting behaviour in the Council.
As mentioned, the last part of the analysis in this chapter is a robustness check of 
the OC results by running the data with NOMINATE as well as by comparing the results 
to Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) scores. NOMINATE builds on much the same 
logic as OC, however, the methods differ in their assumptions about the distribution of 
actors’ utility functions as well as the calculations of starting values for the ideal points 
and cutting planes. In brief, whereas NOMINATE is essentially a probabilistic measure, 
OC instead maximizes the correct classification of legislative choices. Also, an important 
conclusion from studies of the suitability of the scaling methods techniques is that the OC 
method is generally found to produce more reliable results even with fairly small data 
sets. In fact, Monte Carlo tests show that the OC method accurately recovers the 
legislator ideal points and the roll cutting planes at high levels of error and missing data 
in one to ten dimensions also for data sets of the size used in this thesis64 (Rosenthal and
64 Please also note that Rosenthal and Voeten (2004) also find that OC is generally the best performing 
model.
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Voeten 2004; Poole 2000). NOMINATE usually requires larger data sets including 
higher numbers of both individual observations and legislators (Poole 2005, chapter 3 
and www.voteview.com)65. Please refer to Poole and Rosenthal (1997) for a detailed 
explanation of NOMINATE, and Poole (2005, chapter 4) for a discussion and empirical 
comparison of the differences between OC and NOMINATE.
However, at the same time as OC and NOMINATE are being applied to more and 
more empirical data sets, it is also becoming increasingly apparent that these methods 
suffer from a few statistical and theoretical shortages (Poole and Lewis 2003; Clinton, 
Jackman and Rivers 2004). The main point of critique is that the standard errors are 
extremely questionable in both NOMINATE and OC, and makes it difficult to conclude 
on the variance around the estimates. Consequently, a concern arises regarding whether 
the estimates are indeed consistent and provide fully reliable results (Poole and Rosenthal 
1997; Lewis and Poole 2003; Jackman 2000). Although it has very recently become 
possible to include standard errors in the spatial maps produced by OC, the accuracy of 
these are still somewhat doubtful. Therefore, the OC results are in the last part of the 
empirical analysis also compared to MCMC scores, which include both actors’ ideal 
points and standard errors. Details of the Bayesian simulation procedure can be found in 
e.g. Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004) but a brief, non-technical explanation would be 
as follows: The fundamental difficulty in roll call analysis is that everything other than 
the votes is unobservable. The ideal points, bill parameters, and utilities are unknowns. 
But if it was possible to impute values to the bill parameters and utilities, then the ideal 
points could be estimated by regression. By the same logic, if it was possible to impute 
values for the ideal points and utilities, the bill parameters could also be estimated by 
regression. The MCMC algorithm repeatedly performs these imputations and regressions, 
starting from an arbitrary point and alternating between simulation of the ideal points, bill 
parameters, and utilities. Under a wide set of conditions (e.g. Tierney 1996) MCMC 
algorithms are guaranteed to generate samples from the posterior density of the model 
parameters, regardless of where in the parameter space the algorithm is initialized 
(Clinton, Jackman and Rivers 2004: 357). Furthermore, an advantage of an MCMC 
model is that it allows to subsequently include more complex behavioural assumptions
65 Most o f the studies which have made use o f NOMINATE include more than 50.000 individual votes. 
The Council data set used in this thesis is hence considerably smaller than any o f these data.
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such as the issue to be voted upon, apparent coalitions, determinants of legislator 
preferences or the evolution of the legislative agenda. This latter point will not be 
addressed in any detail here, yet, may be of great interest for future research on the 
complex decision-making process in the Council. The conclusion hence finishes the 
chapter by making specific suggestions on how to further extend the model and let also 
other sources of information help to advance analyses of voting behaviour the Council.
4.3.1 Data
The data set used for the OC analysis and following investigations in this chapter is the 
full data set described in Chapter 3. That is, 19.215 individual votes are used for the 
scaling exercise resulting in 24 separate ideal point estimates for the governments. Again, 
it should be reminded that the reason for the 24 observations is that some countries had 
two different governments, and each government has its own entry in the analysis. The 
pooling of all the data of course means that the estimates represent the governments’ 
ideal points across all policy areas as well as without distinguishing between votes cast at 
different times in the legislative process. Whether any of the apparent patterns from this 
analysis are hence biased by the pooling of the data will be investigated in the subsequent 
analyses in Chapter 5 and 6. Everything needed to run the OC programme is available 
from http://k7moa.com/dwnl.htm, and NOMINATE can be found on 
http://voteview.com/w-nominate.htm. The MCMC results are calculated and compared to 
the OC estimates in R, which is available from http://www.r-project.org/. The data from 
the Council which produces the results presented here is available upon request from 
s.hagemann@lse.ac.uk, as are also the instructions to replicate the analyses.
4.3.2 Variables
Since the scaling method techniques used to estimate the governments’ ideal points are 
based merely on the governments’ observed voting behaviour, it is of no relevance to 
discuss the use of variables in the first part of the analysis. However, in order to support 
the interpretation of the OC results, scatterplot matrices are, as explained, introduced with 
comparisons of the ideal point estimates and exogenous measures of the governments’ 
position on a range of issues. The exogenous measures consist of governments’ values on
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most of the issues described in Section 3.3 under ‘independent variables’. The only 
exceptions are that the variables ‘ParDif, ‘Presidency’, and ‘Rule’ are not included in the 
analysis here. ‘ParDif is the possible difference in left/right values between an individual 
party and the entire government. ‘Presidency’ measures the effect of a government 
holding the Presidency for its frequency of opposing the majority. ‘Rule’ distinguishes 
between legislation adopted by QMV and unanimity. Neither of these three variables are 
relevant for the interpretation of the dimensionality of the policy space66. Hence, the full 
list of exogenous measures compared to the OC ideal point estimates in Section 4.4 
comes to:
1) The governments’ positions on the left/right political dimension as measured 
in the domestic sphere (‘Left/Right’);
2) The governments’ positions on the pro/anti-EU dimension (‘Pro/Anti-EU’);
3) The distribution of voting power as calculated on the basis of the relative 
Banzhaf index by using the POWERSLAVE (2002) programme (‘Power’);
4) Geographical location, distinguishing between North, Central and South 
Europe (‘Geo’);
5) Whether or not a Council member is a receiver or contributor to the EU 
budget (‘Budget’);
6) The amount of time a government has been an EU member (‘Member’);
7) The national political system from which the government comes from 
(‘NatSys’).
All of the control variables listed in Section 3.3 have also been compared to the OC 
results, yet, the resulting long list of comparisons with the variables will not be reported 
below since none of these variables turned out to have any correlation with the OC results 
at all. In fact, following the theory in Chapter 2, the expectations to the correlations 
reflected in the scatterplot matrices are that only the values measuring the governments’ 
position on the left/right political scale should produce a somewhat linear picture when 
compared to the OC estimates. The other exogenous measures listed above should 
produce dispersed pictures showing no direct relationship according to the theory.
66 ‘ParDif is not relevant as it is not possible to distinguish the individual party positions in the spatial 
maps from the entire government. ‘Presidency’ is not relevant as it only distinguishes between the 
government holding the Presidency and those which do not, and hence cannot be expected to dictate 
behaviour for all governments throughout the entire time period. ‘Rule’ would only be relevant to 
include if the spatial maps produced two coherent and distinctive groups o f observations, and a binary 
explanation like the decision rule could be the reason.
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Though, the results from each of these comparisons will be presented in order to 
substantiate the interpretation.
4.4 Findings
Table 4.1 below shows the goodness-of-fit of using the OC method with the data set. The 
Aggregate Proportional Reduction of Error (APRE) values report that the OC model is 
suitable for the classification of votes from the data set: APRE varies from zero to one. 
When APRE is equal to zero, the model explains nothing. When it is equal to one, perfect 
classification has been achieved. Hence, a score o f0.692 reflects a convincing robustness 
of the votes classified at the 1st dimension. However, in the subsequent dimensions the 
certainty varies: in the 2nd dimension the APRE score is 0.543, whereas the 3rd is
tVisomewhat questionable with only 0.411. The 4 dimension shows an increase to 0.635, 
whereas the 5th is again down at 0.478, and so on and so forth.
Table 4.1: Council voting explained by OC
Dimension Cumulative
%
Explained
APRE
1 61.5 0.692
2 73.0 0.543
3 78.4 0.411
4 83.4 0.635
5 86.9 0.478
6 89.0 0.485
8 90.1 0.265
9 91.1 0.502
10 91.1 0.427
Besides of presenting the goodness-of-fit of using OC with the data set, Table 4.1. also 
shows the accumulated percentage of votes explained by each dimension. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, studies of voting behaviour in national legislatures have generally found the 
policy space to be characterised by low dimensionality. Therefore, the figures shown here 
should not be of any greater surprise: OC appears to explain a very high percentage of the 
votes already at a very low number of dimensions. The first dimension explains almost 
62% of the votes, the second dimension an additional 11.5%, the third dimension 5.4% 
etc. etc. In other words, when the first dimension has been estimated, the decrease in
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votes explained is extremely rapid, indicating that Council decision-making evolves 
around only very few policy dimensions.
Although the OC method hence seems both suitable and as if it can produce 
interesting results based on the Council data set, the figures from the first few dimensions 
in Table 4.1 appear lower when comparing the percentage of votes successfully estimated 
to other studies using similar methods. For instance, in a study of the European 
Parliament, the first dimension of conflict is found to explain between 86% and 90% of 
all votes in each new parliament since 1979 (Hix forthcoming, 2006). Similarly, studies 
of other legislatures have reported between 88% and 92% of votes being captured by a 1st 
dimension (Poole 2005; Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Rosenthal and Voeten 2004; 
Schonhardt-Bailey 2003; Voeten 2000). Nevertheless, a classification of almost 62% of 
the votes is still a convincingly high number for the 1st dimension estimates, and hence 
suggests that Council decision-making is dominated by a single dimension. However, the 
fact that Table 4.1 shows that the second dimension adds another 11.5% to the amount of 
votes correctly estimated means that the policy space may be more than one dimensional. 
A figure of 11.5% for the 2nd is rather high, particularly when compared to results 
obtained for the 2nd dimensions measured in the above mentioned other scaling studies67. 
Including also the 3rd dimension increases the accumulated percentage even more, from 
73% to 78% of all votes explained. Though, whether this dimension significantly adds to 
the analysis is difficult to judge at this point. Yet, it is clear from the table that each of the 
following dimensions contributes only marginally to the percentage level of votes 
explained. In sum, Table 4.1 hence indicates that voting in the Council is characterised by 
a maximum of three dimensions . The next section will present the spatial maps of the 
governments’ ideal point estimates in these three dimensions.
67 Though, Hix et al. (forthcoming, 2006) also finds a relatively high additional percentage of votes to 
be explained by a second dimension in the Parliament.
68 Each o f the flowing steps in the analysis has been carried out on all 10 dimensions from the OC 
results. However, none of the dimensions above the first 3 showed any patterns in the spatial maps or 
any correlations in the comparisons with the exogenous measures. As will also be apparent from the 
NOMINATE and MCMC results below, these dimensions do not appear to add any significant level to 
the share o f votes explained in these other estimation methods used either. Hence, the last 7 o f the 
dimensions are not included in rest o f the chapter.
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4.4.1 Spatial maps o f voting behaviour in the Council
Figure 4.1 shows a spatial map of the governments’ voting behaviour in the first two 
dimensions and Figure 4.2 shows a similar spatial map for the first and third dimension. 
Rather than simple dots for each government’s ideal point, the figures show the 
confidence intervals around each estimate. In other words, each circle represents a 
government, such that the centre of a circle is the government’s ideal point estimate as 
also listed in Table 4.2, and the area covered by the rest of the circle shows the precision 
with which the ideal point was estimated (i.e. standard errors). Each of the governments 
are shown by its acronym as explained below the figures, and, as some countries have 
had more than one government in this period, the number 1 or 2 following an acronym 
refers to whether it is the first or second government in the years 1999-2004.
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Figure 4.1: Governments’ ideal point estimates in the 1st and 2nd dimensions
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Figure 4.2: Governments’ ideal point estimates in the 1st and 3rd dimensions
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Table 4.2: OC scores, Governments’ positions 
in 1st, 2nd and 3rd dimension
Government Diml Dim2 Dim3
AU1 -0.281 -0.138 0.107
AU2 0.221 -0.330 0.519
BE1 -0.350 0.000 0.000
BE2 0.245 -0.207 -0.076
DK1 -0.275 -0.087 0.129
DK2 0.258 -0.143 -0.287
FI1 -0.238 -0.315 0.135
FI2 0.120 -0.069 0.152
FR1 -0.169 0.160 -0.270
FR2 0.308 -0.051 0.168
GER -0.131 0.202 0.163
GRE 0.092 0.127 -0.116
IRE -0.027 0.112 0.068
IT1 -0.123 -0.319 0.868
IT2 0.305 -0.238 -0.246
LU1 -0.350 0.000 0.000
LU2 0.108 -0.076 0.007
NE1 0.016 -0.490 -0.432
NE2 0.461 0.214 -0.039
POl -0.303 0.238 0.143
P02 0.314 -0.184 -0.308
SPA -0.057 0.255 -0.113
SWE -0.005 0.304 -0.059
UNK -0.138 0.190 0.000
The first observation to make from Figure 4.1 and 4.2 is that the distribution of 
governments along the 1st and 2nd dimension is rather dispersed, whereas the 
governments are more closely located on the 3rd dimension. Since the distance between 
the governments indicates how often they have voted together, this observation suggests 
that a noteworthy degree of disagreement must have been recorded on decisions falling 
under those two first dimensions. Otherwise, if no disagreement had existed, the picture 
would not have been so dispersed.
A second observation from Figure 4.1 and 4.2 is that the confidence intervals 
around the estimates differ considerably across the dimensions. Whereas the circles are 
generally smaller in Figure 4.1 than in Figure 4.2, it is also clear when only looking at 
Figure 4.1 that the estimates are much more precise in the 1st dimension than in the 2nd 
dimension; the very oval shape of each circle means a much higher standard deviation in 
the 2nd dimension than in the 1st. In Figure 4.2 the circles become much larger, 
particularly towards the right hand side of the picture. The confidence intervals show, in
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other words, that although the precision of the estimates vary also within the 1st 
dimension, this dimension is the most accurately calculated, whereas the precision 
increases in the 2nd dimension and ultimately results in overlapping estimates in the 3rd 
dimension.
The third immediate observation to make from Figure 4.1 and 4.2 is of great 
importance to the theory and directly addresses Hypothesis lb69: It is clear from both of 
the OC pictures that in the 1st dimension a change in government means a change in a 
country’s ideal point estimate. In fact, a change in government means quite a drastic 
change in voting behaviour for all of the countries which experienced a government 
turnover: Each of the governments followed by a 1 after their acronym are in the 1st 
dimension placed on the left hand side of the spatial maps, whereas all of the 
governments followed by a 2 are to be found on the right. This observation corresponds 
nicely with the right-ward shift in many of the European governments in 1999-2004. 
However, before jumping to any immature conclusions about the content of this policy 
dimension, a more precautious, yet still significant, conclusion can be drawn: the Council 
members cannot be voting primarily according to geographically defined preferences in 
this dimension, as this would have meant a consistent position also across the 
government changes. The observed change in the voting behaviour shows that a change 
in government means a change in preferences in the Council.
The 2nd and 3rd dimensions do not reflect the same change in voting behaviour 
when there has been a government turnover. In fact, the 3rd dimension does not show 
much difference even between the countries, and it may therefore not be very useful to 
engage in any in-depth analysis of this policy dimension, since the preferences do not 
seem to be very coherent. Also the overlapping confidence intervals further indicate that 
it has not been possible to capture the voting behaviour of the governments very precisely 
in this dimension. Though, before dismissing this third dimension from the rest of the 
analysis, Figure 4.3 shows a scatterplot matrix of the first 3 dimensions in order to ensure 
that any possible relationship between the values in the 3rd dimension and any of the 
other dimensions is not overlooked. It would be a mistake to exclude this dimension if 
the distribution appears to be skewed due to estimations in any of the other dimensions.
69 Hypothesis lb: A pro-/sceptic EU dimension could be secondary to the classic left/right political 
dimension.
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Figure 4.3: Correlations between the 1st, 2nd and 3rd dimension, OC
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The scatterplot matrices in Figure 4.3 show that no linear relationship between the three 
dimensions exists. So it appears as if the 3rd dimension cannot add anything to the further 
analysis. Hence, this dimension will be disregarded in the rest of the chapter, although 
each of the steps in the analysis carried out below have also been applied to this 
dimension. The results from doing the analysis of the 3 rd dimension clearly show that no 
patterns or correlations with the exogenous measures exist. Therefore, the reporting of 
the findings does not seem of any relevance to the further investigations and will not be 
included here.
Having dismissed the 3rd dimension, it is necessary to return to the spatial map in 
Figure 4.1 and comment on another observation before turning to the actual interpretation
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of the content of the policy dimensions: In the figure it appears as if the governments 
which are located centrally at the first dimension take up more extreme positions on the 
second dimension. Conversely, most of the governments located at the extremes on the 
1st dimension appear to be quite centrally located on the 2nd dimension. In other words, 
there almost seems to be a reverse order of the dimensions in terms of the governments’ 
locations at the extremes and towards the centre. However, it is difficult to tell from the 
spatial map in Figure 4.1 on its own whether this pattern is indeed of significance. Also, a 
few cases do not correspond entirely with the trend: the first Portuguese government 
(POl) and the second Dutch government (NE2) are located at the extremes in both the 1st 
and the 2nd dimensions. Again, the scatterplot matrix in Figure 4.3 can help to address 
this question: since no relationship exists between the 1st and the 2nd dimension reflected 
in the upper middle picture of Figure 4.3, the change in the governments’ location from 
the 1st to the 2nd dimension does not appear to follow any specific pattern. In other words, 
the impression of a change from the centre to the extreme - and vice versa -  is not 
significant according to the matrix.
As a last point it could be argued that three cluster tendencies can be detected in 
the spatial map in Figure 4.1. Starting from the left side of the first dimension, one 
clustering of countries includes the first governments in Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark 
and Austria, respectively. This group is located between the values of-0.281 and -0.350 
on the first dimension, and 0 and -0.138 on the second dimension. In other words, this 
group of governments is located quite far left on the first dimension, yet, centrally on the 
second dimension. The second group of governments which seems to have voted together 
is placed in the upper middle part of the picture, between -0.169 and -0.005 on the first
7 0dimension and 0.304 and 0.112 on the second dimension. This group includes the first 
governments in France, and the governments of UK, Germany, Spain and Sweden. As a 
third group it is interesting to see that some of the same countries represented as in the 
first group are also to be found together in this group, yet, this time the new governments 
have moved towards the lower right comer. The group is located between the values of 
0.221 and 0.314 on the first dimension and -0.330 and -0.069 on the second, and 
includes the second government in each of the following countries: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Italy, France and Portugal. Hence, the government changes in those countries
70 One could also include Greece in this group, which has a score o f 0.092.
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had more or less the same effect for their voting behaviour in the Council. They all 
moved from one area on the left side of the 1st axis to another area on the right side of the 
axis.
4.4.2 Interpretation o f the dimensions
Clearly, all of the observations made so far indicate something about what structures the 
governments’ voting behaviour: the location of the governments’ ideal points on the 1st 
dimension in Figure 4.1 immediately suggests that the governments’ preferences on the 
classic left/right political scale as known from the domestic political level also drive the 
voting behaviour in the Council. Almost all of the governments are placed as one would 
expect with even a limited knowledge of the political picture in Europe: the centre-left 
governments are placed in the centre-left side of Figure 4.1, whereas the centre-right part 
consists of the more liberal and conservative governments. The only two slightly odd 
results in this regard are that the second government in the Netherlands is located at the 
most extreme right, and that Spain’s centre-right government is found just left of the 
centre. However, despite these two cases, each of the rest of the 24 governments are 
placed much in line with what could be expected from the parties’ positions at the 
national level. Additionally, the radical changes in the position of those countries which 
experienced a change in their governments also support the immediate impression that 
the first dimension is a left/right political axis. All of the government changes in the EU 
countries in this period involved a substitution of a centre-left or left-wing government 
with a centre-right or right-wing government (see Table 3.5 in Chapter 3), which is also 
what the spatial maps indicates.
Moving on to the second dimension, however, the reading of the figure becomes 
more difficult. No immediate explanation comes to mind with regard to the distribution 
on this dimension, and it is hard to come to any other conclusion than that this 
distribution is simply ‘noise’. A pro-/anti EU division is definitely not detectable, and 
neither does a geographical cleavage, division according to political systems, market 
economy or any of the other proposed characteristics seem to explain this dimension. 
Furthermore, since it was reported in Table 4.1 that this second dimension captures 
another 11.5% of the votes after the 1st dimension has been estimated, this distribution 
cannot be interpreted as the ad hoc coalition formation suggested by some theorists
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either. Ad hoc coalitions would have meant that no patterns could be detected and, hence, 
OC would not have been able to specify the ideal points in this dimension. True, it could 
be argued that the larger areas covered by the confidence intervals suggest that OC 
actually have not been able to calculate the estimates very precisely, and that this could 
be due to ad hoc dynamics. However, the pattern which is detectable in this distribution 
of the estimates should still not be apparent at all in a purely ad hoc scenario. Therefore, 
the conclusion from a first reading of the second dimension must be that either the 
distribution reflects a cleavage in the Council which has not yet been captured by any 
theories, or else the dimension is simply ‘noise’ as suggested above.
Figure 4.4: Correlations between the governments’ positions on the left/right 
political dimension and the ideal point estimates (OC)
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In order to check if this interpretation of the spatial maps is correct, Figure 4 compares 
the results from the first dimension produced by the OC method with the values for the 
governments’ positions on the left/right political dimension as found in the Benoit and 
Laver (forthcoming, 2006) data set. These values are defined on a scale which assesses 
the ‘.. [p]osition on a general left/right dimension, taking all aspects of party policy into
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account’ from 1 to 20, where the extreme left gets the value of 1, and the extreme right 
gets the value of 20.
The scatter plot in Figure 4.4 indicates that the main observed dimension of 
conflict in the Council is the left/right political dimension similarly to that of party 
competition at the national level. The positive and relatively concentrated slope suggests 
that there is a moderately to strong relationship between the OC results from the first 
dimension and the governments’ position on the left/right political scale. The R 2 value of 
.617 further confirms this.
Figure 4.5: Correlations between the government’s position on the pro- 
/sceptic EU political dimension and the ideal point estimates (OC)
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Similarly to Figure 4.4, Figure 4.5 presents the results of comparing the second 
dimension values from the OC model with the governments’ position on a pro-/anti EU 
scale. The exogenous pro-/anti EU values are obtained from the same data set as above, 
and also range from 1 to 20. Here, 1 means ‘Favours increasing the range of areas in 
which the EU can set policy’, and 20 indicates ‘Favours reducing the range of areas in 
which the EU can set policy’. Conversely to Figure 4.4, the picture produced here does 
not suggest any correlation; the governments’ ideal point estimates are scattered across 
the whole matrix. The figure thereby supports the above reading of the spatial maps that 
the second dimension is not dictated by the governments’ attitude towards the EU.
lui rW
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Appendix C includes the scatterplot matrices from doing the same comparisons of the 
OC estimates from the 1st and 2nd dimensions with each of the rest of the exogenous 
measures listed in Section 4.3. However, none of the values from either of these measures 
appear to be correlated with the governments’ ideal point estimates produced by OC, and 
are therefore merely included in the appendix. Taking into account the number of ideal 
point estimates, the correlation matrices provide the best alternative when trying to avoid 
the limitations from a mere subjective interpretation. Also, the exogenous measures are 
widely recognised as convincing indicators for the respective government characteristics 
they estimate. Therefore, it should here be safe to draw the following three conclusions 
from the above findings: 1) governments in the Council vote according to the rule of 
preference-connectedness, such that a government will vote together with the 
governments lying next to it in a uni-dimensional policy space. 2) The distribution of the 
governments’ ideal point estimates corresponds with their positions along the traditional 
left/right political axis as measured at the domestic political level. 3) Government 
changes result in changes in voting behaviour in the Council. In other words, and as was 
predicted by the spatial theories, preference-connectedness is an apparent feature in the 
governments’ voting behaviour, yet, this connectedness is of a party political nature 
rather than the commonly assumed nation-centred definition. Whether these findings are 
exhaustive as explanations for the governments’ voting behaviour will be investigated in 
the following chapters. However, what has been presented so far should be conclusive 
regarding the dimensionality of the policy space; the question is if other government 
characteristics or single issues can also have an influence on the decision to either oppose 
or support the majority. Yet, such factors cannot, as discussed in the first part of the 
chapter, be assumed to shape the policy space within which the governments act. They 
may on the other hand explain something about the constraints under which the 
governments pursue their political ambitions as captured by the left/right political 
dimension.
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4.5 Robustness check with NOMINATE and MCMC
Whereas most other studies which apply scaling method techniques to voting data usually 
adopt the NOMINATE scaling model71, this thesis has chosen to rely mainly on the 
results produced by the OC method. As explained in Section 4.3, this is due to several 
reasons. First, whereas NOMINATE is essentially a probabilistic measure, OC instead 
maximizes the correct classification of legislative choices. Second, and related hereto, the 
size of the data set makes OC the more appropriate method: the OC method produces
reliable results even with fairly small data sets and hence became the natural choice for
11scaling the Council members’ decision outcomes . In fact, Monte Carlo tests show that 
the OC method accurately recovers the legislator ideal points and the roll cutting planes 
at high levels of error and missing data in one to ten dimensions also for data sets of the 
size used in this thesis (Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Poole 2000). However, in order to 
check that the results are not skewed due to a reliance on the OC method, this section 
runs a robustness check with NOMINATE which, although less accurate with this data 
set, should still produce reliable results. Subsequently, the OC results are also compared 
to ideal point estimates as calculated by an MCMC model.
Table 4.3 shows the percentages of the votes explained in each dimension 
produced by NOMINATE. Both the percentage of votes explained and the APRE scores 
are lower in this table than the results reported in the previous section from applying the 
OC method to the data. Here, the 1st dimension explains almost 54% of the votes, 
whereas the 2nd dimension adds another 4.6%, the 3rd dimension 4%, etc. etc. Hence, 
although NOMINATE cannot successfully explain as high a level of the votes as the OC 
can, it still quite accurately captures more than 53% of the votes already by the first 
dimension.
71 For studies o f behaviour in parliaments please refer to Rosenthal and Voeten, (2004); Schonhardt- 
Bailey (2003); Hix et al. (forthcoming, 2006). For studies of behaviour in international assemblies such 
as UN General Assembly please refer to Voeten (2000).
72 Most o f the studies which have made use o f NOMINATE include more than 50.000 individual votes. 
The Council data set used in this thesis is hence considerably smaller than any of these data.
73 Please also note that Rosenthal and Voeten (2004) also find that OC is generally the best performing 
model.
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Table 4.3: Council votes explained by NOMINATE
Dimension cumulative % explained APRE
1 53.499 0.611
2 58.128 0.442
3 62.043 0.463
4 66.837 0.679
5 67.593 0.628
6 69.239 0.702
8 71.082 0.641
9 72.735 0.502
10 73.844 0.546
When further comparing the results from the first 3 dimensions from the OC and 
NOMINATE methods, Table 4.4 shows that the ideal point estimates in the 1st 
dimensions from each of the models are indeed highly correlated. However, the estimates 
in the 2nd and 3rd dimensions in one model do not directly replicate the estimates from 
these same dimensions in the other model. Hence, the interpretation in the previous 
sections of the OC results may in fact be confirmed in this table. There it was concluded 
that the 2nd and 3rd dimensions do not actually capture additional policy dimensions once 
the 1st dimension has been estimated. Since the estimates do not correspond, it is 
therefore likely that the results in the 2nd and 3rd dimensions are merely ‘noise’, as argued 
above.
Table 4.4: Correlation between ideal point estimates obtained by OC and
NOMINATE
NOM dl 1NOMd2 NOMd3 'OCdl OCd2 OCd3
NOMdl
NOMd2
NOMd3
OCdl
OCd2
OCd3
0.096086
-0.00934
0.892632
-0.14943
-0.20963
0.003847
0.033335
-0.08528
0.073217
-0.03946
0.085538
-0.21548
-0.14166
-0.31076 -0.38687
Table 4.5, Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 below report the results obtained with NOMINATE. 
NOMINATE does unfortunately not produce the significance intervals similarly to what 
was reported in the spatial maps produced by OC. Therefore, the governments’ ideal 
point estimates are in Figure 4.6 and 4.7 presented as single dots. Again, the governments
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are represented by their country’s acronym followed by a 1 or 2 if there was more than 
one government from 1999 to 2004.
Figure 4.6 shows a slightly more dispersed picture of the first and second 
dimensions than what was reported by OC. It is not possible to detect any clustering of 
governments as such, and although the first governments in Luxembourg and Belgium 
are now placed as the only governments towards the extreme left on the first dimension, 
this spatial map shows a more scattered distribution of the ideal points in both the first 
and second dimension. Conversely, Figure 4.7 resembles the distribution in the spatial 
map of the first and third dimension produced by OC: Besides of the first governments of 
Luxembourg and Belgium, most of the governments are located in the lower part of the 
picture, with more governments located towards the centre-half part of the x-axis than 
towards the extremes.
Table 4.5: NOMINATE Scores
Legislator D1 D2 D3
BE1 -0.941 0.338 0.732
LU1 -0.941 0.338 0.552
FR1 -0.200 0.215 -0.126
AU1 -0.398 -0.389 -0.389
GE -0.186 0.922 -0.271
DK1 -0.353 -0.528 0.027
SW -0.342 -0.241 -0.441
DK2 0.236 -0.417 -0.417
POl -0.623 0.075 0.075
UK -0.035 -0.624 -0.624
SP -0.021 -0.305 -0.305
FI1 -0.331 0.008 0.008
AU2 0.309 0.615 -0.215
IR 0.225 0.224 0.024
NE1 -0.299 -0.519 -0.519
LU2 0.349 0.101 0.101
GR 0.387 0.309 0.009
FI2 0.414 -0.148 -0.278
IT1 -0.269 0.724 0.124
BE2 0.760 -0.205 -0.205
IT2 0.809 -0.515 -0.515
P02 0.814 0.580 -0.580
FR2 0.995 0.018 -0.418
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Figure 4.6 Governments’ ideal points in 1st and 2nd dimension; NOMINATE
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Figure 4.7 Governments’ ideal points in 1st and 3rd dimension; NOMINATE
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The conclusion from Figure 4.6 and 4.7 must be that running the data with NOMINATE 
essentially reflects the same dynamics in the voting behaviour as measured by the OC 
method. The NOMINATE results show a distinctive left/right divide in the 1st dimension, 
and also the significant changes in voting behaviour when there has been a government 
change are apparent along the first dimension’s axis. Similarly to the OC result, the 2nd 
and 3rd dimensions in the NOMINATE figures do seem to suggest any clear patterns 
either. However, the individual values for the governments’ ideal points in the 2nd and 3rd 
dimensions come out differently from the corresponding dimensions obtained with the 
OC method, and the interpretation of the results should therefore not be assumed to be 
possible as a complete repetition of the OC results. Hence, similarly to the analysis of the 
OC results, the NOMINATE estimates have also been correlated in scatterplot matrices 
with the exogenous measures of the governments values on the policy issues highlighted 
in the literature as having an influence on the preference configurations. However, except 
for an apparent linear relationship between the estimates on the first dimension from the 
NOMINATE results and the governments’ left/right political positions, none of the 
exogenous measures are found to be correlated with the NOMINATE values. Therefore, 
since the results do not add any new information to the analysis, these matrices will not 
be included here.
The very last robustness check of the OC results is conducted by comparing the 
governments’ estimates to the ideal point scores calculated by a Baysian Monte Carlo 
Markov Chain simulation. As explained in Section 4.3, MCMC has the advantage that it 
produces the parameter estimates and their standard errors in one process. However, 
whereas the MCMC scores themselves are reported in Appendix D, Figure 4.8 simply 
shows the comparison of the MCMC scores and the ideal point estimates from the first 
dimension of the OC results. Interestingly, whereas the MCMC scores reflect a clear 
left/right political divide, a second or third dimension does not appear in the MCMC 
calculations of the ideal points. In fact, the MCMC method does not even produce an 
output for these dimensions, showing that the specifications are not possible above the 
first dimension.
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Figure 4.8: Comparison of MCMC 
and OC ideal point estimates
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Figure 4.8 shows a moderate to strong relationship between the governments’ revealed 
preferences as estimated by the MCMC scores and the ideal point estimates from the first 
dimension from the OC method. Hence, although there is some apparent variation 
between the two methods, also the findings from the MCMC method lend support to the 
OC estimations. It should therefore now be safe to conclude that the picture produced by 
OC does indeed capture the dominant trends in the governments’ voting behaviour. This 
observed voting behaviour leaves little doubt that the governments are influenced by their 
party political preferences when adopting legislation in the Council: The dominant first 
dimension shows a distribution of the governments’ ideal point estimates much in line 
with their positions along the traditional left/right political continuum in national politics. 
None of the other dimensions produced by OC can be interpreted by a similarly distinct 
theory.
4.6 Summary
The purpose of this chapter has been to investigate the dimensionality of the policy space 
in the Council. The reason for such analysis is an ambition of capturing the dynamics
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which can explain the Council members’ voting behaviour, and hereby conclude on the 
governments’ preference configurations and potential coalition formations. By applying 
scaling method techniques to the data it is possible to obtain a set of ideal point estimates 
and spatially map the observed voting behaviour. Based hereon inferences can be made 
regarding the content of the policy space.
The findings showed that the governments vote much in line with what is 
predicted by coalition theories and standard spatial models such that a government will 
vote together with other governments located next to it the policy space. In the Council, 
this policy space is found to be uni-dimensional and in line with the governments’ 
position on the traditional left/right political scale as measured at the domestic political 
level. None of the additional dimensions can be estimated with a similar precision as the 
first dimension, and neither do they reflect distinct patterns which could also be 
interpreted by the literature’s theories of decision-making in the Council. Government 
changes are also apparent in the observed voting behaviour: the right-ward shift in many 
of the EU countries results in a right-ward shift in the respective member state’s voting 
behaviour in the Council. Therefore, after having made sure that the results are also 
robust across different methods for estimating ideal point estimates, the analysis 
concludes that Hypothesis 1 is supported. The Council is more than an inter­
governmental institution; party political preferences are easily detected when mapping 
the policy space.
However, two important points should be made in relation to the conclusion from 
these findings: First, as discussed in Chapter 2, the left/right political scale is merely a 
common scale used in relation to party politics, and does not, as such, indicate anything 
about the content of the specific policy issues. It does -  as observed in the findings -give 
structure to the voting behaviour much in line with what has traditionally been 
characterised as preferences over socio-economic standards, however, whether this 
meaning of the left/right axis still remains is disputed (e.g. Karvonen and Kuhnle (2001). 
Nevertheless, the patterns in the Council members’ voting behaviour largely corresponds 
with the distribution along this left/right political axis, which is still a convenient and 
commonly acknowledged measure to categorise and distinguish between political parties 
and political preferences. Second, it should be noted that spatial theory and 
measurements driven by spatial assumptions are limited in a way which is somewhat
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related to the distinction made in this thesis between policy dimensions and other 
variables which may have an influence on voting behaviour. Therefore, the following 
chapters will based on other methods continue to explore whether the findings are indeed 
robust also across policy areas and across the different stages of the legislative process, as 
well as whether other characteristics which cannot be captured in a spatial manner also 
influence Council decision-making.
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Chapter 5: Changes in voting behaviour across the 
different stages of the legislative process
5.1 Introduction
This chapter tests Hypothesis 2,3 and 4 and investigates whether there is any significant 
difference in how the Council members vote at the last voting stage compared to stages 
prior to the final adoption of a proposal. Last stage voting records do not necessarily 
mirror the real conflict structure in the Council (Lane and Mattila 2001; Mattila 2004:35; 
Zimmer, Schneider and Dobbins 2005:6), and since it has been possible to obtain 
information from minutes also from earlier readings of a policy proposal, it will be 
interesting to see if the countries change their decisions to support or oppose a proposal 
across the legislative process.
The empirical results support the hypotheses derived from the theory. Council 
members vote according to their party political preferences at both the last decision stage 
and stages prior to the final adoption: left-wing governments are much less inclined to 
oppose the majority than right-wing governments. In fact, the more a government moves 
towards the extreme right the more likely it is to oppose, whereas the more a government 
moves towards the left the less likely it is to do so. However, this tendency varies across 
the stages for the governments depending on their voting power. Small member states are 
more willing to show disagreement at earlier stages than at the final adoption stage, 
whereas larger member states are almost equally likely to do so across the decision 
process. When combining the interaction of these two findings, the results are hence that 
whereas both small and large right-wing governments more frequently oppose the 
majority than left-wing governments, the difference in voting behaviour across the 
legislative stages between small and large governments on the right-wing side of the 
spectrum is much smaller than the difference between small and large left-wing 
governments. Hence, the findings suggest that only when considering both left/right 
political preferences and the members’ voting power is it possible to adequately capture 
the changes in voting behaviour across the different stages of the legislative process.
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5.2 Voting at the final adoption stage and prior readings
So far no empirical investigations have been presented regarding a possible change in 
voting behaviour across the different stages of the legislative processes in the Council. 
However, most researchers (Mattila 2004; Lane and Mattila 2001; Heisenberg 2005; 
Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006) acknowledge that there may be reasons why the last 
votes are different to the earlier readings, not just under the Co-decision procedure but 
also under the Consultation and Cooperation procedures.
Changes in voting behaviour across different stages of the legislative processes in 
the Council can be a sign of one of four alternatives: 1) either there is a substantial 
difference in the content of the policy proposal from one reading to another, 2) the 
governments change their positions due to a change in preferences, 3) the change can be 
interpreted as a sign of strategic voting, or 4) the members consider the final vote where 
it is decided whether to accept or reject the proposal different to the earlier negotiations. 
Having looked into the substance of the adopted proposals which included the most 
changes from the earlier readings to the final adoption, this thesis finds the first 
alternative highly unlikely. Other researchers (Cini 1996:147) have also estimated that 
the final proposals accepted by the Council contain at least 80% of the original draft. This 
corresponds with what was also explained in the interviews for this thesis74, that if any 
major chances to a proposal are requested during the first reading in the Council, the 
Commission normally withdraws the policy in order to introduce it all over again in a 
revised and more acceptable version.
Since the theory assumes that the governments have stabile preferences over the
«TC
same policy alternatives , the second alternative can also be dismissed. The governments 
do not change their voting behaviour because they change their preferences over the 
content of a policy proposal. This leaves the last two of the four possibilities outlined 
above: A change in voting behaviour could be an act of strategic voting or because the 
members consider the vote on whether to accept or reject the legislation all together 
different to the previous negotiation rounds. These two options are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, and it is unfortunately not possible to distinguish in the analysis
74 Interview I, V, VI, XIV.
75 Again, it should be reminded that a change in government has been treated as a change in the identity 
of the member and, hence, the assumption is related to the stability o f individual governments’ 
preferences.
137
whether an apparent change in the governments’ behaviour is in fact a sign of one 
alternative or the other. Nevertheless, the following considerations regarding the 
incentives to vote strategically may be useful for the analysis of the empirical results.
As explained in Chapter 2, strategic voting is the calculations of how best to 
influence voting outcomes (Farquaharson 1969). The reason suggested in this thesis for 
why large countries vote against the majority more often than smaller countries at the last 
stage of the legislative procedure (Mattila and Lane 2001; Mattila 2004), is that larger 
governments have stronger incentives to signal their opposition to external and internal 
actors: They may wish to state their opposing position on a policy issue for the purpose 
of future negotiations or for the purpose of the implementation process. Smaller Council 
members may similarly have reasons to do so, however, as their possibilities for 
influencing legislation will be less than those of the larger members’, their incentives to 
oppose are also fewer. In other words, smaller countries may acknowledge their limited 
resources and abilities to influence every decision made by the EU. Thus, they restrict 
their attention to issues that they consider especially important, or they may seek to 
influence legislation earlier in the process than the last voting situation. If this example is 
true, it can be expected that mainly the large member states should oppose in the analysis 
of the last possible votes. Yet, when voting situations prior to the last votes are analysed, 
small and big member states should be equally likely to be in opposition; or at least the 
smaller member states should be more willing to show their disagreement than they were 
before. Therefore, as explained in Chapter 3, Hypothesis 2, 3 and 4 which were derived 
from the theory can now be extended to also include predictions across the different 
decision stages:
Hypothesis 2:
A right-wing member state is more likely to oppose the majority than a 
left-wing member state.
Hypothesis 2a:
A right-wing government is more likely to oppose the 
majority than a left-wing government at all voting stages.
Hypothesis 3:
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A country with more voting power will oppose the majority more 
frequently than a country with less voting power.
Hypothesis 3a:
A country with more voting power will oppose the 
majority more frequently than a country with less voting 
power at the last voting stage.
Hypothesis 3b:
A country with less voting power will be more likely to 
oppose the majority at stages prior to the final adoption o f  
a piece o f legislation than at the last adoption stage.
Hypotheses 4:
Small (large) right-wing governments vote differently to small (large) 
left-wing governments.
Hypotheses 4a:
Small (large) right-wing governments vote differently to 
small (large) left-wing governments at all stages.
5.3 Operationalisation
Due to the high costs of opposing the majority, the most interesting point to investigate 
regarding the Council members’ voting behaviour is which factors influence a 
government’s decision to formally voice disagreement. The dependent variable in the 
tests of the above hypotheses is therefore the frequency of a government’s opposition, 
which is here defined as both opposition through voting, abstentions (under Co-decision) 
and in the form of formal statements. Though, applying a linear regression model to such 
data could lead to inefficient, inconsistent and biased estimates. A Poisson regression 
model, on the other hand, is specifically designed for such purposes (Long 1997:218). 
The defining characteristic of the basic Poisson regression model is that the conditional 
mean of the outcome is equal to the conditional variance. However, in practice the 
conditional variance often exceeds the conditional mean, and dealing with this problem 
has led to also the introduction of the negative binomial regression model which allows 
the variance to exceed the mean. Furthermore, a common problem is that the number of 
zeros may exceed the number predicted by either the basic Poisson model or the negative 
binomial regression model. Zero modified count models explicitly model the number of
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predicted zeros and also allow the variance to differ from the mean. However, each of 
these three models are based on the Poisson distribution, which has the following 
properties (cf. Long and Freese 2003: 245ff. See also Cameron and Trivedi 1998 and 
Long 1997): Let p be the rate of occurrence or the expected number of times an even will 
occur over a given period of time. Lety be a random variable indicating the number of 
times an event did occur. Sometimes the event will occur fewer times that than the 
average rate, and other times it will occur more often. The relationship between the 
expected count p and the probability of observing any observed county is specified by 
the Poisson distribution
—f j  y
PrO | = e ** for y  = 0,1,2....
y-
Where ju)0 is the sole parameter defining the distribution and where fi = exP ,xj3 is a 
vector of all the independent variables x, times their effect p . For the further definitions 
and comparisons of each of the different models for count outcomes please refer to Long 
(1997), Long and Freese (2003) or Cameron and Trivedi (1998). The results from 
running the data with each of the models will be presented in Section 5.4. However, it 
can already at this stage be assumed that the most appropriate model for the analyses in 
this chapter is a negative fixed effect Poisson model: The conditional variance does 
exceed the conditional mean (the reason for the negative binomial choice), and the results 
are confined to explaining the data analysed without making any inferences to a larger 
population (the reason for the fixed effect version rather than a random effect model) 
(Cameron and Trivedi 1998:291).
5.3.1 Data
The data set is divided into two for the purpose of the empirical tests in this chapter. The 
first data set includes all legislation adopted between 1999 and 2004 and has a total of 
932 pieces of legislation. It consists of the last possible votes on each proposal, that is, 
the decisions where it is determined whether a final proposal is adopted or rejected. In 
other words, votes from earlier readings are excluded from this data set and the total of
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the individual votes hence amounts to 13,980 rather than the 19,215 included in the 
previous chapter. The second data set consists of votes taken on a sample of the same 
legislation as in the first data set, but includes only the votes from earlier readings. The 
number of legislation which had more than one voting situation is ‘only’ 349 pieces of 
legislation, and is therefore considerably smaller than the first data set. This is partly due 
to the fact that not all of the legislation falls within the Co-decision procedure and 
therefore often do not include several readings. As explained in Chapter 3, although the 
data is not restricted to Co-decision legislation only, the biggest proportion of proposals 
which are presented to the Council several times falls within the Co-decision procedure. 
Furthermore, one of the consequences from the Amsterdam treaty is that legislation can 
now also be adopted already after the first reading under the Co-decision legislation. In 
the time period analysed here 214 acts were already adopted after the first reading and 
therefore have only one recorded voting situation. However, the total number of 
observations in this second data set still amounts to 5.235 (15 x 349) and will be 
sufficient for the statistical methods applied here.
5.5.2 Variables
The analysis of the two data sets from the last voting stage and the prior readings will be 
presented simultaneously in order to make the direct comparison between the results. As 
mentioned, the dependent variable is in both analyses the frequency of a government’s 
opposition to the majority through either voting, abstentions or formal statements. The 
following independent variables are included in both analyses:
The ‘Left/Right’ variable is included and since a high score indicates a 
government is located towards the right end of the political spectrum, the prediction from 
Hypothesis 2 and 2a is that the variable will be significant and positive in the analysis of 
both the final adoption stage and the prior readings.
The ‘EU’ variable is included to measure whether there is an effect of the 
governments’ attitude towards the EU at either the last decision stage or the earlier 
readings. Besides of often assuming that this is the dominant policy dimension in the 
Council, the current literature has also suggested that a media effect at the last adoption 
stage could encourage more EU sceptical governments to vote against legislation more
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frequently at this point in the legislative process (e.g. Mattila 2004). It may therefore be 
relevant to see whether such an effect indeed appears when distinguishing between the 
different legislative stages. However, as the theory presented here does not consider it 
likely that a pro-/sceptic EU effect will be present in the Council members’ voting at any 
of the stages, it is here predicted that the variable will not come out as significant in 
either of the analyses in this chapter.
Although the ‘EU’ variable is not expected to come out as significant in the tests, 
it is still quite possible that an interaction effect exists between the ‘Left/Right’ and the 
‘EU’ variables. As explained earlier, Euro-sceptical left-wing governments may behave 
differently to Euro-sceptical right-wing governments. Therefore, the interaction variable 
‘Left/Right x EU’ is included in the analysis of both the last stage voting data and the 
data from the earlier decision-stages to see if there is a significant impact of this 
combination on governments’ voting behaviour (see also Hooghe and Marks 1999). The 
expectation is that the variable will come out as significant and positive.
As in the previous chapter, the variable ‘Power’ measures the member states 
voting power and is included to test Hypothesis 3a and 3b. The prediction for this 
variable is hence that it will appear significant and positive at the last voting stage, where 
larger members are expected to oppose more frequently than smaller members. Yet, the 
variable may not be significant at the earlier decision stages since the smaller members 
are here expected to be more willing to oppose the majority than at the following final 
adoption. The variable is calculated as described in Section 3.3.
The ‘Geo’ variable is included to see if a geographical divide is indeed apparent 
at any of the voting stages as found by other studies based on different research methods 
and data (e.g. Mattila 2006; Zimmer, Schneider and Dobbins 2005). Following the 
discussion and findings in Chapter 4, the variable is not expected to be significant in any 
of the empirical tests in this chapter.
Although the variable ‘Budget’ did not seem to explain any of the voting patterns 
in the previous chapter, it is here included to see if a differentiation between members 
who are either receivers or contributors to the EU budget has an effect when the data has 
been divided into the last stage voting data and data from prior readings. As mentioned, 
the existing literature has often argued that this may have an affect on the likelihood of 
being either in opposition or in favour of a proposal. Some theorists have even argued
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that EU politics is in general about the wealthier member states’ pay-offs of poorer 
nations by means of subsidies (Carruba 1997; Hosli 1996). Therefore, although the 
theory in this thesis does not find this pattern likely, and although the findings from 
Chapter 4 do not seem to support this view either, the variable is included in order to 
investigate whether an effect could nevertheless appear at some point during the 
legislative process.
The ‘Member’ variable measuring the number of years a country has been a 
member of the EU is also included in the analysis in this chapter. Yet, as in the previous 
chapter, the variable is not expected to come out as significant in either of the regression 
analyses.
‘Presidency’ is included to measure whether there is an effect of a country 
holding the Presidency for its decision to support or oppose a proposal. The variable is 
included as a dummy variable, and it is predicted that whether or not a country is holding 
the Presidency does affect its likelihood of opposing the majority. Countries holding the 
Presidency will generally wish to send a signal of consensus when they hold the 
Presidency (Tallberg 2003) and therefore deliberately do not oppose the majority. Hence, 
the variable is predicted to be significant and negative. However, it could be that there is 
a variance in this behaviour across the different legislative stages if the signal o f‘neutral’ 
broker is primarily aimed at external actors or the public. In that case it might be that the 
country holding the Presidency is mostly concerned with the attention at the last adoption 
stage, and hence still decides to oppose at earlier readings. However, this thesis will still 
regard this option as rather unlikely, but the possibility is certainly interesting to 
investigate.
The variable concerning the national party system, ‘NatSys’, is also included as is 
also ‘ParDiF’, which captures the difference between the left/right value of the entire 
government and the party represented in the sectoral Council where a given vote was 
taken.
The control variables included in this chapter are the variable capturing the 
decision rule (‘Rule’), the workload of the Council (‘Workload’), and each of the control 
variables from the Benoit and Laver (2006, forthcoming) data set: ‘Nationalism’, 
‘Immigration’, ‘EU enlargement’, ‘EU strengthening’, ‘EU Peacekeeping’, ‘EU 
accountability’, and ‘EU authority’. As can be recalled from Chapter 3, these variables
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range from 1 to 20, where 1 is highly in favour of the issue in question, whereas 20 is 
highly sceptical.
Table 5.1 summarises the predicted effect of each of the variables in the data from 
the final adoption stage and the decision stages prior to the final adoption, respectively.
Table 5.1: Predictions of variables’ effect on 
frequency of opposing the majority; 
earlier readings and last voting stage
Variable Predicted Predicted
effect, Earlier effect, Last
readings vote
Left/Right + +
EU No Effect No effect
Left/Right x + +
EU
Power + +
Geo No effect No effect
Budget No effect No effect
Member No effect No effect
Presidency - -
NatSys No effect No effect
ParDif No effect No effect
Workload No effect No effect
Nationalism No effect No effect
Immigration No effect No effect
EU No effect No effect
Enlargement
EU No effect No effect
Strengthening
EU No effect No effect
Peacekeeping
EU No effect No effect
accountability
EU Authority No effect No effect
+ indicates a positive effect.
-  indicates a negative effect.
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5.4 Findings
Table 5.2 and 5.3 below show the frequency of votes cast in favour, opposition, the use 
of formal statements and abstentions per country. As was described also in Chapter 1, it 
is clear from the tables that including voting from the stages prior to the final adoption 
stage as well as the formal statements does of course not result in a completely different 
picture of the degree of contested decisions in the Council. The largest proportion of 
legislation is still adopted as a recorded unanimous decision. However, as in the previous 
chapters, Table 5.2 and 5.3 show that the inclusion of the formal statements and the prior 
readings does indeed elevate the level of recorded disagreement. So although the amount 
of votes cast in favour of legislation in 1999-2004 still exceeds the frequencies of 
oppositions, abstentions and formal statements by many times, a significant number of 
votes is here found to be cast in opposition rather than in favour of the new policies.
When looking into the distributions in the two tables, it is immediately apparent 
that the largest member states generally abstain or oppose the majority more often than 
the smallest member states (column 2 in both tables). However, small member states 
show their dissatisfaction through the use of formal statements to a much greater extent 
than the large member states when compared to their share of oppositions through voting. 
For example, at the last voting stage the four smallest members oppose the majority in 
the formal statements with an average of 15.75 times, whereas they only chose to do so
6.5 times by voting. Conversely, the four largest member states abstain or oppose the 
majority through voting by an average of 30.5 times, whereas they only make formal 
statements 16.75 times on average. Furthermore, a remarkable finding from the stages 
prior to the final adoption in Table 5.3 is that, although the number of legislation has 
made a considerable drop from 931 to 349, the frequency of opposing, abstaining or 
making formal statements has not decreased to a similar extent. The four largest countries 
still chose to oppose or abstain from voting in 17, 11,21 and 22 cases, respectively. It 
hence appears as if the Council members are willing to oppose the majority at the earlier 
readings at a much higher percentage level of the amount of legislation voted upon. In 
addition, there is a similar tendency in Table 5.3 as in Table 5.2 with regard to the larger 
Council members having the greatest share of oppositions or abstentions. Yet again, the 
use of formal statements does not have the same dramatic decrease: both small- and
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medium sized countries often make their opposition explicit through the use of formal 
statements, and here it is to an even greater extent than at the final adoption stage.
Table 5.2: Votes cast per country; Final votes
Country Infavour
Oppose 
or abstain
Formal
Statements
Opp., abst. and 
statements in 
total
Germany 864 41 16 57
France 892 32 7 39
UK 846 27 18 45
Italy 873 22 26 48
Spain 884 22 19 41
Netherlands 890 19 17 36
Greece 904 15 12 27
Belgium 891 9 14 23
Portugal 892 11 38 49
Sweden 885 9 27 36
Austria 891 5 16 21
Denmark 884 11 32 43
Finland 912 4 15 19
Ireland 907 8 7 15
Luxembourg 912 3 9 12
Table 5.3: Votes cast per country; Earlier votes
Country Infavour
Oppose or 
abstain
Formal
statements
Opp., abst. and 
statements in 
total
Germany 313 17 19 36
France 327 11 11 22
UK 295 21 33 54
Italy 313 22 14 36
Spain 318 14 17 31
Netherlands 329 8 11 19
Greece 319 11 18 29
Belgium 337 4 8 12
Portugal 314 9 19 28
Sweden 312 4 26 30
Austria 342 4 3 7
Denmark 307 11 31 42
Finland 337 2 14 16
Ireland 338 6 5 11
Luxembourg 340 2 7 9
146
Table 5.2 and 5.3 therefore show that 1) when taking into account the number of 
legislation analysed, a higher percentage of disagreement is apparent at readings prior to 
the final adoption of a policy proposal than at the last voting stage; and 2) although the 
largest member states have the biggest share of oppositions, abstentions and formal 
statements, there seems to be a difference in the means by which small and large member 
states show their discontent. Small member states are more willing to oppose at the 
earlier stages compared to their share of oppositions at the last stage, and more often 
chose to do so through formal statements than through voting. The big member states 
seem to rely on both measures and do not vary to the same extent as the small member 
states across the different stages.
Next, it is necessary to turn to the question of why a country may chose to oppose 
the majority. The easy answer would of course be that the individual government only 
chooses to do so when it does not find that a proposal can sufficiently satisfy its policy 
preferences. Yet, as discussed above, other factors may also play a role and could prove 
to affect the voting patterns. Therefore, Table 5.4 takes the analysis a step further and 
presents the results of the regressions run with the variables described above. It should be 
recalled that the dependent variable in each of the regressions in the table is the frequency 
of opposing the majority, that is, the sum of abstentions, formal statements and votes cast 
against the majority in the Council. The results are generated by using a negative fixed- 
effect binominal regression model, a fixed effect Poisson model and a basic Poisson 
regression model, respectively.
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Table 5.4: Regression analyses of voting behaviour, last voting stage and earlier votes
Fixed effect negative binominal Fixed effect Poisson
Variable Final votes Earlier votes Final votes Earlier votes Final votes Earlier votes
Left/Right 0.524*** 0.302*** 0.517*** 0.296*** 0.472*** 0.202***
EU -0.010 -0.012 0.007 -0.063 0.007 0.027
Left/Right x EU 0.187** 0.115** 0.104** 0.074** 0.120** 0.231***
Power 0.287*** 0.145*** 0.261*** 0.104*** 0.228*** 0.207***
Geo 0.009 0.281 0.078 0.172 0.051 0.193
Budget -0.182 -0.019 0.102 -0.050 0.068 -0.101
Member 0.206 0.004 0.093 0.084 0.100 0.086
Presidency -0.417** -0.273*** -0.318*** -0.261*** -0.302*** -0.154***
NatSys 0.029 0.151 0.092 -0.017 0.084 0.242
ParDif 0.013 -0.081 0.104 -0.066 0.104 -0.211
Workload -0.372 0.271 -0.359 0.302 -0.352 0.352
Nationalism 0.044 0.007 -0.139 0.014 -0.130 0.088
Imm 0.301 -0.162 0.276 -0.173 0.291 -0.071
EU Enlargement -0.053 -0.297 -0.184 -0.256 -0.174 -0.262
EU Strengthening -0.619 0.009 -0.471 0.034 -0.462 0.038
EU Peacekeeping -0.302 0.198 -0.239 0.298 -0.239 0.304
EU accountability 0.117 -0.063 0.281 -0.115 0.281 -0.179
EU Authority 0.085 -0.041 0.137 -0.137 0.132 -0.155
Constant -2.921*** -2.017*** -1.835*** -1.844*** -1.770*** -1.728***
Log likelihood -111.53 -103.56 -122.85 -128.74 -120.76 -114.06
R 2 .710 .622 .435 .426 .411 .358
N 13,1980 5,235 13,1980 5,235 13,1980 5,235
***indicates p p<0.001,** indicates p<0.01, * indicates p<0.05
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The overall fit of the negative fixed-effect regression model in Table 5.4 is good. The 
R 2 -value is very high both for the last stage voting data (.710) and for the votes cast at 
prior readings (.622), and also the degrees of freedom increases dramatically when 
choosing this model over the others. Therefore, although the log-likelihood scores do not 
improve to any noteworthy degree, nor do the coefficients change dramatically between 
the three models, the negative fixed-effect model appears to be the best alternative76.
Interestingly, it is the same four variables which are of significance from both 
data sets: Only a government’s voting power, its left/right policy position, the interaction 
term ‘Left/Right x EU’ and whether or not it is holding the Presidency affect the expected 
number of times the government will oppose the majority. This means that the variance 
in the voting behaviour across the different stages which was reflected in the descriptive 
statistics in Table 5.2 and 5.3 is not to be found in a difference between which factors 
have an influence at the respective stages, but must instead be due to a difference in the 
magnitude of the effects of the very same variables. However, as the regressions 
presented here do not make it possible to establish the scale of each of the significant 
variables’ effect, the next section will provide a more useful measure for this purpose 
below. Yet, the results from Table 5.4 do indeed give an interesting first insight into 
which of the variables influence a country’s choice to oppose the majority, and therefore 
similarly deserve a careful examination: First, and in support of also the findings from 
Chapter 4, it can be concluded that a government’s position on the left/right political 
scale certainly has an impact on the frequency of opposing the majority. The left/right 
variable is positive and significant at the 0.001 level in both of the negative fixed-effect 
regressions in Table 5.4, and the coefficients indicate that being a right-wing government 
increases the expected number of votes against the Council majority by a factor of 1.69 
(= e 524 ) at the last adoption stage. At readings prior to the final adoption this value is 
somewhat smaller, yet, still comes to 1.35 (= e 302 ), holding all other variables constant. 
Conversely, the ‘EU’ variable is not significant in any of the regressions, however, the 
interaction variable ‘Left/Right x EU’ comes out as significant and increases the expected
76 The zero-inflated model does not perform very well with the data: the correlation between the 
predicted values using the zero-inflated model and the actual frequency of opposition is very low and 
not significant even at the .01 level. Hence the reason for not reporting the results from this version of 
the Poisson model in this chapter.
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number of votes against the Council majority by a factor of 1.12 (= e 115) at the earlier 
readings. The last voting stage sees an increase by 1.21 (= e 187), holding everything else 
constant. One interpretation of these last mentioned results could be that preferences over 
EU integration do not affect the governments’ voting behaviour in a simple, linear way, 
but rather that the effect of attitude towards the EU is contingent on also the 
governments’ position on the left-right dimension77. However, it is difficult to reach a 
completely certain conclusion regarding this matter since Chapter 3 reported that the
7 0
‘Left/Right’ and the ‘Left/Right x EU’ variables are indeed correlated . Nevertheless, 
together the results from the ‘Left/Right’, the ‘EU’ and the ‘Left/Right x EU’ variables in 
Table 5.4 call into question the traditional intergovemmentalist view, yet support the 
theory from this thesis as well as other research projects which maintain that the EU 
integration dimension is no longer the only policy dimension that matters in EU politics.
In addition to the findings from the first three variables in the regressions, another 
interesting result from Table 5.4 is that the variable measuring the effect of a country’s 
voting power on the decision to oppose the majority also comes out as significant. The 
positive results in both regressions indicate that countries possessing more voting power 
oppose the majority more frequently than countries with less voting power. This finding 
corresponds with most expectations from the literature, yet, which have only been 
confirmed in a few empirical studies of voting behaviour in the Council (e.g. Heisenberg 
2005; Mattila 2004; 2006; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006). The implications of this 
finding will be returned to in more detail below, however, it should be mentioned here 
that, besides of providing useful empirical knowledge, the significance of the voting 
power variable in the Table 5.4 answers another highly disputed point in the literature: 
whether voting power indices are useful for the analysis of decision-making in the 
Council (e.g. Albert 2003, 2004; Felsenthal et al. 2003). The findings indicate that, 
although voting power indices are confined to the a priori power distribution as defined 
by the formal distribution of voting weights, the indices do posses an important 
explanatory value and cannot be dismissed due to lack of a more exhaustive empirical 
foundation (cf. Bailer 2004).
77 This conclusion also corresponds with Mattila’s (2004) results.
78 Though, the effect o f the ‘Left/Right’ variable does not change to any noteworthy degree when the 
‘Left/Right X EU’ variable is omitted from the regressions.
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As expected, countries that hold the EU Presidency generally oppose the majority less 
frequently than other member states. The effect of this variable is 0.76 (= e~273) for votes 
prior to the final adoption and 0.66 (=e~M1) for the final votes. Further research hence 
seems to be needed to address questions such as 1) whether or not the member state 
holding the Presidency do enjoy significant agenda-setting powers, and therefore does 
not find it necessary to oppose the majority (Tallberg 2003), or 2) whether the result 
presented here reflects a wish to send a signal of political consensus, and hence makes 
the country restrain itself and not vote according to its true preferences. In any case, the 
findings presented here show that not only do the governments not oppose nearly as 
much when they possess this role, but there is also a considerable change in the 
magnitude of this effect across the legislative stages. Whereas the effect is quite strong at 
the earlier readings, it increases to an even higher level at the final adoption stage.
The ‘Budget’ variable capturing the effect of whether a government’s status as 
either a contributor or beneficiary to the EU budget has an influence on its decision to 
oppose the majority does not prove to be significant in any of the regressions. These 
results therefore question the often heard contention that the Council is divided into either 
a North/South divide (Zimmer, Schneider and Dobbins 2005; Mattila 2006; Naurin 
2006) or that politics from the comparatively small amount of policies with a direct 
subsidiary effect dominate also the general political picture for Council decision-making.
The rest of the variables in Table 5.4 were included mainly to control for different 
characteristics which in some cases could be hypothesised to be of importance to the 
analysis. However, as expected, none of these variables appear significant and no further 
elaboration on these issues seems of relevance here. Instead, moving on to a general 
conclusion based on the findings so far, it is possible to characterise the countries which 
are most likely and least likely to be found in opposition to the majority: a large, right- 
wing government which currently does not hold the Presidency can be expected to 
oppose the majority the most, whereas a small left-wing government which has the role 
of the Presidency is the one least likely to oppose. Furthermore, from the descriptive 
statistics in the first part of the chapter it was also clear that whereas a smaller member 
state would prefer to voice its opposition by the use of formal statements, larger member 
states may equally chose to do so through voting.
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As a final point, and in order to further investigate into the scale of the effect of the 
left/right and voting power variables, Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 are included below. The 
figures graphically show the probabilities of opposing the majority as a function of the 
position on the left/right dimension for small and large member states at the last voting 
stage and at stages prior to the final adoption, respectively. The dotted graphs depict the 7 
smallest countries, and the continuous lines refer to the 8 largest.
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Figure 5.1: Probabilities of opposing the majority for small and large Council members 
along the left/right political dimension; Final votes
.2 .4 .60 8Left-Right
: 8 smallest member states; i.e. Belgium, Portugal, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
Ireland, Luxembourg.
■: 7 largest member states; i.e. Germany, France, UK, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Greece.
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
Figure 5.2: Voting behaviour for small and big member states along the left/right political dimension at voting stages
prior to the final adoption.
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Ireland, Luxembourg.
: 7 largest member states; i.e. Germany, France, UK, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Greece
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Both Figure 5.1 and 5.2 support the results from the regressions, that there is a great effect of 
a government’s left-right position on the likelihood of opposing the majority. In general, the 
more a government moves towards the extreme right, the more it is inclined to oppose the 
majority, whereas the more a government moves towards the left, the less it is likely to do so. 
In Figure 5.1 this is most notable for the large countries although an effect is also easy to 
detect for the smaller countries. A small right-wing government is indeed more likely to 
oppose the majority than a small left-wing government, however, the difference is not as 
profound as reflected in the graph for the large countries.
Figure 5.2 is interesting for several reasons. First, it is shown that, although there is 
still a significant difference between small and large member states’ likelihood of opposing 
the majority, this difference appears to vary across the political preferences. The difference 
between small and large right-wing governments is not nearly as great as between small and 
large left-wing governments, indicating that also small right-wing governments are now 
willing to formally show their discontent when policy proposals do not fulfil their 
preferences. Secondly, Figure 5.2 confirms the hypothesis that the member states change 
their voting behaviour across the different legislative stages when comparing it to the 
findings from Figure 5.1. Particularly small members seem to adapt their decision to oppose 
the majority according to which stage of the legislative process the vote is taken. The party 
political effect is still apparent such that the more a small government moves towards the 
right the more it is inclined to oppose. Yet, the magnitude of this effect is significantly higher 
in Figure 5.2 than in Figure 5.1, showing that particularly the smaller right-wing 
governments are more willing to show their discontent at the earlier stages than at the final 
adoption stage. Larger right-wing governments appear to be consistent in their likelihood of 
opposing, whereas the larger left-wing governments have a slightly higher probability of 
opposing the majority at the earlier readings than at the final adoption stage. In sum, Figure 
5.1 and 5.2 therefore suggest that both the left/right political positions and the distribution of 
voting power must be taken into account when analysing voting behaviour in the Council; 
small and large left-wing governments behave differently to small and large right-wing
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governments and the magnitude of these effects vary across the different stages of the 
legislative process.
5.5 Summary
This chapter has tested Hypothesis 2,3 and 4 and their related sub-hypotheses, stating how 
voting behaviour is expected to differ between large/small left- and large/small right-wing 
governments. The hypotheses were tested on two different sub-sets of the data, consisting of 
votes cast at the final adoption stage of the legislative process and at earlier readings, 
respectively. Though, two curious findings appeared from the presentation of the descriptive 
statistics before the data was run in the statistical analyses. First, a higher percentage of 
disagreement is apparent at readings prior to the final adoption of a policy proposal than at 
the last voting stage relative to how much legislation is voted upon. Second, although the 
largest member states have the biggest share of oppositions, abstentions and formal 
statements, there seems to be a difference in how small and large member states show their 
discontent. Small member states are more willing to oppose at the earlier stages compared to 
their share of oppositions at the last stage, and more often chose to do so through formal 
statements than through voting. When further investigating the findings through regression 
analyses it is found that other variable than size (and thereby voting power) also have an 
effect on a government’s decision to oppose the majority: A government’s position on the 
left/right political scale, whether or not it holds the Presidency and the interaction variable 
between the left/right position and attitude towards the EU all prove to be significant both at 
the final voting stage and at readings prior to the last decision round. In other words, the 
findings support the hypotheses, and the results even show that the more a government 
moves towards the extreme right the more likely it is to oppose. Conversely, the more a 
government moves towards the left the less likely it is to do so. However, although the three 
mentioned variables are significant in both data sets, it is clear that the magnitude of the 
effect of the left/right variable varies across the stages for the governments depending on 
their voting power. The results are that whereas both small and large right-wing governments
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more frequently oppose the majority than left-wing governments, the difference in voting 
behaviour between small and large governments on this side of the spectrum is much smaller 
than the difference between small and large left-wing governments. Hence, only when 
considering both left/right political preferences and the members’ voting power is it possible 
to adequately capture the changes in voting behaviour across the different stages of the 
legislative process.
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Chapter 6: Changes in voting behaviour 
across policy areas
6.1 Introduction
Does the level of contest over policy proposals vary from the policy area of agriculture to 
transport? Is it possible that certain governments are more likely to oppose legislation within 
a specific policy field compared to others? And, if so, how is this variance best explained? 
This chapter provides a range of empirical findings regarding the member states’ voting 
behaviour across the different policy areas and investigates whether any of the results from 
the previous chapters may be driven by behavioural trends in only some policy fields rather 
than all. Furthermore, the chapter investigates whether the observed patterns in the respective 
policy areas correlate with the governing parties’ positions in the corresponding policy areas 
at the domestic level.
The findings show that there is a great variance in both the adoption rate and level of 
contest across the policy areas; this latter variation is apparent in the absolute figures as well 
as relative to how much legislation is adopted in the specific policy field. As in the previous 
chapters, a government’s likelihood of opposing the majority is found to be highly correlated 
with its position on the general left/right political dimension. However, the left/right political 
measure is not consistent in its effect throughout all policy areas: Whereas the previous 
chapters found that right-wing governments generally voted against the majority more 
frequently than left-wing governments in 1999-2004, it here becomes apparent that the 
governing parties’ likelihood of opposing changes across the different policy areas. Right- 
wing governments are still more likely to oppose in most of the larger policy areas, however, 
in the important areas of Agriculture & Fisheries, Economic & Financial Affairs and Justice 
& Home Affairs the effect of party affiliation changes such that left-wing governments 
oppose the majority more often. A government’s decision to oppose or support new 
legislation is furthermore also related to its position in the corresponding policy areas at the 
national level, its voting power and whether or not it holds the Presidency. Attitude towards
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the EU cannot explain voting behaviour in any of the policy fields, nor does geographical 
location or differences between the positions of individual parties compared to that of the 
entire government appear significant. Lastly, it is found that the decision rule influences the 
frequency of recorded oppositions in most policy areas. In those cases legislation adopted by 
QMV makes it more likely that oppositions are recorded than when the formal adoption rule 
is unanimity. Though, this distinction between QMV and unanimity does, interestingly, not 
appear to have an effect in the areas of Environment, Economic & Financial Affairs and 
Justice & Home Affairs.
The chapter proceeds as follows: The next section discusses the division of labour 
between the sectoral Councils and reflects on the expectations from existing research in light 
of a few indicative findings from the data. Section 6.3 then explains how Hypothesis 2,3 and 
4 and the related ‘sub-hypotheses’ are operationalised, and how the empirical analysis is 
carried out. Section 6.4 presents the empirical findings from each of the policy areas and 
analyses the results. The chapter is finished with a summary of the findings.
6.2 Division of labour between Council formations
As explained in Chapter 1, the Council’s activities was in the beginning of the 1999-2004 
period formally divided between 21 sectoral councils, which after the Helsinki 1999 
Conclusions and Seville 2002 Conclusions were reduced to only 9 Council formations. The 
representation of national ministers is allocated according to specialisation, such that 
ministers of finance are members of the Council of Economic and Financial Ministers 
(EcoFin), ministers of environment are in the Council of Environment Ministers (ENV) and 
so forth. This has in various contexts raised a question of whether the division of labour in 
the Council also results in biased policies favouring only one group in the electorate rather 
than the population as a whole (e.g. Franchino and Rahming 2003; Henning 2001; Van 
Schaik 2006). However, at the same time as it is of great importance to investigate such 
implications of the organisational structures, it is also possible that these tendencies are more 
likely to appear within some policy fields than others. The level of integration within the
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various policy areas differs considerably, both in terms of the scope (‘widening’) and content 
(‘deepening’). Hence, it may be that the political dynamics between different interests are 
also played out to varying degrees. Table 6.1 below lists the amount of legislation adopted in 
each policy area, and indicates the differences in the level of activity across policy areas.
Table 6.1: Amount of legislation passed and individual 
votes cast per policy area
Policy area Pieces of Legislation in % Individual
legislation of total adopted observations
Agriculture & 325 34.9 8565
Fisheries
Economic & 137 14.7 2055
Financial Affairs
Justice & Home 104 11.2 1560
Affairs
Environment 78 8.4 1290
Social Affairs 44 4.7 1140
Education/Research 40 4.3 810
Transport 40 4.3 930
Internal Market 29 3.1 465
Development 20 2.1 375
Energy 20 2.1 465
Health 16 1.7 280
General Affairs 15 1.6 225
Industry 15 1.6 270
Consumer Affairs 12 1.3 180
Telecommunications 11 1.2 165
Culture 10 1.1 180
Aviation 9 1 135
Administration 7 0.8 125
Total 932 100 19,215
Table 6.1 shows that Agriculture & Fisheries is by far the biggest category in terms of 
legislation adopted. The total amount of legislation passed in 1999-2004 comes to 325 pieces 
and includes 8565 individual votes cast. Although it only includes less than half of that 
amount, Economic & Financial Affairs follows as the second policy area, after which Justice 
and Home Affairs (JHA) and Environment come next. The policy areas with the least 
legislation are Aviation (9 pieces of legislation and 135 individual votes) and Administration
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(7 pieces and 125 votes). Similarly to the findings in the previous chapters, the fact that the 
last column Table 6.1 in several cases include a higher figure than what would be the results 
if the governments had only voted once on each piece of legislation (15 x the absolute 
numbers shown in column 2) indicates that a considerable amount of legislation was 
presented to the respective sectoral Councils more than once. However, this finding varies 
from one policy area to another: Agriculture & Fisheries has a recorded number of individual 
votes which is 1.8 times79 the number of votes that could be expected if each piece of 
legislation was only presented to the Council once, and if only one vote could be cast per 
legislation. Environment, on the other hand, shows an excess of votes casts of 1.1 times, 
Internal Market only 1.07, and General Affairs does not include any more voting at all than 
what could be expected if the proposals were only presented and voted upon once.
Besides of the great difference in policy activity, the list of policy areas in Table 6.1 
is much like what can be observed in most West European democracies. Seen from this 
perspective, the only missing policy area is a separate category for defence policies. Though, 
the allocation of Council seats according to this policy specialisation has, as mentioned 
above, been questioned with regard to the optimisation of the common good or promotion of 
special interests (e.g. Franchino and Rahming 2003). The ministers from different parties 
will have different core electorates and, consequently, a policy proposal adopted in one 
policy field may be beneficial to one governing party group, but can at the same time impose 
a loss to another group’s electorate (Hix 2005:80). Hence, the division of labour between 
different ministries based on interest representation of single policy areas such as agriculture, 
transport, environment etc. can spur conflict between the respective Council formations. 
Instead of calculating benefits and losses for their national constituencies, minister in the 
respective Councils compare the overall good of the population with a possible gain or loss 
in their own policy field. This argument is very much in line with the theory of this thesis. 
However, as suggested above, it could be argued that a unifying theory of this kind may not 
be suitable for the study of behaviour within all policy fields in the Council. For example, it
79 The 325 pieces of legislation could be expected to have 4,875 individual votes recorded if only a single 
vote was cast by the 15 member states per legislation.
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could be argued that not all policy fields can be assumed to have reached a degree of 
integration where party political preferences can be detected. Furthermore, some scholars 
have argued that there are certain policy issues which are intrinsically state centric, such as 
Justice & Home Affairs and negotiations over contributions to the budget (Economic & 
Financial Affairs). Such possibilities within a few specific areas could not be captured from 
the analyses in the previous chapters. Yet, it is indeed necessary to investigate into this 
matter in order to establish whether this thesis’ theoretical argument actually provides a 
suitable analytical framework across all policy areas rather than just a few. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 2,3 and 4 and their respective ‘sub-hypotheses’ will be tested across policy areas 
by applying the method explained in the next section. Here, it should be recalled that the 
hypotheses state the following:
Hypothesis 2:
A right-wing member state is more likely to oppose the majority than a left- 
wing member state.
Hypothesis 2a:
A right-wing government is more likely to oppose the majority than a 
left-wing government within most policy areas.
Hypothesis 3:
A country with more voting power will oppose the majority more frequently 
than a country with less voting power.
Hypothesis 3a:
A country with more voting power will oppose the majority more 
frequently than a country with less voting power within most policy 
areas.
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Hypotheses 4:
Small (large) right-wing governments vote differently to small (large) left- 
wing governments.
Hypotheses 4a:
Small (large) right-wing governments vote differently to small (large) 
left-wing governments within most policy areas.
6.3 Operationalisation
In order to test each of the above hypotheses a range of descriptive statistics is first presented 
to give an overview of adoption rates and degree of contest across all policy areas. After 
describing both the absolute and relative figures within each policy area, the countries are 
then grouped together in tables and figures presenting the descriptive statistics according to 
geographical location (North/Central/South), a categorisation according to size (Big, 
Medium, Small), according to attitude towards the EU (Pro/Anti-EU), as well as according to 
positions on the left/right political scale. The findings based on these groupings call for 
further exploration, and the next step is hence rigorous regression analyses of the data.
The regression analysis in this chapter is conducted similarly to that in chapter 5, 
although here the data will be divided according to policy areas. However, as the dependent 
variable within each policy area analysed is still the frequency of the member states’ ‘Yes’ 
and ‘No’ votes, the most appropriate model is, as explained in the previous chapter, a 
Poisson regression. Here, a negative fixed effect Poisson model is again found to fit the data 
best when comparing the degrees of freedom and log-likelihood scores with those from 
fitting a basic Poisson regression, a random effect version of the model, or a zero-inflated 
model80. The correlations between the predicted values based on the negative fixed-effect
80 As was explained in chapter 3, the standard Poison regression assumes that the conditional variance is equal 
to the conditional mean. If the conditional variance is greater than the conditional mean, the Poisson regression 
model will be consistent but inefficient, with standard errors biased downwards. This might result in rejection 
o f the null hypothesis in cases where it should not be rejected. The negative binomial regression model allows 
for the conditional variance to exceed the conditional mean, by estimating the conditional mean as a random
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model and the actual voting outcomes vary between .653 and .764 and are highly significant 
beyond the .001 level in all of the 8 policy categories analysed. Though, unlike Chapter 5, 
only the negative fixed-effect model will be reported in this chapter as the separation of the 
data into the different policy areas already results in a large number of regression results. 
Including the findings from each model would therefore greatly increase the complexity of 
the presentation of the results without adding further information to the analysis.
6.3.1 Data
As mentioned, the analysis in this chapter will be carried out by dividing the data into the 
different policy areas and investigate any apparent patterns within each of these areas. 
However, for this purpose it is necessary to make a few choices regarding the categorisation 
of the data: As was clear from Table 6.1, some of the policy areas have had a rather low 
number of legislation adopted in the years 1999-2004. Therefore, it is simply not possible to 
run any convincing statistical models with the observations from all policy areas. One 
solution to the problem is to investigate as many of the respective policy areas as is 
statistically possible and then pool the remaining, smaller policy areas into one. The policy 
area of Transport is the best statistical cut-off point in this case, as it is the smallest policy 
area which still includes a suitable number of observations for robust statistical analysis. 
Choosing Transport as the last separate policy area before pooling the remaining areas also 
means that enough separate policy areas are identified for the analysis to provide interesting 
information about changes across each of the largest policy areas. The policy area of 
Transport has a total of 930 individual observations (62 voting situations by 15 member 
states based on 40 different policy proposals), and using this as the cut-off category results is 
the following 8 policy areas to be used in the statistical analysis:
variable consisting o f the independent variables and a random disturbance term. The random disturbance term 
has the effect o f allowing for variance on the dependent variable for observations with the same values on the 
independent variables. Therefore, the process that generates zero counts may be modelled separately, as a 
binary logistic model where after a decision can be made regarding the suitability of either a standard or a zero- 
inflated Poison regression. Please refer to Long (1997: 217-50) for a further explanation. The substantive 
interpretation o f the results is enhanced if one use the spost STATA commands developed by Long and Freese 
(2003).
164
■ All policy areas,
■ Agriculture & Fisheries,
■ Environment,
■ Economic & Financial Affairs,
■ Social Affairs,
■ Justice & Home Affairs (JHA),
■ Transport, and
■ Other.
6.3.2 Variables
The independent variables used in this chapter consist of each of the independent variables 
used in Chapter 4 and 5 as well as additional variables capturing the governing parties’ 
positions on the policy issues at the national level which correspond with the policy fields 
analysed here. Also a variable ‘ParDif has been included to investigate any possible effect 
of portfolio allocations in national politics on voting behaviour in the Council. Compared to 
the ‘Left/Right’ variable this variable measures the effect of the difference between the value 
of the individual party represented in a sectoral council with that of the entire government. 
The full list of independent variables which were also used in the previous chapters are the 
following: The variable measuring the governments’ position on the left/right political scale 
(‘Left/Right’), their attitude towards the EU (‘EU), the interaction variable ‘Left/Right x 
‘EU’, the governments’ voting power (‘Power’), geographical location ( ‘Geo’), whether or 
not an EU member falls into the category of receiver or contributor to the EU budget 
(‘Budget’), duration of a country’s membership (‘Member’), ‘Presidency’ which captures 
whether there is an effect of holding the Presidency, and ‘NatSys’ which distinguishes 
between adversarial and non-adversarial governments.
As mentioned above, the new variable ‘ParDif differentiates between the weighted 
left/right positions of governments and the individual party represented in a sectoral council. 
Furthermore, a range of additional variables are included in order to investigate whether 
there is any effect of the governments’ position in a given policy area at the domestic level 
on its position in the corresponding policy area at the EU level. Each of these variables are 
only included in the analysis of the respective policy field they correspond with. For
165
example, the variable measuring the governments’ positions on agricultural issues at the 
national level is only included in the analysis of voting behaviour in the Council’s policy 
area Agriculture & Fisheries, the one measuring the governments’ positions on national 
environmental issues is only included in the area of environment, and so on and so forth. The 
effect of each of these policy variables are then reported for the respective policy fields in the 
regressions under the heading ‘National Policy’. The variables are defined as follows:
For the area of environment, a variable ‘Env’ is included measuring the attitude 
towards the protection of the environment. The value 1 corresponds to ‘Supports protection
r k  hof the environment even at the cost of economic growth’, and 20 is ‘Supports economic 
growth even at the cost of damage to the environment’. This variable is a weighted average 
of the governing parties’ positions as reported in Benoit and Laver (forthcoming, 2006). 
Each of the variables in the next three policy fields have similarly been found in this data set.
For social policy, a variable ‘Soc’ measures social attitude, where 1 means ‘Favours 
liberal policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality and euthanasia’ and 20 is 
‘Opposes liberal policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality and euthanasia’.
Two variables are included for the area Economic & Financial Affairs. The first is 
‘Tax’ which captures the attitude towards public expenditure vs. taxes. 1 means in favour of 
promoting raising taxes to increase public services and 20 means in favour of promoting 
cutting public services to cut taxes. The second is ‘Private’ and defines the extremes as: 
Promotes maximum state ownership of business and industry (1) Opposes all state ownership 
of business and industry (20).
For Justice & Home Affairs, a variable measures attitude towards civil liberties, 
labelled ‘Lib’, as: Promotes protection of civil liberties, even when this hampers efforts to 
fight crime and promote law and order (1); and Support tough measures to fight crime and 
promote law and order, even when this means curtailing civil liberties (20).
For the policy area of Agriculture & Fisheries a variable ‘Agri’ measures attitude 
towards support for agriculture and farmers. Yet, unfortunately no data has been available in 
this specific policy area for the parties in government from 1999 to 2004. The parties’ 
positions have therefore instead been estimated from the Budge et al. (2001) party manifesto
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data, which does provide the respective parties’ positions in the area of agriculture, yet, 
which covers the years 1945-1998. Each party in government has simply been allocated the 
values from the latest available years in this data set, i.e. values measured between 1994 and 
1998. Hereafter the governments’ positions are calculated in the same fashion as the rest of 
the policy variables by estimating a weighted average according to the allocation of cabinet 
posts in each government (cf. Budge et al. 2001:166).
The policy area of T ransport posses an even greater challenge in terms of establishing 
the governing parties’ position in this policy field at the national level. It has simply not been 
possible to obtain any convincing measure for positions within transport policies, and hence, 
the best possible solution seems to be to analyse the voting behaviour within this policy area 
by using a measure of the governments’ general attitudes towards regulation. This variable 
will of course be in addition to the general left/right variable and the rest of the variables 
defined above, however, it must be concluded that a very specific measurement of the effect 
of national politics is unfortunately not possible in this case. Nevertheless, deregulation 
(‘Dereg’) is measured on a scale from 1 to 20 where 1 means a government favours high 
levels of state regulation and control of the market, and 20 means it favours deregulation of 
markets at any opportunity.
A dummy variable is included for the decision rule under the heading ‘Rule’. The 
variable is included to investigate whether there is a difference in the level of recorded 
disagreement when the decision rule is QMV compared to when legislation is adopted by 
unanimity. The literature has made different suggestions regarding this matter, and 
particularly when also including abstentions and formal statements in the analysis, it will be 
interesting to see if governments are in fact influenced by the formal decision rule.
Lastly, and as in the previous chapters, a number of control variables are furthermore 
included in order to control for empirical irregularities and for alternative explanations. 
These control variables are ‘Workload’, ‘Nationalism’, positions on immigration issues 
Tmm’, attitude towards EU enlargement (‘Enlar’), ‘EU strengthening’, ‘EU Peacekeeping’ 
‘EU accountability’ and ‘EU authority’. Table 6.2 summarises the effect of all of the 
variables as predicted by the hypotheses.
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Table 6.2: Predictions of variables’ effects 
across policy areas
Variable Effect(theory)
Effect
(literature)
Left/Right + + / no effect
EU No effect +
Left/Right x + + / no effect
Power + +
Geo No effect +
Budget No effect +
ParDif + + / not considered
Member No effect +
Presi - -
NatSys No effect Not considered
National Policy + Not considered
Rule + + / no effect
Workload No effect No effect
Nationalism No effect + / no effect
Imm No effect No effect
Enlar No effect + / no effect
EU Strength No effect +
EU Peace No effect No effect
EU Account No effect +
EU Authority No effect +
+ indicates a positive effect. 
- indicates a negative effect.
6.4 Findings
Figure 6.1 below provides a general overview over the amount of opposition through voting, 
abstentions, formal statements and total oppositions per policy area. Two findings appear 
from the figure: First, and as also shown in Table 6.1 above, it seems that there is a 
considerable difference in the level of contest across the respective policy areas. Secondly, 
the figure shows that the different possibilities for voicing discontent are also used 
differently across policy areas. For example, whereas Agriculture & Fisheries experienced 
that a total of 204 oppositions were recorded, only 29 of these came in the form of direct 
votes against the majority. Abstentions happened on 62 acts adopted within this policy area,
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and formal statements were recorded 113 times. Similarly, Environment has the second 
largest number of total oppositions, yet, only 43 times was this through formal voting, 
whereas formal statements were made 217 times and abstentions 71 times. However, in some 
of the other policy fields the tendency is completely opposite: in Transport, for example, the 
total of all oppositions came to 72 and the majority of these were through direct voting. In 
this policy field formal statements were only given on 24 occasions and abstentions on 11. 
Hence, the option of using formal statements as a means of opposing the majority is not 
always the dominant alternative, although it definitely does seem to be popular within the 
majority of policy areas.
Figure 6.1: Oppositions, abstentions and formal statements per policy area
250
Oppose
Abstain
Formal
Total
Table 6.2 further divides the oppositions per policy area to also include also divisions per 
country. Two interesting findings are apparent from Table 6.3, and become even clearer 
when the results in the table are turned into a graphical picture as in Figure 6.2: Although 
there is quite some variation in the Council members’ frequency of opposing within the 
respective policy fields, it is apparent that the governments all tend to oppose within certain 
policy fields and refrain from opposing in others. The previous chapters suggested that this 
tendency would probably be correlated with the amount of legislation adopted within the 
respective areas, since the policy areas with most policy activity are also the ones with the
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highest amount of legislation with recorded opposition. Although Figure 6.2 is perhaps not 
too useful for further and more detailed interpretations, the other immediate observation 
from the results is the changes in the colours across the different policy areas in this figure: 
None of the countries seem to consistently dominate throughout all policy areas in terms of 
recorded opposition. In other words, none of the Council members are found to be opposing 
in all areas, and all countries seem to generally vary somewhat in how they are located on the 
scale of frequency of oppositions throughout the policy fields. Hence, it appears as if some 
of the conclusions in the current literature regarding certain countries’ continuous dominance 
as frequent opposers at the last voting stage could perhaps benefit from further elaboration. 
One example is that Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace (2006:283) find that Germany and Denmark 
is always in the top of opposing countries. Here, this appears to only hold within Agriculture 
& Fisheries, Economic & Financial Affairs and Social Affairs.
170
Table 6.3: Recorded oppositions per country, per policy area
Policy area GER FRA UK ITA SPA NEL GRE BEL POR SWE AUS DEN FIN IRE LUX Total
Administration 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Agri & 
Fisheries 22 14 20 24 14 9 9 5 17 21 10 21 11 5 2 204
Aviation 6 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 0 2 1 1 0 1 0 16
Consumer
Affairs 1 0 1 2 2 2 1 4 2 1 0 1 2 0 1 20
Culture 0 1 1 2 2 1 2 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 12
Development 
Econ. & Fin. 
Affairs
1
29
0
20
1
44
2
32
1
6
4
6
1
11
0
6
1
7
3
2
0
4
2
12
1
8
2
3
0
4
19
194
Educ./Res. 3 0 4 4 3 8 0 9 2 4 1 2 2 0 0 42
Energy 8 1 0 0 1 3 2 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 21
Environment 25 14 7 12 8 31 20 18 17 40 19 31 11 16 8 277
General Affairs 0 4 4 6 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 18
Health 1 2 4 0 2 2 1 2 0 2 0 3 2 0 1 22
Industry 5 2 0 2 0 4 1 2 1 2 1 0 1 0 1 22
Internal Market 3 3 5 2 5 8 2 3 3 3 0 2 2 0 2 43
Justice and 
Home Affairs 12 5 19 20 11 4 4 1 8 4 0 9 7
3 5 112
Social Affairs 1 2 6 13 7 2 9 4 1 2 0 2 0 0 2 51
Telecomm. 0 2 1 2 1 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 11
Transport 12 3 4 6 5 8 2 5 7 2 4 5 3 0 6 72
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Figure 6.2: Frequency of oppositions per country, per policy area
In order to further identify any immediate patterns in the respective policy fields, it may be 
easier to get a better overview by dividing the countries into different groups. The groupings 
are here done according to 1) population size, 2) geographical location, 3) attitude towards 
the EU, and 4) the governments’ positions on the general left/right political continuum. As 
discussed in the previous chapters, many more groupings are of course possible, however, 
for now the analysis will be limited to these most popular divisions suggested in the 
literature. Other possible cleavages will be investigated in the statistical analyses in the 
subsequent sections.
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Figure 6.3: Frequency of oppositions for big, medium and small Council members
300
Big
Medium
Small
Total
Big: Germany, UK, France, Italy, Spain
Medium: Netherlands, Greece, Belgium , Portugal, Sweden
Small: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg
From Figure 6.3 it is clear that the big Council members certainly oppose more than both 
medium and small members. Whether the difference between the largest of the governments 
and the smaller and medium sized members are also as big as could be expected from the 
current literature can be debated. However, the previous chapter made it clear that findings 
such as the ones presented in Figure 6.3 may disguise the differences in how and when 
oppositions are voiced. Although the results presented in Chapter 5 were therefore generally 
more informative regarding the effect of the governments’ sizes than what can be deducted 
from this figure, it is here interesting to see these aggregated differences distributed across 
policy areas: Besides of the largest Council members being the ones which oppose most 
frequently across the majority of policy areas, it appears as if smaller and medium members 
do not differ much in the level of disagreement voiced in any of the policy fields.
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Figure 6.4: Frequency of oppositions according to geographical location
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 North
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North: UK, Sweden, DK, Finland, Ireland
Central: Germany, Netherlands, Belgium , Austria, Luxembourg
South: France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal
Figure 6.4 presents the frequency of oppositions according to geographical location. 
Interestingly, there does seem to be some difference between the categories within the largest 
policy fields. However, this difference is not a consistent North/South divide such as is often 
argued in the literature (e.g. Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006; Naurin 2006). In fact, the 
apparent differences between the categories vary considerably across the policy fields: In 
Agriculture & Fisheries Southern members have opposed more than both Central and 
Northern members, whereas Northern and Southern members interestingly appear to have 
almost the same high level of recorded oppositions in Economic & Financial Affairs. Here, 
the Central members have much less recorded oppositions than the two other categories. This 
pattern is also apparent in Justice & Home Affairs, though, in Environment, Social Affairs 
and Transport the distribution is changed again. In Environment and Social Affairs the 
Northern and Central governments have the same level of recorded oppositions, whereas all 
three categories have different degrees of recorded oppositions in the area of Transport. 
Then, what does this suggest? First, it seems as if these results could perhaps explain why a
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North/South divide is often found in the current literature. The aggregate results across all of 
these policy areas could maybe lead to a conclusion of a North/South divide. Second, and in 
contrast to such a conclusion, the findings show that a difference between the different 
geographical categories may in fact exist when analysing the individual policy areas, 
however, the possible effect of this categorisation is not consistent across the different fields. 
The regression results below will establish whether the distinction is indeed of significance.
Figure 6.5: Frequency of oppositions according to attitude towards the EU
Sceptic
Pro
Total
Pro: Germany, France 1, UK, Italy 1, Netherlands 1, Greece, Belgium 1, Belgium 2, Portugal 1, 
Sweden, Austrial, Denmark 1, Denmark2, Finland 1, Luxembourg], Luxembourg2 
Anti: France2, Italy2, Spain, Netherlands2, P ortu ga l, Austria2, Finland2, Ireland
In Figure 6.5 it has been necessary to distinguish not just between countries, but also 
between the different governments which held office during 1999-2004. The figure 
differentiates between governments which are generally in favour of the EU and 
governments that are sceptical. The result is clear: except for the area of Economic & 
Financial Affairs, no significant differences can be observed between the two groups. It 
could be hypothesised that the reason for the apparent division in Economic & Financial 
Affairs is due to fact that this policy field includes the issue of who are contributors and 
beneficiaries from the EU budget. Recipients are generally assumed to be more pro-EU than
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contributors (e.g. Carruba 1997; Hosli 1996), and if this distinction should be detected in any 
policy area, Economic & Financial Affairs would be the area most likely to show the 
difference.
Figure 6.6: Frequency of oppositions for centre-left and 
centre-right governments
300
Left: Germany, Francel, Italy 1, Belgiuml, Belgium2, Portugall, Sweden, Denmarkl, 
Finland I.
Right: Francel, UK, Italy2, Spain, Netherlands 1, Netherlands2, Greece, Portugall, 
Austrial, Austria2, Denmark2, Finland2, Ireland, Luxembourgl, Luxembourg2
In Figure 6.6 the distinction between governments in office has been made similarly as in 
Figure 6.5. However, here the grouping is according to party political affiliation, such that 
centre-left wing governments are defined by the red line and centre-right governments by the 
blue. A difference is apparent between the two categories in each of the largest policy areas, 
but, as above, it is difficult to conclude on the rest of the policy categories in the figure. 
However, the effect of party affiliation does not appear consistent such that either left- or 
right-wing governments are always in opposition. Chapter 5 showed that right-wing 
governments generally opposed the majority more frequently than left-wing governments.
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However, from Figure 6.6 it becomes clear that certain policy areas deviate from this trend. 
In fact, in the area of Agriculture & Fisheries left-wing governments oppose almost double 
as much as right-wing governments, and in Economic & Financial Affairs as well as Justice 
and Home Affairs, left-wing governments are also somewhat higher on the scale than right- 
wing members. Though, the findings from Chapter 5 are certainly confirmed in the area of 
Environment, where the right-wing governments have opposed almost four times as much as 
the left-wing governments. Also in Social Affairs and some of the smaller policy areas the 
finding of right-wing governments as more frequent opposers seems to hold. Hence, Figure 
6.6 seem to indicate that a difference between left- and right-wing governments does exist as 
concluded in the previous chapters, however, the effect of the party affiliation is not 
consistent throughout the policy areas. Left-wing actually seem to oppose more within 
certain fields than what could be assumed based on the findings in the previous chapters, and 
it could be that particularly the area of Environment has somewhat driven the results so far. 
However, there is one extremely precautionary note to make with regard to Figure 6.5 and 
Figure 6.6: The groupings of the governments may have the consequence that the results in 
some of the policy areas are somewhat biased. Since for example Portugal 1 and Portugal 2 
were not in government at the same time, and therefore did not vote on the same policy 
proposals, it is a bit misleading to compare all the governments’ voting behaviour 
simultaneously. The regression analysis in the following sections overcome this problem, 
and the general findings from the two figures are still relevant to bear in mind in the further 
analysis: Pro- and sceptic EU members do not differ in their voting behaviour except for in 
the area of Economic & Financial Affairs, yet, a difference is apparent between left- and 
right-wing governments. However, this difference varies greatly across policy areas, and the 
findings from the previous chapters may therefore benefit from a further investigation into 
the effect of this distinction within each policy field. The next step is hence to present the 
results from running the data from each area in a fixed-effect Poisson regression.
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Table 6.4: Fixed effect negative Poisson regression analysis of voting behaviour across policy areas
All Agri &Fish Soc. Affairs Env Econ &Fin Aff. JHA Trans Other
Left/right .402*** -.246*** .077*** .143*** -.174** -.192*** .205*** .418**
EU 0.062 0.005 0.081 -0.004 0.062 0.081 0.023 0.019
Left/right x EU .107*** -.076*** .093** .129*** -.007 -.072** .064**
Power .523*** .219*** .072** .097*** .292*** .358*** .115*** .618***
Geo 0.004 0.023 -0.039 -0.005 0.017 -0.138 -0.104 0.079
Budget 0.116 -0.681 -0.326 0.054 -0.093 -0.137 0.079 0.094
ParDif 0.029 0.007 0.175 0.186 0.095 -0.004
Presidency -.364*** _193*** -.080*** -.194*** -.329*** -.462*** -.118* -.174***
NatSys 0.093 0.075 0.163 0.132 0.056 0.107 0.006 0.042
National Policy0 .242*** .198*** .086*** .071** .089** .244***
Rule .245** .092*** .237*** 0.146 0.057 0.112 192*** .157**
Constant 1.812*** 1.099*** 0.917**
***00 1.193*** 1.017*** 1.443*** 1.814***
Log likelihood -109.57 -122.57 -116.72 -130.01 -199.32 -109.57 -125.44 109.57
Pseudo R-Sq. .561 .689 .453 .671 .655 .602 .521 .693
N 19215 8565 1140 1291 2055 1560 930 2945
♦♦♦indicates p p<0.001,** indicates p<0.0l, * indicates p<0.05
° Please recall that this variable measures the effect o f the positions within the respective policy fields at the national level. Hence, for the policy area o f  
Environment the variable includes the estimates o f the governing parties’ position on national environmental positions, in Social Affairs it measures the 
governing parties’ positions on national social policies etc. See Section 6.3 for the complete explanation.
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Table 6.4 shows that the overall fit of the regression model is very good across all policy 
areas. The pseudo R 2 is .561 for the pooled data and varies between .453 and .693 in each 
of the other categories. The table has four blank spaces where the variables ParDif and 
National Policy could not be measured. The reason is that neither of these variables have 
estimates which could be used in the analysis of the policy categories ‘All' and ‘Other’.
A first finding to notice from the table is that although the first variable measuring 
the effect of the governments’ position on the left/right political scale is highly 
significant in all of the policy fields, the variable changes direction. This is clear evidence 
in favour of the theory of party politics, however, provides only partial support for 
Hypothesis 2. Right-wing governments are not always more inclined to oppose the 
majority than left-wing governments. In fact, in the areas of Agriculture & Fisheries, 
Economic & Financial Affairs and Justice & Home Affairs the effect of being a right- 
wing government decreases the likelihood of opposing the majority with a factor of .78, 
.84 and .83, respectively, when holding all other variables constant81. Though, in each of 
the other policy areas the effect of being a right-wing government significantly increases 
the frequencies of oppositions. In sum, the regression results therefore confirm that party 
political affiliation does indeed have an influence on voting behaviour in the Council, 
however, the consequences of this effect must be considered in context of the respective 
policy areas.
The interaction variable Left/Right x EU is also highly significant in all policy 
areas, except for Economic & Financial Affairs. The EU variable on its own, on the other 
hand, does not come out as having an effect in any of the policy areas. Therefore, the 
finding from the descriptive statistics presented above, that a difference could exists 
between pro-/sceptic EU members in the area of Economic & Financial Affairs, does not 
hold in the more rigorous analysis presented here.
As explained, the groupings in the descriptive statistics may have disguised a 
certain degree of bias as the governments were then compared without taking into 
account the fact that some of them were not in government at the same time. Also, some 
governments were only in office for rather short periods during the years 1999-2004, 
whereas others were in government throughout the whole period. The regression results 
do not include such a possible bias since the analysis is here the effect of the independent
81 The factor change is calculated by taking the e of the coefficient.
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variables on each governments’ frequency of opposing the majority rather than merely a 
comparison between the governments’ frequencies. In short, although a difference in the 
voting behaviour between the pro- and sceptic- EU governments was apparent in the 
descriptive statistics, the regression results in Table 6.4 captures the effects more 
correctly; here it is clear that the distinction between governments based on their attitudes 
towards the EU is not of significance for the voting behaviour.
Voting power is similarly to the results in the previous chapters also highly 
significant throughout the policy areas, whereas neither a division between North, Central 
and South Europe (‘Geo’), contributors or receivers (‘Budget’), national political systems 
(‘NatSys’), nor a difference between party positions and government positions (‘Party 
Position’) prove to have any effect. However, an effect can be found from whether or not 
a country is holding the Presidency and also from the governments’ positions in the 
corresponding policy areas in national politics (the ‘National Policy’ variable). In other 
words, a government’s position in social policies at the national level is highly correlated 
to its voting behaviour in the EU policy area Social Affairs. Similar patterns are also 
confirmed in each of the other policy fields and could be read as an indication that the 
political dynamics increasingly resemble those observed in the domestic political sphere.
Lastly, the table shows that there is an effect of the decision rule only in some of 
the policy areas. In the categories All, Agriculture & Fisheries, Social Affairs, Transport 
and Other it matters for the frequency of oppositions whether the decision rule is QMV 
or unanimity. In these areas QMV results in a higher proportion of legislation being 
adopted with recorded disagreement than unanimity. However, in the areas of 
Environment, Economic & Financial Affairs and Justice & Home Affairs this effect does 
not appear as significant. Interestingly, the decision rule hence does not seem to have an 
influence on the governments’ decision to oppose the majority in all policy areas .
Unfortunately, Table 6.4 does not allow for interpretations regarding the 
magnitude of the effect of the results. Nor is it possible to compare the results from 
variables across the different data sets. Hence, in order to make such comparisons and 
further comment on the effect of the different variables, Table 6.5 presents the odds ratios 
for the variables for each policy area.
82 This finding may appear partly due to the inclusion o f formal statements. A comparison of the 
findings presented here with results from an analysis without the formal statements will be further 
investigated in a planned forthcoming paper.
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Table 6.5: Odds ratios for opposing the majority across policy areas
Variable All
Areas
Agri & 
Fisheries
Soc.
Affairs
Env Econ. & 
Fin. Affairs
JHA Transport Other
Left/Right 1.481 0.917 1.493 1.619 0.905 0.971 1.652 1.477
EU - - - - - - - -
Left/Right x 
EU 1.394 1.126 1.428 1.456 1.581 1.423 1.484 1.399
Power 1.443 1.399 1.326 1.151 1.322 1.396 1.221 1.602
Presidency 0.601 0.493 0.804 0.698 0.473 0.641 0.791 0.835
National 1.591 1.278 1.622 1.328 1.190 1.247
Policy
Rule 1.316 1.298 1.304 - - - 1.398 1.442
Only the variables which were significant in the regression variable have been included 
in Table 6.5, and the results are presented as a variance around 1, such that anything 
above 1 is positive and anything below is negative. In other words, the result 1.481 from 
the Left/Right variable in the category ‘All Areas’ means that a one unit increase in the 
Left/Right variable results in a 48% increase in the likelihood of opposing the majority. 
Conversely, the finding that the Presidency variable shows a score o f0.493 in the area of 
Agriculture & Fisheries means that the likelihood of opposing the majority in this field 
decreases by 51% when a government holds the Presidency.
The findings regarding the significance of the Left/Right variable from the 
regression analysis is elaborated further in this table by the finding that the effect of party 
political affiliation is extremely strong in the areas of Environment and Transport. Yet, 
also the categories All Areas, Social Affairs and the remaining policy areas pooled into 
the category Other show strong increases in the effect of a governments positions on the 
left/right political scale. For each of these policy areas a one unit change in the position 
towards the right extreme of the policy spectrum means an increase of between 48% and 
65% in the likelihood of opposing the majority. So the effect of this variable is clearly of 
great influence in these cases. Conversely, the effect of policy location in the fields of 
Agriculture & Fisheries, Economic & Financial Affairs as well as Justice & Home 
Affairs is not nearly as strong. Here, a right-ward move of one unit along the political 
axis means a decrease in the likelihood of opposing the majority by 8%, 10% and 3%, 
respectively. Hence, the effect of the variable is in those cases much less than in the other 
policy areas, although also highly significant in the regression results.
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The magnitude of the effect of the voting power variable also varies across the different 
policy areas. Here, the highest scores are in the categories Other, Justice & Home Affairs 
and Agriculture & Fisheries. The lowest recorded effects are in Transport and 
Environment.
The effect of the Presidency variable is beyond doubt in all of the policy areas, 
however, particularly the areas of Agriculture& Fisheries and Economic & Financial 
Affairs are in Table 6.5 shown to include a great effect of this role. Governments holding 
the Presidency in either of these policy areas experience a decrease of more than 50% in 
their likelihood of opposing the majority.
The variable measuring the governments’ positions in the respective policy fields 
at the national level vary a lot in the magnitude of the effect. Whereas Justice & Home 
Affairs ‘only’ sees an increase of 19% per one unit in the scale from the national 
positions, Agriculture & Fisheries and Environment increases by around 60%. Though, 
as mentioned above, it is clear from the table as well as from the regression results in 
Table 6.4 that the positions in national politics certainly have some explanatory power 
also for decision-making in the Council.
Whether a policy proposal falls under QMV or unanimity only matters for a 
government’s decision to oppose the majority in the areas of All, Agriculture & 
Fisheries, Social Affairs, Transport and the pooled group of the remaining policy areas, 
Other. As was found in the regression results, the decision rule is not of significance in 
either Environment, Economic & Financial Affairs nor Justice & Home Affairs. 
However, the effect of the variable in the first mentioned categories is quite consistent 
across the policy areas, and shows an effect of between 30% and 40% in the increase of 
the likelihood of oppositions when the decision rule is QMV rather than unanimity.
6.5 Summary
3 remarkable findings appeared in this chapter: First, although the level of disagreement 
varies considerably across policy areas, it is still the governments’ position on the 
left/right political spectrum, the distribution of voting power and whether or not a 
government is holding the Presidency which explains the voting behaviour within each of 
the policy categories analysed. However, the effect of the left/right political positions is
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not consistent across all policy areas. In the areas of Agriculture & Fisheries, Economic 
& Financial Affairs and Justice & Home Affairs left-wing governments are more often 
found to oppose than right-wing governments, whereas the picture is opposite in all of 
the rest of the policy fields. Second, when including variables on the governments’ 
positions in the corresponding policy areas from the national political sphere, it is evident 
that these positions also have some explanatory power when the governments are acting 
at the EU level. Third, portfolio allocation at the EU level does not seem to alter agency 
drifts by individual council formations in terms of voting behaviour: The party 
composition in the respective sectoral councils does not produce a better explanation for 
voting behaviour than the composition of governments in the entire Council. In sum, 
governments can in this way therefore be argued to act rather unitarily across policy 
areas, however, this conclusion is here of course drawn without taking into account 
issues of agenda-setting or the actual policy content of the legislation adopted. Also, as 
the unity of the governments is here measured with regard to coherence of policy 
preferences rather than nation-based interests, this finding does not hold across 
government changes as well. As was shown in Chapter 4, a change in government means 
a change in policy positions.
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Conclusion
This thesis has argued that the representatives in the EU’s Council of Ministers behave 
much like members in a national legislature when voting on policy proposals. 
Governments represented in the Council are political parties with explicit preferences 
over the content and degree of regulation as well as the extent of direct or in-direct 
redistribution of goods in the population. Once an acceptable level of cooperation within 
a policy field has been agreed in the European Council or in the Council’s preparatory 
bodies, decision-making within the Council itself becomes a party political matter. 
Hence, this thesis has argued that the Council members’ preferences fall within the 
traditional left/right political dimension, rather than the commonly argued pro-/sceptic 
EU dimension.
Party political assumptions have been applied to the Council context also by other 
researchers (e.g. Franchino and Rahming 2003; Hix and Lord 1997; Hooghe and Marks 
1999; Mattila 2004). However, contrary to previous accounts, this thesis has suggested 
that the governments are rational actors who behave strategically rather than sincerely 
within the left/right policy space. The argument is that, although left-wing and right-wing 
governments are expected to form coalitions as predicted by standard spatial theory, 
voting behaviour in the Council cannot be interpreted in the strict form where actors who 
have opposing preferences to a proposal will vote ‘No’, and actors who favour the 
proposal will vote ‘Yes’. Opposition to the majority is simply too costly an act, as 
members in this case are generally excluded from participating in negotiations on the 
policy issue in question. Therefore, only members who find themselves in strong 
disagreement with a proposal, and who find it necessary to signal this disagreement to 
internal or external actors, will oppose the majority. Calculations of when disagreement 
should be voiced are in this thesis summarised to be a combination of two factors, 
namely 1) the distance between a Council member’s ideal policy position and the status 
quo, and 2) the member’s relative voting power. In empirical terms this means that, first, 
the further away a government is located along the policy spectrum from where the 
majority of governments are situated, the more likely it is to voice disagreement. Second, 
for these governments in the minority, larger member states will be more inclined to 
oppose the majority through formal voting than smaller member states. In political
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science terms, the combination of the hypotheses of left/right dynamics and the 
consequences of the actors’ strategic calculations over the distribution of voting power 
can hence be summarised as a theory of ‘weighted preference-connected coalitions’. 
Small/large left-wing governments vote differently to small/large right-wing 
governments, and when the majority of governments is from one side of the spectrum, 
then the largest of the member states from the opposing side will be the ones most likely 
to actively disagree.
Summary of the empirical findings
Existing quantitative studies have already identified left/right political trends in Council 
decision-making (e.g. Franchino and Rahming 2003; Lane and Mattila 2001; Mattila 
2004). However, no conclusion has so far been reached with regard to whether the 
left/right political findings should be interpreted as one variable out of several which can 
explain the governments’ behaviour (Mattila 2006), or if left/right politics is in fact a 
dominant policy dimension. The distribution of preferences in the policy space has 
consequences for the predictability of possible coalition formations, pivotal member(s) 
and, as a result, the location of new legislation. Therefore, since the content of the policy 
space is of great importance for the further empirical analyses of the Council members’ 
voting behaviour, this fundamental issue was addressed in the first of the empirical 
chapters, Chapter 4.
The evidence supports the theory: When comparing the results produced by the 
geometrical scaling method technique Optimal Classification (OC) with exogenous 
measures of the governments’ positions on a range of policy areas, it becomes apparent 
that the observed pattern on the first dimension is the amalgamated left/right political 
dimension. Left-wing governments are generally located on the left-hand side of the 
spatial ‘maps’ produced by OC, and right-wing governments are located towards the 
right. Additionally, the right-ward change in many of the European national governments 
during the 1999-2004 period is also reflected in the OC results: for example, the social 
democratic governments of Denmark, Austria and Finland voted together with other 
centre-left wing governments in the first period of the 1999-2004 years, whereas the 
government changes to centre-right governments in all of these countries led to voting
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behaviour which was more in line with how votes were cast by other centre-right 
governments. Hence, apart from the relative location of the governments vis-a-vis each 
other, the apparent changes in voting behaviour indicate that voting behaviour in the 
Council is indeed of a party political nature. No evidence can be found for other similarly 
distinct theories, and, to be specific, patterns in support of apro-/sceptic EU dimension or 
North/South division do not appear from the findings. A robustness check of the findings 
was conducted by comparing the OC results with results from repeating the analysis with 
another popular scaling method, NOMINATE, and a Baysian MCMC model.
The second empirical test was carried out in Chapter 5 and explored changes in 
voting behaviour across the legislative stages in the policy process. Hypotheses 2,3, and 
4 state that there is a difference between left- and right-wing governments’ likelihood of 
opposing the majority, and within the left/right division also between large and small 
governments. These hypotheses were tested on votes cast at the final adoption stage, and 
votes cast at reading prior to the final vote, respectively.
The findings in Chapter 5 support the hypotheses, yet, also provide additional 
information about the voting behaviour across the legislative stages. First, the results 
make it clear that the same variables have an effect on a government’s likelihood of 
opposing the majority at all voting stages. A government’s location on the left/right 
political scale, its voting power and whether or not it is holding the Presidency all 
influence the frequency with which the governments oppose the majority. Leaving the 
Presidency variable momentarily aside, the results showed that, during the period under 
investigation, the more a government moved towards the extreme right, the more it was 
inclined to oppose the majority. Conversely, the more a government moved towards the 
left, the less it was likely to do so. Furthermore, the distribution of voting power had a 
strong influence such that governments with more voting power would oppose more 
frequently than governments with less voting power. Combined with the policy location 
it then became evident that large right-wing governments were generally the ones most 
likely to voice disagreement in 1999-2004, a period where left-wing governments 
dominated the Council. However, the magnitude of these effects was found to differ 
considerably across the legislative stages: Whereas the last voting stage saw a very strong 
division between the large and small governments, this difference was not as profound at 
stages prior to the final adoption. Particularly the difference between small and large
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right-wing governments was found to decrease at the earlier readings. In sum, the 
variance across the legislative stages seems to indicate that Council members take into 
account whether a vote is at an early reading or the final adoption of legislation. 
Particularly governments with a smaller share of voting power change their behaviour 
considerably across the different legislative stages, though, the left/right dynamics are 
still dominant in either scenario.
Chapter 6 included the third empirical analysis and investigated possible changes 
in voting behaviour across policy areas. The hypotheses tested in this chapter are 
replications of the ones investigated in Chapter 5 regarding the differences in voting 
behaviour between small/large left- and small/large right-wing governments. However, 
here the sub-hypotheses accommodated expectations to how these differences may be 
apparent across the different policy areas.
The findings in Chapter 6 were that there is a great variance in both the adoption 
rate and the level of contest across the policy areas in absolute figures as well as relative 
to how much legislation is adopted in the respective areas. As in Chapter 5, whether a 
government decides to oppose the majority in each of the policy areas is highly correlated 
with the position on the general left-right policy dimension, its voting power and whether 
or not it holds the Presidency. However, in this chapter the left/right variable is found to 
vary across the areas, not just in magnitude but also in direction: Right-wing 
governments are generally found more inclined to oppose the majority than left-wing 
governments, though, in the important areas of Agriculture & Fisheries, Economic & 
Financial Affairs and Justice & Home Affairs the variable comes out as negative, 
meaning that the further to the left a government is located on the left/right political axis, 
the more it is inclined to oppose. The magnitude of these findings are strongest for policy 
fields were the right-wing governments are more frequently in opposition, although the 
results are significant beyond the .001 level in all areas. In addition, attitude towards EU 
integration is not found to explain voting behaviour in any of the policy fields, yet, the 
position of the governments on policy-related areas from national politics is found to 
have a significant impact. Lastly, the analyses of the different policy areas show a 
difference between legislation adopted by unanimity and QMV. In the categories ‘All 
Policy Areas’, ‘Agriculture & Fisheries’, ‘Social Affairs’, ‘Transport’ and the pooled 
category of ‘Others’ it is more likely that legislation will include recorded opposition
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when the decision rule is QMV than when it is unanimity. However, in the areas of 
‘Environment’, ‘Economic & Financial Affairs’ and ‘Justice & Home Affairs’ this 
distinction does not appear; the difference between QMV and unanimity cannot explain 
the frequency with which the governments voice disagreement in those areas.
In addition to the empirical tests of each of the hypotheses derived from the 
theory, another important intention behind this thesis has been to provide empirical 
evidence which may help to generally advance the current knowledge of Council 
decision-making. Hence, descriptive statistics have been presented in each of the 
empirical chapters, and Chapter 1 pointed out three key findings from the data set which 
are in contrast to existing accounts of the use of rules and procedures in the Council. 
First, it was shown that if analyses of voting behaviour are not restricted to final stage 
voting outcomes, but also include stages prior to the final adoption, then the degree of 
recorded disagreement increases considerably. Inclusion of formal statements following 
the adoption of a decision provide an additional source of information and can, if 
included in analyses of formal decision documents, further elevate the recorded level of 
conflict. Second, the findings presented in this thesis regarding the use of ‘A’ and ‘B’ 
points do not correspond very well with the current literature’s description of the 
Council’s use of formal rules for adopting legislation. ‘A’ points are commonly described 
to be nodded through at the ministerial level without much discussion, whereas ‘B’ points 
are controversial policy proposals that frequently result in ‘contested’ decisions (e.g. 
Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006:183). In contrast, the results from the data used in this 
thesis show that ‘B’ agenda points in many cases do not appear more controversial than 
‘A’ points in terms of recorded disagreement. Neither do they seem to be used to the 
extent that would be expected from the current literature’s focus on the issue. When 
asked about this contradiction, several Council practitioners have instead explained that 
another use of the distinction between the ‘A’ and ‘B’ agenda points is in place: the 
distinction is increasingly a political signalling tool rather than merely an institutional 
measure to ensure more efficient negotiations. The third of the findings regarding the 
rules and procedures was that the changes in the legislative procedures after the 
Amsterdam Treaty seem to require some attention with regard to the effect for the 
internal decision-making in the Council. As the data showed that a considerable amount 
of legislation is adopted already at the Council’s 1st reading, it seems necessary to
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investigate whether a consequence hereof is also an increase in explicit voting and use of 
formal statements in the long term in order to ensure quicker adoptions. Such trends have 
not been detected in this thesis’ data, however, practitioners and qualitative studies have 
suggested that it may be on the increase in the post-enlargement era (Mammonas 2005; 
Lemmp 2006).
In sum, the evidence supports the theory presented in this thesis that party politics 
dominate governments’ voting behaviour in the Council. However, it should be stressed 
once again that this does not indicate that policy outcomes from the Council may not also 
be settled according to the member states’ preferences over the level of integration and 
according to their general attitude towards the EU. Yet, any such factors cannot be 
expected to be apparent in the voting behaviour and have not been possible to trace in 
any of the empirical analyses in this thesis. A logical explanation for this may be that the 
European Council as well as the extensive preparatory negotiations prior to the Council’s 
meetings leave only an insignificant proportion of the legislation debated and adopted in 
the Council to be a matter of integration or nation-based interests. The largest proportion 
of policies is over the degree of regulation or technical specifications within already 
existing EU policy areas. Hence, voting behaviour on these issues does not reflect nation- 
based preferences as such. Although national preferences may play a role in the 
definition of the larger strategic decision-making on EU cooperation, this thesis has 
shown that EU legislation is certainly dependent also on which political parties are in 
government; voting behaviour within the EU’s most important legislative institution is 
influenced by party affiliations, and members of the Council cannot be studied merely as 
national representatives.
Comparison of empirical findings with existing research
Chapter 3 explained how each of the hypotheses deducted from the theory would be 
tested in each of the empirical chapters. However, as has been made clear throughout the 
thesis, several other propositions have been presented in the literature. Hence, in order to 
also evaluate the support for some of the alternative explanations, Table 7.1 below 
summarises the findings from the empirical analyses and compare them with the
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predictions from the theoretical argument presented in this thesis as well as the 
alternative explanations from the literature.
The table shows that some of the predictions from the existing literature are 
supported, while others are questioned. The ones that are supported are the current 
studies’ arguments and findings that 1) there is an effect of the governments’ party 
political affiliation on their voting behaviour in the Council, 2) an interaction effect 
between governments’ left/right political preferences and their general attitude towards 
the EU can be detected in their voting behaviour in the Council (or, in other words, that 
right-wing EU sceptical governments vote differently to left-wing EU-sceptical 
governments), 3) there is a difference in behaviour between small and large Council 
members, and 4) holding the Presidency has an effect on a government’s frequency of 
opposing the majority.
On the other hand, the assumptions from the literature which are not supported 
are 1) that governments’ attitude towards EU integration has an effect on its legislative 
behaviour, 2) that geographical location may affect decisions to oppose legislation, 3) 
that individual ministers’ behave differently in voting situations than their entire 
government would , 4) that duration of a government’s EU membership has an effect on 
support or opposition to the majority, and 5) that it is of no importance whether 
legislation is adopted by unanimity or QMV, since most decisions are recorded as having 
been passed by a unanimous Council.
The mixed support for the arguments from the existing literature should be further 
clarified by noting that research on Council decision-making does not - as of yet - share a 
common analytical framework. Hence, as was also described in Chapter 1, Table 7.1’s 
summary of the predictions from the current literature is also a summary of several 
different theoretical views on how best to capture legislative dynamics within the 
Council. While the evidence on this basis shows partial support for the existing literature, 
it provides strong support for the behavioural predictions derived from this thesis’ theory. 
Each of the key predictions were substantially and significantly supported, with the only 
exception was that the left/right variable changed direction in three of the policy areas
83 As discussed in Chapter 6, this finding does on the other hand not show if the content of the policies 
is biased due to the preferences o f the sectoral ministers.
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analysed in Chapter 6 . The last section of this thesis discusses the implications of the 
findings for the study of political bargaining in the EU’s bicameral structure.
Table 7.1: Comparison of predictions and findings
Variables Existingliterature
Chapter 4: 
Dimensionality
Chapter 5: Across 
legislative stages
Chapter 6: Across 
policy areas
Left/Right Positive Positive Positive Positive/Negative
Attitude to EU Positive No effect No effect No effect
Left/Right x 
attitude to EU Positive Positive Positive Positive/Negative
Voting Power Positive Positive Positive Positive
Geo Positive No effect No effect No effect
Budget Positive No effect No effect No effect
PartyDifference Positive Not included Not included No effect
Member Positive No effect No effect No effect
Presidency Negative Not included Negative Negative
National Party 
System Not considered No effect No effect No effect
National Policy Not considered Not included Not included Positive
Rule No effect Not included Not included Positive (some areas)
Workload No effect No effect No effect No effect
Nationalism Positive No effect No effect No effect
Immigration Not considered No effect No effect No effect
EU Enlargement Positive No effect No effect No effect
EU
Strengthening Negative No effect No effect No effect
EU Peacekeeping Ambiguous No effect No effect No effect
EU
Accountability Ambiguous No effect No effect No effect
EU Authority Negative No effect No effect No effect
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Implications of the theory for bicameral politics in the EU
Legislative behaviour in one chamber in a bicameral system is known to be influenced by 
the collective decisions made in the other chamber (Buchanan and Tullock 1962). 
Following the theory and findings summarised above, and considering the existing 
knowledge about voting behaviour in the Parliament, both of the two legislative 
chambers in the EU consist of representatives from the same political parties and form 
coalitions around similar policy dimensions (cf. Hix 1999, 2001, and Hix et al. 
forthcoming 2006; Mattila 2004). Therefore, it is likely that the theory and findings from 
this thesis will have implications not only for the study of the Council on its own, but 
also for the EU as a bicameral political system. Since the political parties represented in 
both institutions are rational self-interested actors, it can be assumed that these parties 
will seek to exploit the possibility for manipulating policy outcomes towards their own 
policy preferences also across the institutional divide. In fact, a recent study based on 
both the data set used in this thesis and a data set consisting of MEPs’ voting behaviour 
in the same time period (Hoyland 2005), finds that voting behaviour in the Council 
influences the likelihood of MEPs’ support of amendments in the Co-decision procedure 
(Hoyland and Hagemann 2006). The finding is that the governing parties can speculate in 
the likely policy outcomes from not only the negotiations in the Council, but also the 
Parliament’s likelihood of successfully amending the Council’s common position. The 
evidence in the study shows that when disagreement is recorded in the Council, 
governing parties who are located towards the other end of the policy space than the 
majority will be much less likely to support amendments in the Parliament than when no 
disagreement is recorded. Governments in the majority will support amendments more. 
The explanation could be that the high decision threshold in the Council does not allow 
for a policy change that is satisfying to the majority of the governing parties. These 
parties can therefore push for a further policy change in the Parliament. Parties in the 
minority will oppose such amendments. Figure 7.1 and 7.2 below show how the policy 
dimensions in the Parliament and the Council overlap in the Co-decision procedure by 
presenting ideal point estimates produced by MCMC for the two institutions. Figure 7.3 
furthermore shows the mean level of support for second reading amendments by party 
group in the EP. It should be reminded that in 1999-2004 the majority of governing
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parties in the EU consisted of left-wing governments. All of the results are from Co­
decision votes only, and can be found in the more rigorous analysis in Hoyland and 
Hagemann (2006)84. Though, as a general conclusion, the implications of this thesis for 
the study of bicameral politics in the EU is that, when considering the Council actors as 
political parties rather than national representatives, both intra- as well as inter- 
institutional power dynamics become quite different to what is traditionally reflected in 
the literature. It will be interesting to further explore these highly interconnected research 
agendas for Council decision-making and EU bicameral politics suggested by the 
findings.
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84 B jom  Hoyland has done the rigorous analysis o f  the voting in the Parliament in the C o-decision  
procedure in Hoyland and Hagemann (2006). It is with his consent that the results are presented here.
Figure 7.1: Council members’ revealed policy positions, 
Co-decision votes 1999-2004
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Figure 7.2: Party groups’ revealed policy positions in the Parliament, 
Co-decision amendments 1999-2004
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Appendix A
A Method for Calculating the Council members’ Voting 
power: The Normalised Banzhaf Index
This appendix provides the definition for the normalised Banzhaf Index referred to in 
Chapter 1.
A voting body has N members with voting weights w]9w2,...,wn and a decision rule in
terms of a threshold. A particular combination of votes is referred to as a division and the 
Banzhaf (1965) index is essentially concerned with counting the number of swings, that 
is, the voting outcomes that can be changed from losing to winning by members 
changing how they cast their weighted vote. A swing for member i is a coalition 
represented by a subset of members of the assembly: S n N  z> St ,i <£ S ,, such that
£  W j < q and £  r ,  + W i 'z q
j e S ,  j e S ,
A swing is then a coalition where the total votes cast in favour of a particular decision fall 
short of the threshold without those of member z, but equals or exceeds it when member i 
joins. The number of swings for i is 77, and the total number of swings is rj = ^ 77, .  The
i eN
total number of divisions (that is, the number of subsets of N) is 2 ” . The relative Banzhaf 
index for member i is on this background the member’s relative number of swings, 
denoted 73,:
p,=ihiv=t),iYsij 1= 1, 2,
i eN
It is worth noting here, that the relative Banzhaf index is in fact the normalised version of 
the Penrose (1946) measure, which is, as mentioned in Chapter 1, an absolute measure of 
each member’s voting power and is denoted n  = 7ji ! 2”' 1 . Inherent in the relative Banzhaf
index is that the sum will always come to 1 and the individual scores therefore indicate 
the share of member i in the combined capacity of all members to influence decisions.
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Appendix B 
List of interviews
The list of interviews is only available for the supervisor, co-supervisor and the 
examiners of this thesis. Please contact me on s.hagemann@lse.ac.uk with questions 
regarding the interviews.
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Appendix C
Comparisons between the governments’ ideal 
point estimates (OC estimates) and exogenous 
measures of the governments’ characteristics
The first 5 figures in this appendix show the comparisons of the various exogenous 
measures from Chapter 4 with the governments’ ideal point estimates in the first 
dimension. The following 6 figures are the correlations between the exogenous measures 
with the OC estimates from the second dimension. Please refer to Section 3.3 in Chapter 
3 for a description of the exogenous measures and to Chapter 4 for an explanation of the 
OC results.
Figure 1: Scatterplot of the governments’ attitude towards 
the EU and the OC estimates from the first dimension
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Figure 2: Scatterplot of the governments’ voting power
and the OC estimates from the first dimension
♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
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Figure 3: Scatterplot of the governments’ geographical location 
and the OC estimates from the first dimension
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Figure 4: Scatterplot of the governments’ status as either a 
contributor or receiver from the EU budget and 
the OC estimates from the first dimension
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Figure 5: Comparison of (o!d’ and ‘new’ governments and 
the OC estimates from the first dimension
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Figure 6: Comparison of the governments’ political system*
and the OC estimates from the first dimension
♦ ♦♦ ♦
OCDiml
* Political system refers to whether the government is from 
an adversarial or non-adversarial political system.
Please refer to Chapter 3 for details.
Figure 7: Scatterplot of the governments’ voting power 
and the OC estimates from the second dimension
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Figure 8: Scatterplot of the governments’ geographical location
and the OC estimates from the second dimension
♦  ♦
OCDim2
Figure 9: Scatterplot of the governments’ status as either 
a contributor or receiver from the EU budget and 
the OC estimates from the second dimension
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Figure 10: Comparison of ‘old’ and ‘new’ governments and the OC
estimates from the second dimension
Member
NatSys
♦ ♦
♦ ♦
♦ ♦  ♦
OCDim2
Figure 11: Comparison of the governments’ political system* 
and the OC estimates from the second dimension
♦ ♦ ♦  ♦
OCDim2
* Political system refers to whether the government is from 
an adversarial or non-adversarial political system.
Please refer to Chapter 3 for details.
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Appendix D
MCMC ideal point estimates for the governments 
represented in the Council
Dimension 1 2.5% 25% 50% 75% 97 .5%
theta.germany 0.097415 0.35164 0.49207 0.64087 0.968572
theta.francel -1.707220 -1.03150 -0.72605 -0.39752 1.665415
theta.france2 -0.630418 -0.29491 -0.13154 0 . 02606 0 .321619
theta.uk 0.734132 1.13289 1.39690 1.69841 2 .427098
theta.italyl -0.496934 0.14932 0.53719 0.99929 2.015276
theta.italy2 -1.196335 -0.82123 -0.65380 -0.49911 -0.224157
theta.spain 0.042911 0.23544 0.37185 0.51686 0.821563
theta.netherlandsll.418184 -0.94538 -0 .73887 -0.55053 -0.187201
theta.netherlands2-0.663637 -0.29103 -0.11800 0.04715 0 . 377088
theta.greece -0.588123 -0.30702 -0.18384 -0.08821 -0 . 008941
theta.belgiuml -1.096658 -0.70495 -0.52190 -0 . 34845 0.006346
theta.belgium2 -1.088629 -0.06159 0 .44729 0.99601 2.147366
theta.portugall -1.741441 -1.09285 -0.83534 -0.62188 -0.232193
theta.portugal2 -1.037224 -0.38345 0.09010 0.94373 2.178517
theta.sweden -0.346553 -0.07349 0 . 06372 0.21040 0.489223
theta.austrial -0.899237 -0.02317 0.46997 0 . 98378 2.116622
theta.austria2 -0.513959 -0.21560 -0.07052 0.07503 0.353785
theta.denmarkl -0.726082 -0.21277 0.07802 0.44154 1.446869
theta.denmark2 -0.817434 -0.43009 -0.23843 -0.04467 0.295683
theta.finlandl -0.455727 -0.06826 0.13371 0.33953 0.771728
theta.finland2 -0.672200 -0.29077 -0.11840 0.05130 0.372761
theta.ireland -0.334710 -0.05756 0.08323 0.23097 0.504337
theta.luxembourgl -1.142217 -0.05202 0.45328 1.01529 2.169595
theta.luxembourg2 -0.691082 -0.36931 -0.20337 -0.04559 0.250592
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"It is unacceptable that the EU’s most important law-making body 
still meets behind closed doors when acting as a legislator. It is 
necessary for the public to gain insight into its functioning and 
politics. The Council should respond to calls for greater 
transparency coming from Parliament, civil society and the general 
public."
MEP quoted in Euractive.com article “MEPs urge EU Council to prop up 
transparency”, 27th o f February 2006.
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